Introduction, chap. II, § m; Bowring, vol. I, p

129. Introduction, chap. II, § viii ; Bowring, vol. I, p. 5. — Pourcomprendriî la valeur de l'expression « principe asctUique >^, voir dans les biograpliit'S de Hume et d'Adain Sniilli les tracas (|ue leur firent subir lefanât i<[ues d'Keofse ; et les ohservalii^ns de Smitli sur la '^ moral it<^ ascétique» des \icilles Universités, sur Topposition, en morale, du système <f lib(!^ral » et du système "austère*. V. en particulier Rae, life of Adam Smith, pp. 81 Pt 124 sqq.

130. V. Mss. Tniv. Coll. n* 69, dans un manuscrit de 614 pages intitulé Inscf'pmla Prc'paratory Prinriplcs : Utilily is nota I^iw. For utility is but a qiialily, a properly; a property an act has of inereasing happiness ; that is of averling pains or inereasing plcMsui^es. Utilily is a qualily of many kinds of acts. But a command is (»nc particular kind of act itself. And a law is a command. — A dictate of utility is not a law. For a dictate uf utility is but some one's opinion Ihul Ihere is utility in a certain mode of conduet. An opinion is an act of tho understanding. But a cunimant is an uH of the wili. And a law is a command. And thus we are ciearod of another braa<:h of tlie preleiuled law of Nature. — Et Bentham continue : lie lias underslanding, and his understanding without the troubli* of heariiig pro and con, pronounces an action to be rightor to he wpong . and so llierc is a Law of Nature for it or agîiinst it. This is the way l)r prirt»

(pp. 44-46) NOTES. 299

raakes Laws of Nature. Another says he lias a sensé on pnrpoae : and it is this aense that pronounces îvhat is right and what ia wrong. This ia the M'aj tbat Lord Shaftesbary, Jy Hutchinson {$ic)^ and the triumTirate of Doctors lately slaughter'd, net to say bntcherM, by D' Priestley, raake Laws of Natare. — Bentham avait donc lu et apprécié les remarques de Priestley sur Keid, Oswald et Beattie. — Dans les Traités^ le principe de «ympathie et d'antipathie s'appelle aussi principe < arbitraire». Faut-il Toir dans cette dénomination un souvenir de Priestley reprochant à Reid d*avoir, en réfutant le scepticisme de Hume, introduit lui-même un scepticisme universel, « denying ail the connections which had before been supposed to aubsist bet^reen the several pbaenomena, powers^and opérations of the mind, and substituting such a number otirulependenty arbitrary, instinctive principleSy that the very enumeration of them is really tiresome»?