‹ La formation du radicalisme philosophique (volume 5)Chapitre 106 sur 188 · Bowring, vol. X, p · texte numérisé non relu

Bowring, vol. X, p

70. Mss. Univ. Coll., n» 32 (Législation VI. Code civil), dans un fragment intitulé Civil Préface : The présent work as well as any other work of mine that bas been or ^^ill be published on the subject of législation or

290 NOTES. (Pp. 26-29)

any otlier branch of moral science is an attempt to extend tlie expérimental metbod of reasoning froin the pbysical branch to the moral. What Baeon was to the physical world, Uelvetius v/as to the moral. The moral world haa therefore had its Bacon, but its Newton is yet to come. — Cf. Bowring, Yol. X, pp. 587-8 : Bentham's Memoranda, 1827-8 : What Bacon did was to proclaim Fiat experimcntum ; but his owa knowledge of Natural Fhilosophy was ignorance. — >Vhat Locke did, was to destroy tlie notion of innate idcas. — What Norton did, was to tlirow light on one brancli of science. — But 1 hâve planted the tree of Utility. — I bave planted it deep, and sprcad it widc. — Vol. X, p. 70 : Memoranda, 1773-4 : Digest of the Law prématuré bcfore Locke and UeWetius. — A digcst of the Laws is a work tbat could not bave been executed with advantage before Locke and Helvetius had written : the Ûrst establishing a test of perspicuity for ideas ; the latter establishing a standard of rectitude for

actions The matter of the law is to be governed by Helvetius. For tlie

form and expression of it wc must resort to Locke. — From Locke it must receive the ruling principles of its form — from Uelvetius of its matter. — By the principles laid down by Locke it must be govemed, in as much as it is a discoursc ; hy those of IlelvetiuSf in os much <uUis a discourse from authority. prcdicliny punishinenl for tome modes of oonduct and reward for others,

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