CHAPTER VIII \V A G B A M
i me trouvant assez bien rétabli. — Marbot had brokeu dowii ami been iu hospital since the death of Latines. He had been promoted, and was now chef d'escadron and aide de camp to Masséna. Napoléon had offered to put him in the Guard, which would hâve been équivalent to an additional step in rank, but he had preferred to accept Masséna's offer.
69 avait fait élever de nombreux retranchements. — Charles had fortiried the two villages of Aspern and Essling, and had connected them by eutrenchments. He had done something, too, at Enzersdorf, but there was nothiiiir serions farther ou in the direction of Miihlleiten. The limits within which the passage nuist be attempted were clearly defined, and French military critics are of opinion that the river might hâve been held. This would not hâve decided the campaign, but would hâve prolonged it, and might possibly hâve affected the attitude of the North Germans. But Charles had resulved on a pitched battle on chosen ground. As a prélude to the battle he probably hoped to inflict a good deal of damage on the French before they were ail ac
As regards the French criticism above mentioned, General Hamley takes a différent view : " Whett the defender sees that the passage cannot be opposed, his usual course will be to take a position in the neighbourhood of the bridge ; and the aasailant, after passing^ cannot manœuvre to tum this position, for by so doing he would uncover the bridge, the sole link in that part of his liue of opération. He must therefore make a direct attack on the position, which will almost certainly be on commanding ground. After his repuise at Essling, Napoléon accumulated in the island of
186 NOTES [chap. vin.
Lobau sach ample means of passage, and so strengthened his communication with the Vienna side of the river, that it was in vain to attempt to oppose his landing ; the Austrian army therefore took post six miles off, on the heights of Wagram, its right stretching towards the Danube. Napoléon, after passing, formed his columns of attack, and was victorious in the battle." — Opérations of War, p. 235.
86 sur les rives du Tage. — Sainte-Croix was shot from a Portuguese boat, as he was reconnoitring the eastern end of the famous Lines.
89 Ils fortifiaient même Enzersdorf. — Marbot accepts the popular opinion that Charles fully expected Napoléon to attempt the passage at the same point where he had crossed before. It is hard to believe that a soldier of Charles's expérience can hâve altogether overlooked the danger from Enzersdorf to Mûhlleiten. On the other hand, if that face of the island was neglected, why ail thèse useless works above? Charles seems, indeed, to hâve been in two minds whether the river was itself defensible or not.
227 toute l'armée venant d'Italie. — Include hère Marmont's corps from Dalmatia. Bernadotte and the Saxons had been watching the river higher up towards Krems.
231 Trois solides ponts. — The engineers under Bertrand had only taken twenty days to build two great bridges on piles across the large arm ; the third bridge was an ordinary one of boats.
243 placées sur deux lignes. — As Charles had determined on a défensive battle at a distance, the forces near the river were rather corps of observation. They were to do what injury they could, and then fall back on the true positions behind.
268 de quitter Presbourg. — John had moved up the river, and was on the right bank opposite Presburg, when he received the order mentioned in the text. There was time for him to hâve reached the field early on the 6th, but he loitered inexcusably on the road, and arrived too late to be of any use. After the campaign lie was sent into exile, and disappears from history, except for a moment in the commotions of 1848.
CHAP. VIII
287 très souffrant encore. — Masse'na's horse had stumbled and thrown him badly a few days before.
291 il était très gai. — Marmont, too, notices the elation of Napoléon at the thougbt and sight of ail his completed arrangements and vast array : he adds, perhaps a little unkindly, that a man of Napoléons superiority should hâve been above such feelings of pride.
377 se plaçaient à leur ordre de bataille. — From right to left : Davout, Oudinot, Marmont, Eugène and Macdonald, Bernadotte, Masséna. Marmont's corps was somewhat withdrawn, and formed part of the reserve. The three villages of Glinzendorf, Raschdorf, Aspern, mark the French right. centre and left. on the afternoon of the ôth.
•^89 les Bwarois. — The contingent of Bavarians under de AVréde and the Wurtembergers under Vandamme were on the left of Oudinot, and the army of Italy was on the left of Bernadotte.
412 la faute énorme de les diviser. — The mistake rather was that the amount of ground originally chosen for the defence, and in wliich the Austrians were now taking position, was so extensive. The Austrian right, centre and left may be marked by the villages of Gerarsdorf, Wagram and Neusiedel. The position of the right was very strong ; the centre and the left had the benefit of the Russbach ; but the flank of Neusiedel was exposed. The ground hère was uot naturally strong, as was the case on the right, and, for a défensive battle, the village should hâve been made into a fortress. It was in this direction that the Archduke John was expected, which was perhaps the reason why entrenchments were neglected.
415 les hauteurs de Stamersdorf. — There were detachments hère, and even farther away, but the mass of the right wing was in and about Gerarsdorf.
426 résolut de s'en emparer. — Apparently Napoléon supposed that the Austrians were in confusion, and that he could break their position. The brunt of the attack, which was made in the late afternoon of the 5th, was upon the villages of W'agram and Baumersdorf, and on the régiments ranked between
188 NOTES [chap. vin.
them. Macdonald was in the centre, with Bernadotte on his left, and Oudinot on lus right. But tlie attack had not been properly concerted ; it was ill supported, and was a total failure. Macdonald had previously satisfied himself that the Austrians were properly formed, but he had tried in vain to get Eugène to represent this to Napoléon.
430 Lamarque. — A gênerai of division under Macdonald.
431 ces deux villages.— Of the three villages mentioned in the sentence the writer intends to refer to the last two.
433 fit une attaque si molle. — There seems no sufficient évidence for throwing the blâme on Bernadotte. The whole attack was a mistake, and the responsibility for it must fall on Napoléon, who ordered it.
440 Ce mouvement s'exécuta. — In this paragraph Marbot passes too lightly over the failure. Macdonald writes : " Heureusement l'ennemi se contenta de nous avoir repoussés et n'osa pas franchir le ruisseau à notre poursuite ; pourtant quelques escadrons auraient suffi pour nous disperser ; . . . il n'est pas difficile de juger de tout ce qui en serait résulté. "• — Souvenvrs}\>. 153. So, too, Marmont : "Si l'ennemi eût suivi les troupes, il est impossible de diviser les conséquences qui auraient pu en résulter." — Mémoires, iii. 233. The theory that some of the troops blundered and fired on each other appears to be adopted from Napoleon's bulletin, and needs better évidence.
465 notre centre était à Aderklaa. — The Saxons remained at Aderklaa for the night, after being driven down from Wagram.
474 la ligne ennemie. — The Austrian corps from left to right were : llosenberg, Hohenzollern, Bellegarde, Kolorath, Klenau. Probably in ail great battles there are a number of divisions that might bave been brought up, but are not ; tbey get forgotten, or are left in positions where circumstances make them useless. Thus, besides the Archduke John, there was an Austrian division midor Prince Beuss at Bisamberg, another near Nussdorf on tlie Danube, a tliird near Kroms. As to the numbers aetually engaged, they are generally given roughly as 160,000 on either side — a scale of battle so far new to modem Europe.
chap. vin.] WAGRAM 189
476 C était donc le point essentiel. — Marbot speaks as if Wagram were at the outset a sort of no-man's-land. He means, or ought to meau, tliat it was of vital importance to tlie Austrians to keep it, and to the French to capture it.
480 beaucoup trop étendu. — If the Austrians had remained ou the défensive, they were perhaps not covering more ground than they could hold. Drawn up, as they were, in the outside position with regard to the French, any attempt to turu the enemy's wings by advaucing their own was bouud to weaken their centre dangerously. Napoléon held the inner position, and it was for him to attack.
489 venait de prendre l'offensive. — This was certainly a perilous change of tactics. It has been suggested that it was due to the Arehduke discovering that his left was insecure. Owing to the irreat length of the lines the order to attack reached the différent corps at a considérable interval of time.
490 la canonnade se prolongea. — The Arehduke John seems to hâve listened complacently front the bank of the Morava, where he was making a considérable hait.
508 en ce moment à Presbourg. — Or, at any rate, he might hâve been still there, for any use that he was. The Austrians not unnaturally laid great stress on the absence of the Arehduke John. French writers perhaps underestimate the importance of his non-arrival.
514 qui franchit ce ruisseau. — While Gudin continued the attack in front, the other two of Davout's divisions — Friaut and Morand — crossed the stream lower down and attacked in nank. This was the movement which the Arehduke John's présence might hâve prevented.
520 il ordonne à Masséna. — Beruadotte had been driven out of Aderklaa : then, supported by three divisions of Masse'na's corps, he retook it. One of Masse'na's divisions — Bondet — had been left near Aspern. The others liad been hrought so far forward that they were overlapped by the Austrian right, which was rapidly turninjr the French left. In the centre the Austrians recovered Aderklaa, even before Masse'na's movement to save Boudet must hâve given it them.
190 NOTES [chap. vin.
545 faire face à Hirschstatten. — The attempt to check the advance of the Austrian right by a direct movemeiit against it failed. At this time both armies had pushed their right wings forward, and were defeating their enemy's left. The balance was ultimately turned by the greater weight of the French in the centre.
546 trois divisions de Macdonald. — Macdonald and thèse divisions — Broussier, Lamarque and Seras — novv distinguished themselves. Heavy French batteries prepared the way for them, as they were changing front to take the new direction ; they then marched steadily forward in spite of a galling artillery fire, and effected a lodgment in the enemy's line at Sussenbrunn. Hère they were checked by Lichtenstein's squadrons, while, on their own side, Nansouty's cuirassiers were slow in coming, and the nearest cavalry of the Guard refused to move. Ultimately Macdonald was supported by the Bavarians and by Guyot's light cavalry of the Guard, and the position was maintained. It was the state of his line hère in the centre, rather than the fire of the guns from the island, that compelled Charles to recall his right, which was followed step by step by Masse'na.
There vvas a good deal of subséquent heart-burning about the inaction of the French cavalry at the critical moment. Most of the blâme was thrown on a certain Colonel Walter. But there was something to be said for him. It appears that the cavalry of the Guard had been too freely called upon at Essling, and a régulation had been issued that they were onlv to move by order of Bessières or of Napoléon himself. For the moment Bessières had been disabled, and Napoléon was elsewhere ; so Macdonald' s urgent request was refused.
558 deux lettres Z. — Would not a single 7i better explain the state of things?
579 une position concentrique. — Readers of Marlborough's campaigns will remember his use of a similar advantage at llamillies.
614 le prince de Hesse-Homburg. — In 180(î Homburg had been absorbed into Hesse-Dariustadt, and so into the Confédération of the Hhine : the Landgraf had objected.
628 se faisant soutenir pur Oudinot. — As Davout's divisions
chap. vin.] WAGRAM 191
pressed beyond Neusiedel up the little stream, Oudinot made another and successful attack ou Baumersdorf, and together they advanced on Wagram. The Austrian centre held its ground long enough to give the right wing sufficieut time to retrace its steps.
633 en fort bon ordre. — The days of disasters such as Austerlitz and Jena were now happily over. Neither side had many prisoners or trophies to show ; and the Austrians, covered by a powerful artillery, moved unmolested from the field. In the evening the Archduke John's corps began to appear in the neighbourhood of Leopoldsdorf, toi) late to do more than cause an alarming panic in some of tlie French divisions. But it is useless to throw ail the blâme for the defeat upon John. Charles himself had proved quite unequal to the occasion. The Austrian soldiers fought well, and, with better generalship, the resuit might hâve been différent.
It was fortunate for the French that the Austrians had left the field before the panic occurred. The incident has some importance as bearing on the state of the French soldiers. Was the spirit of the Great Arniy already declining? Marmont, who was an eye-witness, and whose own division behaved well, gives a graphie, perhaps over-coloured, account of what happened. He tlien concludes with the reflection : " Les terreurs paniques sont un triste symptôme de l'état moral d'une armée. Il en est arrivé quelquefois dans les armées françaises; mais ce n'est jamais dans leur bon temps. L'armée d'Austerlitz et celle d'Iéna n'en ont pas offert d'exemple." — Mémoires, iii. 241.
Early next morning Napoléon visited Macdonald's quarters, and there was a reconciliation à la vie, à la mort, between them. Macdonald was now made Marshal. He was of Scotch descent and rather opiuionated, but a stout and honest soldier. In the Napoleonic wars he is chiefly remembered for his defeat at the Trebia in 1799, his passage of the Splùgen with the army of the Grisous in midwinter 1800, and his defeat at the Katzbach in 1813.
Oudinot and Marmont were also made Marshals ; and, among the other promotions, Saint-Croix became General of brigade. In one of the last charges of the battle the French lost Lasalle, perhaps their linest light cavalry officer.
192 NOTES [chap. vm.
Before Napoleon's order of the day appeared after the battle, Bernadotte issued one of his own, complimenting the Saxons on their prowess, and sttributing a considérable share of the victory to them. Tins was a breach of étiquette, for which he M'as sent from the field in disgrâce.
The panait of the Austrians begau on the 7th; but on the llth both sides were glad to acceptthe respite of the armistice of Znaim. Whether the war was to he continued depended on events at a distance. If the English expédition to North Germany was effective, or if Wellesley won his campaign, Austria was prepared to fight on. But the belated English expédition ended in the melancholy fiasco of Walcheren ; and though Wellesley, after forcing Soult's position on the Douro, had moved up the valley of the Tagus and defeated Victor at Talavera, he found the French gathering behind him in too great numbers, and was obliged to retreat into Portugal. Thus in Spain the battle fell to the English, the campaign to the French.
There was now no hope of help, and Austria had to make terms. The Peace of Vienna gave a part of Upper Austria to Bavaria, added Western Galicia — the Austrian spoils in the last partition of Poland — to the Saxon Duchy of Warsaw, and eut Austria off from the Adriatic by annexing the coastline as far as Turkish Bosnia to Napoleon's empire.
Austria shamefully abandoned the Tyrolese and relapaed into lier old selfish courses. There was no room any longer for a high-minded patriot like Stadion, and the helm of Austrian policy passed naturally into the hands of the more suitable Metternich.
Marbot's chief exploits as an aide de camp were now over, though he still had to serve on Masse'na's staff throughout that Marshal's Spanish campaign before he got his own régiment— the 23rd Mounted Chasseurs.
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