C. BENTINCK

') Il restera trois jours à Deventer pour prendre part aux délibérations des Etats d'Overysel.

1748. Nov.] 190 —

LETTRE X€IX

Newcastle à Hardwicke. Principes du système politique *).

Hanover, Nov^ j= 1748.

My dear Lord.

As I hope very soon to hâve the pleasure of seeing your Lordship and the rest of my friends in England in perfect good health and humour; and as H. R. H. the Duke ^) has appointed to meet me at Grave in my way to the Hague, for which place I shall set out on Monday next, I thought it might not be improper to give your Lordship some short idea of my thoughts as to our future conduct in foreign affairs, according to which I shall probably, as I find occasion, talk both to the Duke and the Prince of Orange and his ministers at the Hague; and I chuse rather to send my letter to your Lordship than directly to my brother, that, if y ou should approve any part of it, it may hâve the additional advantage of your représentation.

I shall begin by assùring you, that no man living is further than I am from any thought of breaking the présent peace, so happily reestablished , or of taking any measures, that may give cause or room for it; on the contrary, my whole plan is built upon this définitive treaty and the best and only means

') Cf. Béer Aufzeichnungen des Grafen William Beniinck etc. p. LXXV, et Michael dans les Forschungen zur Brand. u. Prensz. Gesch. I 592 svv. Apparemment cette lettre est le résultat des conférences à Hanovre; elle contient le programme de la politique de Newcastle; c'est pourquoi une copie fut envoyée à W. Bentinck.

2) Cumberland.

— 191 [1748. Nov.

of preserving it, which I think no body can answer for, if that is to dépend purely upon the will of France and Prussia. I put those two powers together, not that I would do anything, either jointly or separately, to provoke one or the other, but from my appréhension, that their interests are so unavoidably connected, that, when either of those two powers shall think proper to disturb the présent tranquillity , the other will sooner or later follow; and therefore I would propose, that such measures should be taken, that neither of them may be tempted wantonly to do it. And that, I humbly think, can no way be so effectually done as by collecting and Connecting (as I mentioned in my letter to the Duke of Bedford, to which I hâve not had any answer) our allies upon the continent, and keeping at ail events the fleet in such a condition as to be able to maintain our superiority at sea. For if our old allies, with the addition of such as can be got, can be supported on the continent, and France sees that, whenever she breaks with England, she runs the same risk for her commerce and marine, which she has so severely felt this war, neither France nor Prussia will be encouraged to attempt to break the peace. I would not be understood by supporting our allies on the continent to mean, that the king should be at any expence, at least only a mère trifle, by granting subsidies for that purpose. The great point is that our allies, and principally the States of HoUand and the Queen of Hungary, should see, that the king is fully determined to préserve and maintain the old alliance and System ; and for that purpose , that able and active ministers should be sent immediately to the great courts; that it should be laid down as the first principle , that the présent peace should be preserved upon the foot of the définitive treaty, but that that should

1748 Nov.] 192

not dépend singly upon the pacifick disposition of France, which may alter upon the least change in their interior administration , or upon any prospect they may hâve of procuring more advantageous conditions for themselves or their allies. The first step to be taken is, to settle a most perfect concert and union of measures and interest with the Prince of Orange; to see what means there are, or how they arelikely to be executed, of putting the Republick of Holland in any tolerable condition of being useful to itself or its allies. The next is, jointly with the Dutch, to remove ail jealousies and misunderstandings, that hâve been maliciously raised at the Court of Vienna; the most effectuai way of doing which would be the getting rid of M^ Bartenstein, who is known to hâve been the author of ail the extravagant und ill-judged conduct, that has been held by them, and who is not thought a friend to the présent alliance. But this may be difficult to bring about, and therefore ail other methods should be tried, that may correct and remove the just complaints His Majesty has of the late behaviour of the Court of Vienna. It is possible this may be brought about by the Court of Rûssia, which has been applied to by the Empress Queen, and which is now, in conséquence of that application, actually employing her good offices with the Maritime Powers for that purpose; and the making use of this channel will hâve this other effect of uniting more closely the Empress of Russia with the Maritime Powers and the House of Austria. When there is once an appearance of a perfect union and harmony between thèse four considérable powers, there is no doubt but many Princes of the Empire, who hâve already given some marks of their good disposition, would then openly déclare themselves and take part with His Majesty and His allies for the

193 — [1748. Nov.

préservation of the piiblick peace ; and by that means the Empire, which used to be the greatest terror to France but in the late war was a dead weight to the last and at first greatly abetted the views of France, may corne to take such part with the Maritime Powers, as would make a most solid and permanent System for Europe. The House of Saxony (which is very considérable in the Empire and, by its présent connection by Poland with Russia, might be of infinité service in conjunction with the other Powers) would probably, when they see a disposition, be induced to take a thorough part with the Maritime Powers and the House of Austria. Whether and when it may be proper to set on foot particular négociations for the renewal of alliances or forming a System of this kind, must dépend upon the future complexion of things. It will be sufficient at présent, that it should be known, what the views of His Majesty and the Prince of Orange are. If, in the further progress, a défensive alliance should be thought proper, certain numbers of troops might be agreed to be constantly kept up in time of peace by the Powets on the continent, and His Majesty's part should consist singly in the support of the fleet, wherein the Powers on the continent are, to adegree, as much interested as Great Britain itself. The necessity of taking some such measures as thèse, and that soon, must occur to every body, who considers the late danger, that England and ail Europe were in of being swallowed up by the superiority of the arms of France and Prussia, from the want of concert and conduct amongst the allies, which such previous measures might prevent for the future.

Should nothing of this kind be done, I am apprehensive that we shall indulge ourselves in reproaching the Court of Vienna for their weakness, ingratitude