‹ La formation du radicalisme philosophique (volume 2)Chapitre 99 sur 186 · Bowring, vol. X, p · texte numérisé non relu

Bowring, vol. X, p

70. Ms». Univ. Coll., n* 32 (Législation Vï. Code civil), dans un fragment intitulé Civil Préface : The présent work as well as any other work of mine that bas been or will be published on the subject of législation or

290 NOTES. (Pp. 26-29)

any other braach of moral science is an attempt to extend the expérimental metbod of reasoning from the pbyaical branch to tbe moral. ^Yhat Bacon was to the physical world, Helvetius waa to tbe moral. The moral world bas ttierefore had its Bacon, but its Newton is yet to corne. —Cf. Bowring, vol. X, pp. 587-8 ; Bentham's Memoranda, 1827-8 : Wbat Bacon did was to proclaim Fiat experimerUum ; but his own knowiedge of Naturdi Philosophy was ignorance. — W'hat Locke did, was to destroy the notion of innate ideas. — >Yhat Newton did, was to tlirow light on one branch of science. — But I hâve planted the tree of Utility. — I bave planted it deep, and spread it wide. — Vol. X, p. 70 : Memoranda, 1773-4: Digest of the Law prcmature before Locke and HeWetius. — A digeat of the Laws is a work that could not bave been executed with advantage before Locke and Helvetius had written : the ûrst establishing a test of perspicuily for ideas ; the lattcr establisliing a standard of rectitude for

actions The matter of the law is to be governed by Helvetius. For tlie

form and expression of it we must resort to Locke. — From Locke it must receive the ruling principlcs of its form — from Helvetius of its matter. — By the principles laid down by Locke it must be governed, in as much as it is a djscourse ; by those of Helvetius, in as much as itis a disœurse from authority- predicting punishment for some modes of conducl and reward for olhers,

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