Pol. Just., Book V, chap. xxi

41. Book III, chap. n (Of the Social Contract), chap. m (of Promises), 2e éd., vol. I, pp. 190 sqq.

42. D'où un des principaux paradoxes de la morale de Godwin : la critique du contrat, de la loi, de l'institution du mariage. « The institution of marriage is a System of fraud... Marriage is a law, and the worst of ail laws. Whatever our understandings may tell us of the person, from whose connexion we should dérive the greatest \jnprovement, of the worth of one woman and the demerits of another, we are obliged to consider what is law, and not what is justice. »

43. Pour ariver à cette conclusion, il suffisait à Godwin de transformer en objection cette observation de Hume (Treatise, Book III, part. II, sect. II) sur Tidée de justice : « A single act of justice is frequently contrary to public interest; and were it to stand alone, without being followed by other acts, may, in itself, be very prejudicial to soclety, When a man of merit, of a beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or a seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably ; but the public is the real sufferer ».

44. Il convient dénoter que, sur un point important, Godwin rompt avec la tradition de Hobbes, que Ben t ha m «avait suivie ; au lieu d'affirmer, par haine de nominaliste contre les universaux, que la justice est un produit de la loi positive, il affirme que la justice est une vérité, antérieure aux lois, et que les lois ne font qu'énoncer, que constater. — Book V, chap. i : Législation has already appeared to be a term not applicable to human society. Men cannot do more than déclare and interprète law; norcan there be an authority so paramount, as to hâve the prérogative of making that to be law, which abstract and immutable justice had not made to be law previously to that interposition. — Book II, chap. v (2 e éd.) : Législation... is not an affair of human compétence. Immutable reason is the true legis-

lator, and lier decrees it bchoves us to investigate. The fu ne lions of society extend, not to tbe making, but the interpreting of law ; it cannot decree, it can only déclare that which the nature of things hasalready decreed,and the propriety of which irresistibly flows from the circumstances of the case... AU governmcnt is strictly speaking executive.