CHAPTER III JENA

1 Cependant. — The chapter opens at the beginning of October 1806. There had been fresh causes of hostility during the last eight months, and when, to crown ail, the truth about Hanover became known, there had been a great explosion of anger at Berlin, and Frederick William had decided for war. The moment was ill chosen. If Prussia had joined the Allies a year before, it is possible that Napoleon's campaign on the Danube might hâve been ruined. It was now too late. Russia, indeed, was willing to try again ; Great Britain at once sank her own causes of différence with Prussia ; but Austria neither could nor would lend a hand. Meanwhile the French army was perfectly ready, and admirably placed for an effective campaign.

i les différents corps de lu grande armée. — The numbers and commanders of the corps were the same as last year, only that Marmont, with the 2nd, was absent in Illyria. The expression se rapprochaient du Mein is hardly correct. For, with the exception of the Guard and Marmont's corps, the army since Austerlitz had been living at free quarters in the countries about the Main, while the Confédération of the Rhine was being organised.

2 venait d'arriver a Wurtzbourg. — Napoléon reached Wùrzburg on October 3. The cavalry and artillery of the Guard were still behind.

5 traversant la Saxe. — Partly with the idea that in assum-

ing the offensive they were following the teaching of Frederick

the Great, partly in order to control Saxony, the Prussians

had sacrificed the strong défensive line of the Elbe. Saxony

was not worth the risk ; and there can be no doubt that the

chat, m.] JEXA 167

prudent course would hâve been to hold the Elbe, and tben, if necessary, the Oder and tbe Yistula, with no pitched battle till the Russians had arrived. The Prussian forces were divided into a larger and a smaller army. The first gathered round Erfurt under the Duke of Brunswick ; the second was on the Upper Saal under the Prince of Hohenlohe. Brunswiek's communications lay along the Saal to the Elbe at Magdeburg ; Hohenlohe, who had a quasi-independent command, had corne from Dresden, and his communications lay that way. Most of the Prussian gênerais were old men, who had seen no service since the Seven Years' War ; the soldiers were driven serfs or bought foreigners ; the equipments and trains were to the last degree cumbersome and out of date. Divided counsels and slow movements marked the whole array, which was utterly unfit to cope with the experienced gênerais and tried soldiers of Napoléon.

32 vers les frontières de Saxe. — The French were pushing rapidly to the Upper Main, from which three mountain paths — Coburg to Saalfeld, Kronach to Schleitz, Baireuth to Hof — would take them across the Thuringian Forest to the Upper Saal. Lannes and Augereau were to form the left at Coburg, Bernadotte and Davout the centre at Kronach, Ney and Soult the right at Baireuth. The reserve cavalry was with the centre divisions.

39 qui possédait des notes. — What is related hère is comparatively innocent ; but some of Xapoleon's tricks to influence the soldiers were bad. Bourrienne says, that before reviewing a régiment the Emperor would set an aide de camp to learn ail about some old soldier chosen by the colonel, and then, finding the man by his number in the ranks, "il s'approchait de lui comme s'il l'eût reconnu, l'appelait par son nom, lui disait : ' Ah ! ah ! te voilà ; tu es un brave, je t'ai vu à Aboukir ; que fait ton vieux père? Ah ! tu n'as pas la croix ? tiens je te la donne.' " Bourrienne does well to characterise this as " un singulier charlatanisme."

58 Cette méthode. — Only the Guard received regular rations ; the rest lived mostly as freebooters : one is glad to hear that the System had serious drawbacks.

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68 Nous n'étions pins éloignes. — Only the Thuringian Forest now separateil the two armies, each of which was intending an attack on its enemy's communications ; but, while Napoléon knew his own mind, and had got nearly a week's start, the Prussians were ail at sea. The proper line for the Prussians to strike was unquestionably, as Brunswick maintained, the Erfurt-Eisenach-Fulda road. But Hohenlohe was not conforming to this. Hohenlohe was for crossing the hills on the left, instead of turning them on the right. This would hâve hrought the Prussians not on the flank, but on the front, of the French. Supposing it successful, the French would be driven back along their own line, instead of eut off from it. Each army could only effect its purpose by moving to its own right. It was for Napoléon to attack across the eastern end of the hills, so as to turn Brunswick's flank and eut him off from the Elhe.

81 mirait dû se placer. — But, with the French crossing over three passes, he would hâve been easily eut off if he had attempted to block one of them. This advance guard was not really strong enough to watch the hills, any more than to give battle at Saalfeld.

88 un ruisseau marécageux. — The Schwartza, a not uncommon name.

94 pour battre les Français. — There was far too much of this sort of arrogance among the Prussian officers, who were soon to learn that they were trading on a past and exhausted réputation.

141 Notes allâmes à Kahla. — Meantime the divisions of the centre — Bernadotte and Davout — were pushed forward, and became the right of the new line facing the Saal. The former right — Ney and Soult — would be the new centre. On the Prussian side, Hohenlohe had now been summoned across the river to take up a position from Jena to Weimar, under the impression that the main French force was coming down the left bank of the river. Hohenlohe was thus to cover Brunswick's retreat towards Naumburg, and follow as rearguard. The Prussians already found themselves in a false position, and could only hopetorecover the Elbe atMagdeburg.

" When two armies are manœuvring against each other's

CHAP. m.] JENA 169

flanks or communications, that army whose flank or communications are must immediately threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movement of its adversary." — Hamley.

156 le débouché. — The road at its top is called the 1 -Schnecke,' from a fancied resemblance to the convolutions of a snail-shell.

208 massés sur le Landgrafenberg. — Marbot's distribution of the corps is not quite correct. Launes and the Guard «-eut up by the Curate's Path, and spent the uight crowded on the top. In the early morning, whilst the fog was still heavy, one of Lannes's divisions, advancing on the plateau that slopes to the west, attacked and took the village of Cospoda on the left, the other that of Closewitz on the riarht. After this there was a pause, duriug which Soult's leading division appeared on the scène, having climbed up from a village callt-d Lobstadt Meantime Augereau was following the Muhlthal, and was near the Schnecke with one division, while the other had turned off by the right, and was climbing the plateau as best it could.

240 Le corps du maréchal Ncy. — With a portion of his corps Ney had hurried up the Landgrafenberg: by the Curate's Path during the pause, and, passing between Lannes and Augereau, immediately renewed the fight — rather to Napoleon's annoyance, who was meaning to wait till more divisions were up. It must be remembered that Napoléon supposed that the main Prussian army was before him, in which case Xey's precipitate action might hâve been serious.

241 la cavalerie de Murât. — The eavalry had been far down the right bank of the river, and had now galloped back.

244 le général Racket, — Rûchel, with a contingent of Westphalians, had been forming the right of the liue at Weiinar, nearly twelve miles away. By the time lie arrived, the rest of Hohenlohe's divisions were broken beyond remedy.

267 les remit à leur souverain. — The Elector, Frederick Augustus. wa< marie kin>r, and entered the Confédération of the llhine. After Tilsit he further received the Duchy of Warsaw.

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288 Le prince de Weimar. — The Duke of Weimar, with what had been the vanguard, had got left behind by the suddenness of the retreat.

302 un succès non moins grand. — In reality a much more striking success than Napoleon's own. Davout' s division, single-handed, had checked and defeated the main Prussian army.

305 elle fut double. — Other examples occurred on June 16, 1815, and on August 6, 1870.

314 le célèbre prince de Brunswick. — Brunswick is said to hâve accepted the command in the hope of preventing war. He had a poor opinion of the other commandera : " Ruchel is a tin trumpet, Mollendorf a dotard, Kalkreuth a cunning trickster. The gênerais of division are a set of stupid journeymen. Are thèse the people with whom one can make war on Napoléon ? No. The best service that I could render to the king would be to persuade him to keep the peace." — Miiffling, quoted by Fyffe.

315 se rendant de Weimar à Naumburg. — The Duke was not intending to cross the river at Naumburg — or rather at Kosen —but to destroy or guard the bridge, while his army, passing the Unstrut at Freiburg, continued to move down the left bank of the Saal.

332 Les troupes de Bernadotte et de Davout. — Napoléon had sent both thèse corps, and also Murat's cavalry, to Naumburg. Then, thinking that they would meet a broken enemy more effectively by taking separate positions, he sent two oi'ders : (1) To Murât, Oct. 13 : " Portez-vous le plus tôt possible avec le corps de Bernadotte à Dornbourg. " (2) To Davout, Oct. 13, evening : " Si le Prince de Ponte-Corvo (Bernadotte) était dans vos environs, vous pourriez marcher ensemble, mais l'Empereur espère qu'il aura déjà marché avec la cavalerie du Grand-duc de Berg (Murât) pour Dornbourg." — Lanfrey, iii.

337 connurent quelles forces. — Not at ail ; the fog was as thick hère as higlier up the river.

341 comptant pour rien les lauriers partagés. — This is hardly fair. Relations were constantly strained between

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Napoléon and Bernadotte, so that it was not unnatural for Bernadotte to act on the directions expressed in the above despatches.

347 il devait y rester. — Is this a fair interprétation of the second despatch? It was stupid, rather than criminal, of Bernadotte not to get into one or other of the battles going on so near him. On the first day of the battle of Leipzig Nev's corps was wasted ; so, too, d'Erlon's wandered ineffectivelv between the fields of Quatre Bras and Ligny.

364 près du village de Hassenhausen. — At Hassenhausen the road divides — the right to Kôsen and the bridge for Naumburg, the left to Freiburg and the Unstrut Davout had secured Kosen overnight. In the earlv morning he sent Gudin forward to Hassenhausen, where the real struggle took place. Each side got three divisions suceessively into the battle. Fortunately for the French, the remaiuing two on the Prussian side were not used, spite of Blùcher's urgent entreaties. It was Gudin's division that had been held back at the beginning of Austerlitz, and had then distiuguished itself. Half of it was destroyed at Hassenhausen. Friant"> division was directed to the French right of Hassenhausen. opposed to Wartensleben ; Morand's to the left, against Oranjre. Morand himself. like Friant, lived to command a division of the Guard at Waterloo ; Gudin fell in Russia.

379 espérant s'y rallier. — They intencled to advance again on the morrow. Now was seen the mistake of'not haviug used their last divisions at Hassenhausen. It would be hard to find a parallel for such utter disaster from a single day's fighting.

392 témoigna sa haute satisfaction. — But his bulletin to Paris was ungenerous, completely disguising his own miscalculation. None of the other marshals ever won such a battle as this.

402 il en fut quitte. — If the day had gone against the French, Bernadotte would hâve been the scapegoat ready to hand.

406 lui servit en quelque sorte. — Bernadotte's corps was fresh and could start at once. The pursuit of Blûcher, the

172 NOTES [chap. m.

one gallant figure amongst the craven fugitives, carried it to Liibeck, into which Blùcher had thrown himself, fighting desperately against hopeless odds. When the French took the town, they found a Swedish corps there. Bernadotte made himself civil to the ofncers, and gave them honourable terms. Afterwards, when casting ahout for an heir to the throne, the Swedes remembered this. It was the élévation of Bernadotte to the throne of Sweden, and the part he ultimately took on the side of the Allies, that make Napoleonic writers so prejudiced against him.

463 dans toutes les directions. — Military writers praise the extraordinary rapidity with which the French divisions were scattered in order to gather the fruit of victory to the utmost.

474 Les forteresses. — It was this capitulation of the fortresses, not merely on the Elbe, but also on the Oder and the Vistula, that most deeply disgraced the Prussians. The worst cases were Magdeburg and Kiïstrin. Danzig and the little Kolberg were honourable exceptions.

477 visita le tombeau du grand Frédéric. — And stole his sword and sash for the Invalides.

478 se rendit à Berlin. — The famous ' Berlin decree' establishing the Continental System was issued on November 21, and proved the most disastrous step for his own future that Napoléon had yet taken.

After the collapse of his ally, the Czar still determined to continue the war, and the scène changea to the country between the Lower Vistula and the Niémen. Hère, on February 8, 1807, Napoléon failed to overthrow the resolute and capable Benningsen during the snowstorms of the ghastly field of Eylau. But the victory at Friedland, on .Tune 14, was décisive. Alexander and Napoléon agreed to meet on the raft at Tilsit, and the one sovereign who had hitherto fought for the cause of Europe fell under the wand of the enchanter. The public clauses of the Peace of Tilsit arranged that the territory of Prussia west of the Elbe should be formed into the kingdom of Westphalia for Jérôme Bonaparte, and that Prussian Poland should become the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for the King of Saxony. Secret clauses added that Napoléon should help the Czar to get Fiuland and the

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Danubian provinces, wliile the Czar should assist in coerciug the ueutrals, Denmark and Portugal, into the league against Englaiid. Thus, after ail his protestations to Frederick William, the tzar had sacrificed Prussia to gain his owu ends, an .1 the tw o Emperors had formed a conspiracy more dangerous to libertv than anything Europe had hitherto seeu.

Araoug the New Year's honours Marbot was promoted Captain. At the battle of Eylau Augereau's corps was annihilated ; but Marbot, on his wonderful mare, braved a hundred deaths and lived to tell the taie.