Po/. JuxL, Book IV, ciiai). x (2^ éd

.34. Pol. Just., Book II, chap. ir, 2e éd., vol. 1, p. 127.

35. By gratitude I understand a sentiment, A\!iich would lead me lo prefer one man to acother, from some other considération than that ol his superior usefulness or ^vortli : that is, which Avould make something true to me (for example this preferableness) which cannot be true to another man, and is not true in itself (idée empruntée, nous dit Godwin dans une note, à rEssay ou thc Xafure of True Virtue, par le B. Jonathan Edwards). Pol. Jmt., 2^ éd., Book II, chap. ii, \ol. I, pp. 129-130. — Cf Moderu Inficletily considered, \\itli respect to its iniluence on sociely ; in a sermon preached at the Baptist Meeting , Cambridge , nov. 1800 (^Vorks of Robert Hall., vol. I, p. 58, note).

36. Pol. .Just., Bouk II, cliap. v. Le chapitre a pour titre, dans la deuxième édition, le titre : « Uf righls ■• ; il était inlituli'', dans la première, « The rights of man ».

37. Pol. Just., Book II, chap. v. Et Godwin continue par une réfutation directe de Paine : It is in the samé spirit we hâve been told, that every nation bas a righl to choose its form of government. A most acute and original author was probably misled Jjy the vulgar phraseology on Ibis subject, wben he asserts, that « at a time when neither the people uf Erance nor national assembly were troubling themselves about the affairs of Rngland or the Englisb parliament, Mr. Burke's conduct was unpardonable in commencing an unprovoked attack upon ihem » (2" éd., pp. 165-166).

38. Pol. JusL, Book II, chap. vi. Of tlie exercise of private judgment (2'' éd., vol. I, pp. 171 sqq).

39. Pol. .lusl., Book I. chap. iv, i; 1. 4U. Pol. JusL, lîuuk V, cluni. \\i.

41. Book III, cliap. ii (Of the Social Contracti, chap. m (of Tromises), 2'- éd., voL 1, pp. 19(1 sq(i.

42. D'où un des principaux paradoxes de la morale de Goduin : la critique du contrai, de la lui, de l'institution du uiariatic. « Tlie institution of marriage is a System of fraud... Marriage is a law, and tiie worst of ail laws. Whatever our understandings may tell us of the person, from wliose connexion wc should dérive the greatest improvement, of the worlli of one woman and the demerits of another, we are obliged to consider wliat is law, and not wiiat is justice. »

(Pp. 82-88) NOTES. 310

43. Pour arriver à celte conclusion, il suffisait à Godwin de transformer en objection cette observation de Hume {Treatise, Bock 111, part. H, sect. II) sur ridée de justice : « A single act ol' justice is frequeutly contraiy to public interesl ; and Avere it to stand alone, without being Ibllowed by other acts, niay, in itself, be very prejudicial to'society, When a man of merit, of a beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or a séditions bigot, he bas acted justly and laudably ; but tbe public is the real sufferer ».

4'k 11 convient de noter que, sur un point important, Godwin rompt avec la tradition de Hobbes, que Bentham avait suivie; au lieu d'affirmer, par haine de nominaliste contre les universaux, que la justice est un produit de la loi positive, il affirme que la justice est une vérité, antérieure aux lois, et que les lois ne font ((u'énoncer, que constater. — Book V, ehap. i : Législation lias already appeared to be a term not applicable to liuman Society. Men cannot do more than déclare and interprète law ; nor cait there be an autbority su paramount, as to bave the prérogative of making that to bL' law, whicli abslract and immutable justice had not made to be law previously tothat interposition. — Book II,chap. v (2° éd.) : Législation... is not an affair of human compétence. Immutable reason is the true legislator, and lier decrees it beJioves us to investigate. The functions ofsociety extend, not to the making, but the iiiterpreting of law ; it cannot decree, it can only déclare thatvvhich the nature of things bas already decreed,and the propriety of whicli irix'sistibly flows froin the circuinstances of tiie case... AU government is striclly speaking executive.