LESLOISDELAPENSÉE ET LES RÈGLES DE L'ACTION
1. Bowriog, vol. X, p. 561 ; sous le titre : Logic. — J. B's Logical Arrangements, employed as Instruments in Législation; and Locutions employed, as Instruments in the Field of Thought and Action. — 29 juin
î. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, 1829. — Nous citons sur rédition Stuart Mill, annotée par Stuart Mill, A. Bain, A. Findlaler, et G. Grote, 2 vol., l'« éd., 1869.
LA CONNAISSANCE
1. Meadley, Life of Paleyy p.83: Uis (Paley's) lectures on Locke,in particular, were truly valuable ; and bcyond ail doubt, such a popular illustration of the Essay on the Human £^nderstofidin^,calculated for the meridian of the présent day, is still wanting, and rendered perhaps more iiecessary, from the growing celebrity of a différent school in the Theory of Mind, of which the genius and taste of Professor Stewart hâve long been the great ornament and support.
2. Education j p. 11 : Mr. Hume peroeived much more distinctly than any of the philosopbers who had gone before him that to philosophize concerning the human mind, was to trace the order of succession among the elementary feelings of the man... This was a great discovery ; but it
must at the same lime be owned that it was imperfectly dereloped by Mr. Hame... Âfter him and at a short interval appeared two philosophers, who were more sober-minded and had better aims. Thèse ivere Condillac aad Hartley. — Sar Tinfluence exercée par Dugald Stewart sar James MiU, V. Bain, p. 412. — Cf Bain, p. 16 : lettre i Macvey Napier, 1821 : AU the years I remained about Edinbnrgh, I used, as often as I possibly could, to steal into Mr. Stewart's class to hear a lecture, which was always a higli treat. I hâve heard Pitt and Fox deliver some of their most admired speeches ; bat I never heard anything nearly so éloquent as some of the lectures of Professor Stewart. The taste ibr the studies which bave formed my favourite pursuits, et which wilt be so till the end of my life^ I owe to him, — et p. 189, lettre à Napier, 11 mai 1820 : the delightful exhortations to mental enterprise, and to press forward unceasingly to new attainments, to which I listened with rapture from the lips of Mr. Stewart. >- Cf. AnalusiSy chap. m; yoI. 1, p. SI. — Westm. Aer., m* IV, oct. 1824, art. Y, Brodie's HUtary ofiktBritii^ Empira, p. 346 : Hune poesessed powers of a very high order ; but regard for trathCoraiMlno part of iHS-eharacter. He reasoned with surprising acuteness ; but the object of bis reasoniDgs was not to attain truth, but to show thaï it wa& unaUaiiiable. Uis mind, too, was completely enslaved by a taste for literatore; not th<m kinds of literature wliich teach mankind to kmaw the causes of their happiness and misery, (hat tliey may seek theoneand avoid the other; but that literature which without regard for truth or utility, seeks only to excite émotion. — Bain {StuaHMiU, p. 34), attribue l'article i St. Mill.
3. AnalysiSj ch. xxiv ; vol. II, pp.3i9 : In the séquence of eventscalled Cause and Ëffect, men were not contented with the Cause and the EfTect; they imagined a third thing, called Force or Power, which was not the cause, but something emanating from tlie cause, and the true and immédiate cause of the ElTect. This illusion lias been minutely examined, as we liave already remarked, by a late Philosopher; by wliom il bas beeu l)i-oved, beyond tlie reach of contradiction, that the power of any cause is notiiing différent from the cause. — Cf. chap. xiv, sect. U ; vol. II, p. 42 note, oi\ Touvrage de Brown, Inquinj into tfie Relation of Cause and EffÊct, est appelé « one of the most valuable cootributions ta science for whieh we are indebted to the last generatioo ». — L'admiration de JaiMs Mill pour Brown ne va pas cependant sans réserve. Mill nous dit (Fragment on Maddantos/iy p. 314) que Brown « was but poorly read m the doctrine of association ». — Cf. Westm, Rev.^ n* IX, janv. 1826^ art. y 111 : On the Nah»re, Measures, aiid Causes of Vabm, vol. V, pu 161 ; Dr. Brown, who made use uf the v\ord « relative saggestioo » as an ooenh cause^ to explain whatevcr he did not undersland. — Si. Mill s'exprime }»resque dans les DoéoLes termes, à la p. Xli de sa préfiice à ]^Analysi$i
4. V. la biographie de Brovta, par David Welsh, en tète des Lùetwres
(P. 235) NOTES. 45i
a» thé PkUoâophy of the Human illtnd, — et Leslie Stepbeo, iàe Englisk {/(OJABrioM, Yo\. U, pp. 261 sqq.
5. Sir William Hamiltoo, Discussions on PhUosophy and LUerature^ etc.. 3< éd., 1866, p. 44.
6. Brown, Lechire XXXII, pp. 207-8. — Cf. Lecture XXXIII ; p. 210 : the French school of metaphysics — p. 211 : the French System — p. 212 : the aniyersal, or nearly uniyersal, metaphysical creetf, of one of the mort enlightened nations of Europe; — Lecture XVIII, p. 114 : one of the mort acate of modem French metaphysicians, and, with scarcely an exception, ail the philosophera of the French metaphysical school, who are his followers. — Cf. Dngald Stewart, PhUosophy of the Human Mind, p. 358 : I hâve already exhaasted ail that I haye to offbron theCondillac's writings ; and I flatter myself hâve sufficiently shown how widely his commentary differs from the text of his author. It ts this commentary, hoiwenrer, which is now almost universallj recelved on the continent as the doctrine of Locke, and ^hich may justlj be regarded as the sheet anchor of thoae Systems whieh are commonly stigmatized in England with the appellation of French philosophy. — Cf. EssaylY, p. 137.— James Mill, dans sa traduction do livre de Villers sur la réforme, écrit, à un moment où il est encore un disciple des Écossais : «That thaphtloeophical spirtt haa been less alive dnring laie than former years in England, is an assertion which seema to be owing to an unaccoantabledeffreof ignorance in an autbor of 80 mach inaecuracy and knowledge. Thehitest English philoio|iher8 with whomheappears to beacquainted are Locke and Hume. But he might bave known that Reid had written siace their time, and eren Degerando, a liring French author, would hâve told him, that to Reid we are indebted for the introduction of the true method of philosophizing into tbe science of mind, and for some of the noblestdiscoverieswhich hâve been made by any one man in any science. Degerando would bave alao inibrmed him of the labours of Stuart, Campbell, Beattie, and otber followers of Reid, and of the assistance whicb philosophy bas derived from their efiforta. — V. encore madame de Staël, (ie VAUemagne, III* partie, chap. ii : La métaphysique, qui déplace le centre de la vie en supposant que son impulsion vient du dehors dépouille Thomme de sa liberté et se détruit elle-même , car il n'y a plus de nature spirituelle dès qu*on Tunit tellement à la nature physique, que ce n*est pins seulement que par respect humain qn'on les distingue encore : cette métaphysique n'ert conséquente que lorsqu'on en fait dériver, comme en France, le matérialisme fondé sur les sensations, et la morale fondée sur Pintérét. La théorie abstraite de ce système ert née en Angleterre ; mais aucune de ses conséquences n'y a été admise. En France, on n'a pas eu l'honneur de la découverte, mais bien celui de Tapplicatiim... [En Angleterre, au contraire] Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Smith, Reid, Dugald Stuart, etc., ont étudié les opérations de notre entendement avec une rare sagacité; les ouvrages de Ihigald Stuart en
452 NOTES. (Pp. 235-237)
particulier contiennent ane théorie si parfaite des facultés intelleetaelles, qu'on peut la considérer, pour ainsi dire, comme Thistoire naturelle de Tétre moral.
7. Romilly à Dumont, 26mai,1814 {MemoirSj vol. III, pp. 135-136, note).
8. Cependant Hazlitt prélude à la thèse soutenue plus tard par Coleridge, puis par Carlyle, lorsqu'en 1888 (p. 106), il essaie d'établir une afHnilé intellectuelle entre les deux branches de la race teu tonique. . . « I shall then be ready to give up my dull, cloudy, English mysticism, for tbe clear sky of Frencb metapbysics >. — Même parmi les radicaux utilitaires, un article de la « Revue de Westminster v (avril 1624, art. III, Memoirs of Goethe) y s'applique, par devoir d'impartialité philosopbique, à justifier la littérature et la philosophie allemandes contre les préjugés hostiles du sens commun anglais, particulièrement manifestes dans la c Revue d'Edimbourg ».
9. Edinhurgh RevieWy n« II, janv. 1803, art. I. PhUosophie de Kaniy Villers (pp. 253-280). Brown conclut (p. 264) : The merit of Kant appears to us to consist less in invention, Ihan in occasional déductions from the opinions of others. It is that part of his System which niay be considered as a commentary on the innate susceptibilities of Leibnitz, for which alooe we consider the world as indebted to him : and perhaps, in the présent circumstances of philosophy, even the extravagant length to which be bas pursued a just principle, may bave been of favourable influence. Against the more inviting system oî ienmali$m.,, which bas spread se rapidly from the writings of the late French melaphysicians. . . it required a bolder enunciation of its force to surprise into discussion ; and discussion, exciteti as it bas been, in one country at least, to such enthusiasm of inquir}, will terminale, we trust, in the mulual correction of the errors of Kant and of Condillac. — Cf. le jugement qu'il porte sur la philosophie allemande, Lecture XXXII, p. 202.
10. Mackintosh a Dugald Stewart, 14déc. 1802 : Germany is metaphysically mad; France has made some poor efforts, which bave ended inlittle m»re tlian the substitution of the word Ideology for Metapbysics; in England such spéculations bave been long out of fashion, and Scotiand bas nobody to rely on but you for the maintenance of her character.
11. Bentham aussi, mais Bentham prend néanmoins contre Burke la défense de la « métaphysique », de la spéculation sur les principes. V. Rat. ofJtid. Ev. Book I, chap. XVll ; Bowring, vol. VII , p. 115:Toexplain or to inquire what it is a man means, ismetaphysios : — ligbt isan objectof hatred to ail owlsand toall thieves; définitions, under the name of metapbysics, to ail rhetoricians. a I hâte metapbysics >, exclaims Edmund Burke, somewhere ; it was not withoul cause. — Cf. Bowring, voL X, p. 510 : Mémorandum Book, 1818-1819.
12. Bowring, vol. X, p. 562 (conversations avec Bowring, 1826-1827) ;
(Pp. 237-242) NOTES. 453
et vol. IV, p. 425 ; Jeremy Benlham to his Fellow-CUiiens of France on home$ ofpeen and senates — Cf. Bowring, vol. X, p. 384: Bentham à Dûment, Q. S. P., 16 avril 1802 :.. . Two Germaa Compilera : compilera l take for granted since they are Germans. — Cf. la première leçon d'Austin, the Province of Jurisprudence, — Bentham méprise l'histoire aussi absolument que pouvait faire un cartésien. Cf. ses paroles à Philarète Chasles : « Je ne méprise pas Milton, mais il appartient au passé, et le passé ne sert à rien ». (Ph. Chasles, Membres, 1876, t. 1, p. 161 ; sur Texactitude de ce récit d'une entrevue avec Bentiiam, nous avons beaucoup de doutes; le récit semble avoir été fabriquée Taide d'un article de Hazlitt). — Cf. Editcatioriy p. 21 : sur les ouvrages de Darwin et Cabanis. — There are some works recently announced by German physiologists, the titles of wbich promise aids in the same endeavour. But though we ezpect from them new facts, and ingenioushints, we hâve lesshope of any great num ber of sound conclusions.
