THE CONTENT OF THE THEISTIC INTUITION

When discussing the methods of the origin of the idea of God in the human mind, we found, in the chapter in which intuition was dealt with, that the theistic belief was a simple and ultimate conviction of our nature of which no further analysis can be given than that it is native to, and inseparable from, our very being. Itis an ineradicable fact, and in its very nature not capable of being reduced to lower terms. This conviction or primitive belief is the product, neither of evolution, induction nor revelation. On the other hand, it must be pre-supposed before theistic predicates can be applied to any object, and in order to make reasouing about God possible, or a revelation from God intelligible. It was also seen that the instinct of worship was associated with this conviction or intuitive belief concerning God. It was further hinted that the most feasible metaphysical explanation of the ground or cause of this conviction is to be found in regarding it as virtually God'’s testimony in the soul of man to the reality of His existence, and to the direct spiritual relation He sustains to the human mind.

A more detailed exposition of what is involved in the position just stated than was given in the previous chapter is necessary at this stage. We do not deem it requisite to enter into a full discussion of the a-priori elements of cognition in general, nor do we think it necessary to vindicate at length the reality of the intuitive factors in human knowledge. A few things in this connection, however, require to be emphasized and kept clearly in view, especially in the theistic discussions of the present day. The spirit of modern science looks with distrust upon the a-priori features of knowledge. Positive philosophy rejects all entities, and banishes all essences from its domain, Some writers who profess to be very advanced in their thinking describe the region of intuition as the

haunt of mysteries, and as a storchouse of difficulties. Others regard intuition as merely a name for certain subjective feelings or opinions, which have no inherent stability, and no objective validity. If these claims of modern scientific thought be well grounded, then both our philosophy and our theology must be phenomenal in its nature, To justify the general positions of the intuitional theory is necessary, in order to provide us with an adequate psychology, and with the proper rational ground for Theism and Christianity.

We therefore maintain that the human mind in its original nature and endowment is not merely a /abwla abrasa. On the contrary, it possesses certain native capacities, and it involves certain fundamental conditions of cognition. These capacities or conditions are not of the nature of innate ideas or fully developed principles of knowledge. They are not even to be regarded as matured powers or well defined faculties. They are rather simple native powers or potential capacities, which antedate all definite empirical knowledge, and condition the modes of its acquisition. In the nature of the case, they cannot be the product of ‘’ducation, association or experience. They must be presupposed before education can begin, before association can come into play, and before experience can be realized. We have now before us the the philosophical tournament of the ages. From Confucius and the Greek empiricists down to Comte and modern empiricists, we have the same contest going on. We see phenomenalism with its empirical method on the one side of the arena, and realism with its intuitive method on the other. In this contest we cast our lot with the intuitionalists. ;

It is important to notice how the intuitive element runs through all departments of human knowledge. In varied forms it is present in all cognition. Some advocates of intuitionalism have perhaps made a mistake in connecting intuition with a special faculty, or in confining it to particular elements of our knowledge. As we Jook upon it, intuition in some form underlies and conditions all

the modes of cognition, This intuitive factor stands related to the real and and the supersensible, which is manifested phenomenally through what has by some been called the external and internal senses, Thus intuition has a place in sense-perception. In the knowledge of material objects about us, which we have by the external senses, the phenomenal element is known by the senses, but intuition gives us the real or permanent factor in these objects. It is here that the truth and error in Kant's doctrine of sensuous intuition appears. In self-consciousness, also, in which we have a knowledge of self and its operations, intuition is present, The internal sense, as it has becn called, manifests, as phenomena, the products of the various mental operations, while the real or permanent is given in the intuition of self, This phase of intuition corresponds with what Kant calls the unity of apperception, which he places at the root of the categories, Then we have what may be called rational intuition, where we rise from phenomenal co-existences and sequences to higher unities or ideals. This form of intuition naturally divides into three branches, related to the #re, the complete, and the rigA, respectively. The true corresponds with the Platonic za which is the real in the phenomenal in this particular sphere. The complete is the beautiful or ideal connected with what has often been called the æsthetic faculty. The right stands related to the moral faculty or practical reason, which gives us, not as the result of induction but as the product of intuition, the knowledge of the real and abiding distinction between things right and things wrong, in our moral nature and ïts activities. Then once more, and rising a step higher in our analysis, we find the intuitions of our religious nature. Here we enter the shere of religion proper, for religion is more than a matter of intellect, of emotion, or of morality. The theistic intuition and the instinct of worship are to be located in what may be termed our religious nature, As to the reality of the facts of man's religious nature there can be no doubt, The question now before us has reference

to the significance of these facts. We deal now specially with the ‘heistic intuition and with the instinct of worship. Has this intu. ition objective validity? Is there any Being to worship? Oris the intuition a mere creation of reason, and the instinct of worship simply a subjective sentiment ?

Now, in order to justify the claims of intuition in general, and of the theistic intuition in particular, certain tests are required to distinguish intuition from individual opinion, By what marks are we to know which are the ultimate elements in our knowledge? What are the tests of those elements of cognition which cannot be reduced to lower terms? These tests have been presented in nearly the same way by different writers We may mention the three following as sufficient for our present purpose: Necessity, Universality and Congruity. By necessity it is meant that those elements in our knowledge which cannot be dispensed with, which are involved in all our mental processes, which assert their presence amid all the changes of the phenomenal, and which condition the mode in which the phenomenal shall be manifested,are to be regarded as intuitive. Universality implies that those features in cognition which appear in all ages, in all circumstances, and among all men as fundamental facts in regard to the way in which the human mind acquires its knowledge, are to be looked upon as intuitive. By Congruity it is understood that there must be harmony amongst our various intuitions, and between our intuitions and all the other psychological facts of our nature. Among our intuitions there must be no contradiction, but rather inherent consistency. They, in their very nature, give unity to experience, which would otherwise be fragmentary, unrelated and without cohesion. If we apply these tests to the theistic intuition and the instinct of worship, we find that the intuitive nature of these facts is amply vindicated. When this intuition and instinct first rises in the soul it may not be fully formed, It may be vague and require many influences to reduce it to definiteness. It is, however, the sponta-

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neous outcome of the soul, and not the result of reflection or experience. The question now before us has reference to the evidential value of this intuition in relation to the actual existence of God. What is its value as a method of proof?

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