CHAPTER VII

THE ETHICO-THEISTIC METHOD.

We now reach one of the most cogent of all the theistic proofs. Next to the design argument, the moral argument has received in recrt times more elaborate discussion than any of the other proofs of the divineexistence. Itis almost as readily understood as the de- . sign argument by the ordinary mind, and it is less open to attack, perhaps, than any of the proofs yet considered. By some writers it is relied on almost exclusively to establish the fact of the existence of God. Some even go so far as to say that the moral faculty is the religious organ of the soul, that the dictates of conscience are the voice of God in man, and that by means of the moral nature man has an immediate intuition of God as a distinct personality. It need scarcely be remarked here that Kant, after he had shown as he thought and as many others have since thought, that all the ordinary logical proofs were more or less inconclusive and contradictory, rested in the moral argument for the theistic inference. In a somewhat circuitous way he finds in the moral law without, and the categorical imperative within, man's moral nature a sure ground for belief in God, freedom and immortality. Hamilton takes nearly the same view, and says that for the belief in immortality and the existence of God, we must rest on the ground of man’s moral nature, Flint and after him Diman work out this line HE pion hs torrent e CONCSESor

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But it is to be remembered that the theistic proof is complex and cumulative. The moral proof is not the only valid line of inference ; it is merely one of the many lines all converging toward the same conclusion, To stake the validity of the proof of the existence of God on the ethico-theistic method alone, as some German writers and others have done, is to tell some of the best allies Theism has that they are not needed, and at the same time to flatter the moral argument even more than it deserves. It has its place, and a very important place, along with the other lines of proof. It may not do as much as some of the arguments already considered to establish the fact of the divine existence, but it will enable us to clothe the divine Being with nobler attributes than any of the foregoing methods have done. The moral argument, however, must be kept in its proper place.

In unfolding the proof here we find that it naturally divides itself into two branches. We have one line of proof connected with the fact of duty, which fact involves the notion of right and the sense of obligation. This line is largely psychological, and may be termed the deonto-theistic branch of ethico-theism. The other branch of proof stands related to the moral order of the universe, and to the notion of the highest good, or summum bonurm. This branch is rather ontological in its nature, and it may be designated the agatho-theistic phase of ethico-theism. A brief section will be devoted to each of these branches of the argumeni. A third section of this chapter will be devoted to a review of the Kantian criticism of the theistic proofs in general, and of his relation to the moral argument in particular.

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SECTION I

DEONTO-THEISM,

This section has to deal with the moral faculty, and the testi. mony it bears to the existence of God. What is the nature of the facts of conscience, and how far are we justified in making the theistic inference from these facts? Some writers maintain that the validity of the inference does not depend on any particular theory as to the origin of the moral faculty, and in regard to the nature of moral distinctions. Flint incidentally takes this position, but others assert it much more decidedly than he does. Taking the facts of our moral nature as they are, looking at the notions of rightness and oughtness as we find them, these writers say that we are justified in making the theistic inference apart from any theory as to their origin. We admit that this position may be successfully maintained, yet if morality is derivative and not ultimate in its nature, we feel that the argument it supplies for the existence of God is considerably weakened. If, therefore, the force of the proof is affected by the view we take of the nature of morality and of the origin of conscience, Theism cannot afford to be indifferent to the form of ethical theory which it adopts. A brief outline of these theories may be given, with a view to the adoption of the true one, and for the purpose of bringing into clear relief how this method leads out to the vindication of Theism. In a general way, all types of ethical theory may be divided into four classes. We look at these in order, and estimate their theistic import. | To the first class belongs all those forms of ethical theory which find the origin of the ideas of rightness and oughtness in some form of external law, restraint or authority. Thus Hobbes presents civil law and the authority of the state as the ground of morality. Bain and others maintain that conscience is merely the type within the individual of the restraints, parental, civil and social, by which he

114 THE METIIODS OF THEISM.,

is surrounded, Morality thus springs from a kind of fear, and obligation, in the first instance at least, is nothing more than a dread of the penalty of violated external law. It is clear that all such doctrines either presuppose the notion of right, or place moral distinctions on a purcly arbitrary basis. The idea of right underlies that of law, and law can have no inherent and absolute authority unless it is founded on the notion of rightness. The rzg/%4 and the ought are ethical atoms, and are incapable of further analysis. The theistic inference may perhaps be properly made from this view of morals, yet it is clear that it does not follow necessarily from it.

In the second class we would range all those theories which make pleasure, self-love, or utility in any form, the basis of morals and the source of the idea of rightness. Here we have Epicurus, Helvetius, Bentham, Paley, Mill, and many others who, with certain differences in details, agree in their general principles. These views, taken together, are generally termed the Utilitarian system, It assumes two general forms. The lower form is purely individualistic or egoistic in its nature. This is the selfish system, where the idea of duty rests on that which conduces to the happiness or utility of the individual. The higher and more modern form of the thcory is what is called universalistic or altruistic hedonism at the present day. Here the notion of the general good of mankind is made the ground of morality. That which tends to the good of the greatest number, that which is benevolent rather than selfish, is right and ought to be done. AÏl these views agree in denying that the ideas of rightness and oughtness involved in the notion of duty are simple and ultimate. They are derived from self-love, happiness, or utility in some form, and are thus developed. It is evident that utilitarians do not succeed in either reducing the notions of right and ought to lower terms, or in showing clearly how facts which are first expressed in terms of self-love come to be expressed in terms of right or ought. The utilitarian doctrine, even in its most refined form, cannot fully explain the fact of obliga-

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tion. It may postulate it and emphasise its import, but it cannot explain it. The desirable which is merely optional, can never, on utilitarian principles, be transformed into the dutiful which is obligatory ; nor can the self-interestedness from which the utilitarian starts ever be elevated by him into the disinterestedness which he must admit in human conduct, without violating the fundamental principles of his thcory. If he attempts to do so the notion of right will either be ignored or assumed, and the notion of ought will be left unexplained by this theory. The natural tendency of this theory is therefore anti-thcistic; and if it be truc, Theism has at least uncertain footing so far as the moral argument is concerned,

As forming a third class we may mention those views of ethics which are connected with scientific evolution. These views are mostly quite recent in their origin. Spencers Data of Ethics made the first attempt to cover the ground of morality by the method of evolution. This book has value, not so much in itself, as on account of the fact that directly or indirectly, polemically or apologetically, it has been instrumental in giving us such treatises on ethics as we have from Green, Sidgwick, Bradley, Stephen and Martineau. Evolutionists must account for ethical facts, They must explain the origin and deliverances of conscience by means of the principles of their system. They must also provide a basis for moral obligation. Their cxplanations run along hereditary and socialistic lines. Those things which tend to conserve society are by a kind of natural selection lifted up above those things which do not, and in the course of time men begin to call these things right and to say that they ought to be done. Then each successive generation leaves what may be termed an ethical deposit to which the next generation falls heir, and so by degrees the idea of rightness clearly emerges, and the notion of oughtness is clothed with commanding authority. Morality then rests in those things which are necssary for the existence and well-being of the

social fabric, It seems pretty clear that evolutionists have not yet

succecded in presenting an adequate ethical system. They have given an elaborate natural history of the way in which ethical facts are developed or modified, but they have not reduced duty to lower terms, nor have they shown how moral obligation comes to be absolute in its nature. Evolutionary ethics even if true may not destroy the theistic inference, but the form of that inference must be modified, if not reconstructed, in order to meet the new conditions of the problem.

In the fourth class we place all those theories which maintain that the principles of morality are ultimate, that conscience is an original faculty, and that the ideas of rightness and oughtness are simple and irreducible in their nature. The general systems holding this view may differ in details, but they all agree that moral principles are ultimate,and incapable of further analysis. From Socrates down to Hutcheson and intuitionalists generally we find advocates of this theory. We believe that this istthe true doctrine ; and what has been already said when discussing the method of intuition prepares us for the acceptance of this theory without much additional exposition. Conscience or the moral faculty we take to be an original or intuitive element in our nature. The distinction between things right and things wrong we believe to be ultimate and underived. The authority of conscience, and the control it exercises not only over what we ought not to do, but also over what it commands us to perform is simple and absolute, and cannot be resolved into anything else.

This being the nature of conscience and of the notions of rightness and oughtness, the theistic inference is easy and natural. We cannot stop with a simple statement of the psychological nature of obligation ; we are naturally led to infer an objective ground for this authority. The form of the inference here is nearly the same as in the method of intuition, only the material of the inference is different. The moral nature, with the facts of rightness and oughtness belonging to it, bears testimony to the existence and moral

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attributes of God. The postulate of the existence of God, and that he is moral governor, will more fully satisfy all the conditions of the problems of duty than any other, It will give an objective ground for the idea of right, and for the sense of obligation, which is in harmony with the psychological nature of these facts. Conscience, it may be remarked, does not give us a direct intuition of God as moral governor, for the direct object of conscience is morality. But the law to which conscience requires obedience cannot be the product of my own moral nature, It must come from a lawgiver other than myself. The 4 jure authority of conscience is an abiding attestation to a source of authority which is above it, If, therefore, man's moral nature docs not contain within itself the explanation of all its facts, the theistic hypothesis is not only the natural but also the necessary solution of its problem.

SECTION Il,

AGATHO-THEISM.

This section has to discuss the theistic significance of the notion of the highest good. This good has to be regarded as not only for the individual but also for the moral order and well-being of socicty. Is there a good towards which men may strive, and strive not in vain? Is there an ideal to which society may look forward, and a good in which it hopes some day to rest? Is there a moral order in the universe, where in the long run, either in this life or in a future state, the right shall triumph and the evil be overpowered? Is pessimism or optimism the true philosophy of human life? In ancient times the question of the nature of the highest good was largely discussed by moralists. The Platonists, the Stoics and the Epicureans, from different standpoints, gave prominence to this idea in their systems,

The question of the relation of the good to the right is confesscdly à difficult one, and cannot be fully discussed here. As the aspiration of man's nature rises up and longs for an ideal desirable good, how far is it to be controiled by the right? It would be a mistake to subordinate the right to the good, for this would throw us on the ground of expediency, where the measure of obligation would be determined by consequences rather than by the idea of right. In the long run we believe that the good and the right will harmonize. A thing is never right simply éecause it is good and makes us happy, but the right will in the end ever be found to conduce to our highest good in the true sense of the term. In society, too, we find that no real good is ever lost, Virtue never dies. Truthisimmortal. This is the morning star of an optimism which aspires hopefully towards the realization of the supreme good. The attainment of this ideal is to be secured not so much by striving selfishly after it, as by the careful performance of right conduct. If this be the case, we would ‘aturally expect that there should be harmony between the right and the good, between the dutiful and the desirable. We see how ïit is also that ‘we get happiness by doing right, and yet we are not to do right for the sake of happiness.”

The inference here seems simple. If there be in man an aspiration after an ideal good, and if we find in society a gradual movement on towards higher and better things, the conclusion seems patural that all this points to an all-controlling Being, who is Himself absolute good as well as absolute right. To make good the inference here we do not require to remove all difficulties, or explain, for example, the origin of evil, or the existence of pain and suffering, It is enough if we find that virtue brings its own reward and vice its own punishment as a general rule. Even when right conduct may bring present pain, yet in the end we find that it elevates, ennobles and purifies the soul. The advance of the race towards the goal of the good may be very slow, but it is

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nevertheless sure, With passing years there is substantial progress, and slowly but surely victory is declaring itself for the good. ‘We conclude from all this that there is sufficient in these things to justify the conclusion that there is a Being who contains in Himself all the perfections towards which the individual aspires, and to the attainment of which society age after age is tending. Thereis a power which makes for righteousness. With the theistic inference thus vindicated we may cherish and rejoice in an optimism which is the beacon light of man's destiny. Atheism or agnosticism can only lead us down the dark and cheerless shades of pessimism, This form of the inference might be expanded and ïillustrated at any length, but this very brief statement of must suffice,

SECTION III

THE KANTIAN CRITICISM.

The criticism of the current arguments of the natural theology of his day made by Kant requires special attention, both on account of its logical acuteness, and on account of the immense influence it has had upon the estimate put by very many writers since Kant’s day, on the value of reasoning concerning the existence of God. Some, following Kant, rely almost entirely on the moral argument ; and others, thinking all argumentation inconclusive, rest on revelation, or on the intuition of an infinite personal God, as the only safe ground to take against atheism. To see how far we should go in the direction Kant has marked out, and so many since him have followed, is a very important thing to do at the present day. Our conviction is that too much weight has been allowed to Kant’s criticism of the ordinary rational proofs of the divine existence, and too much praise has been bestowed upon him

for the way in which he presented the moral proof, To justify this position will be the object of this brief section.

The exposition here may be conveniently divided into two parts. In the first we shall examine Kant’s critique of the theistic proofs, and in the second we shall enquire as to his consistency in retaining the moral argument while rejecting the rational proofs. A few paragraphs only can be given to each of these points.

In the first place, we examine Kant’s destructive criticism of the rational proofs of the existence of God. He first classifies these proofs under three heads. These are the ontological, the cosmological, and the teleological or physico-theological. This classification might be criticised as imperfect, if we wished to be very severe on Kant. But we only remark that his error here is, that he classifies these arguments as if they were entirely independent of each other, whereas they are supplementary to, and confirmatory of, each other. |

The next stage of his criticism takes up these arguments in order, and proceeds to show that the ordinary proofs contained therein, if followed out, must land us in logical contradictions or antinomies. We have already hinted once or twice at some of his criticisms in our discussion of the onto-theistic proof. He says that the judgment concerning the existence of a necessary Being is analytical, not synthetical ; and in making the theistic inference, he asserts that we cither assume the existence of the object of the necessary idea, or identify our #.ought of the object with the object. He also denies that exss/ence is a real predicate, and maintains that the fact that there is in the mind a conception of a necessary Being is no reason for concluding that such a Being actually exists. We admit that Kant’s reasoning here has force against those forms of the onto-theistic proof which argue from the presence of the necessary idea to its objective validity. But we remark, first, that the necessary idea is not a conception, and hence not open to the criticism which Kant would make of the onto-theism of Anselm and Descartes. And

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we remark, secondly, that the position already taken in this essay, that the postulate of the divine existence is the condition of the trustworthiness of human knowledge is not affected by the Kantian criticism. This is the stronghold of onto-theism, which need only surrender when absolute scepticism ascends the throne of human reason,

In dealing with the cosmological proof Kant handles it with considerable severity, We pass by, for the present, the fact that he virtually resolves it into the ontological argument. He maintains that the principle of causation, which is the ground of the cosmological proof, belongs only to the realm of experience and to the sphere of the phenomenal. The theistic proof, he says, makes a transcendental use of the category of cause in employing it to prove the existence of God, who is, of course, noumenal. In like manner, in the infinite series of phenomenal sequences, he says that we cannot get beyond the series to a first cause which is nonphenomenal. We make two remarks here. In the first place, this absolute separation between noumena and phenomena is not justifiable, so far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, and it has done harm to the interests both of philosophy and theology. It must land us in idealism in regard to the contents of cognition, or in agnosticism so far as the existence of the noumenal reality either of mind or matter is concerned. Fichte and Spencer are the logical descendants of Kant. In a truc theory of cognition we believe that the intuitional and empirical elements so unite all along the line, that we have a knowledge alike of the noumenal and the phenomenal in all our cognitive acts. In the second place, we do not admit that the principle of causation belongs to the empirical sphere alone. The only supposition upon which this might be true, would be that there is no such a thing as efficient cause. All that we find in experience is change or succession, but this is merely phenomenal. We have also the conviction of power, potency or cûciency, and this we maïntain is the real notion of cause, It is

given in intuition, it underlies change at every stage of the series as well as stands at its beginning. Kant can only make good his contention that the cosmological proof is invalid, by first binding the strong man of efficiency who dwells in the citadel of the noumenal and then spoiling his house.

He treats the teleological argument with a measure of respect, and has perhaps rendered good service in confining it to its legitimate sphere... His criticism of it in the first instance at least, is Jimitative rather than destructive. He shows that it had been used by natural theologians to prove too much. He pointed out that the design inference only justified the positing of a framer or an arranger of the universe, not an originator of it. God can only be the architect not the the creator of the universe according to this argument. In like manner, the teleo-theistic proof does not warrant the conclusion that God is an infinite Being. The marks of intelligence in the universe may be many and evident, but they are nevertheless a finite quantity and may require a very great intelligence, but do not logically justify the inference that this intelligence has the attribute of infinity. Most Theists now frankly admit the propriety of both these criticisms. At the same time we maintain that the teleological proof has much value, The idea of infinity can be vindicated oï other grounds, and the reality of a first cause who is originator or creator can be justified by other methods, and then the degree of intelligence demanded by the marks of design will most naturally attach itself to this first cause, We must not suppose, however, that because Kant very properly limited the design argument in this way, that we have no good rational ground for believing in an infinite Being who is creator.

Another important remark remains to be made in regard to the manner in which Kant proceeds with his criticism. It has been already stated that Kant resolves both the cosmological and teleological arguments into the ontological. He proceeds to do this in a very ingenious way, and endeavors to show that before the

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theïstic inference proper is really reached all the arguments must enter the domain of onto-theism. Then since the ontological proof is inconclusive both the others are also inconclusive. He, in short, reduces the stronger to the form of the weaker that he may ‘he more easily destroy both. The theistic proof, we need only again remark, is cumulative in its nature, and the validity of the proof does not depend on the force of any single argument strong or weak, but on the combined strength of them all taken together. One argument establishes one element of the proof and another another element, and we must not reject all argumentation simply because any given proof does not establish the whole theistic position, Observe, further, what happens as Kant reduces the cosmological and the teleological proofs to the terms of the ontological, in order to reject them all. The onto-theistic proof is the only one that is a-priori. In the other two arguments there are a-posteriori elements. When Kant reduces these two to the a-priori form he quictly drops out of sight the a-posferiori elements altogether, and coolly ignores their logical significance. This consideration is of very great importance when taken along with Kant’s statement that the design argument is th= oldest and the best of all the proofs used to establish the fact of the divine existence. We cannot but feel that Kant either fails to show that these three arguments are identical in principle, or he succeeds only by ignoring the distinguishing a-posteriori factors in those that he reduces to lower terms. We conclude, therefore, that Kant’s criticism of the rational proofs of the existence of God is not nearly so effective as is generally supposed, and that he has by no means shown that all arguments to prove the divine existence are necessarily inconclusive or selfcontradictory in the sphere of reason,

Let us now see whether Kant is logically consistent when he passes to establish the theistic position by means of what has been called the moral argument. With him the idea of God was merely regulative of our thinking in the domain of pure reason, In the

sphere of practical reason, however, ît is otherwise. The moral law is authoritative, and not merely regulative. The famous phase, the categorical imperative, denotes the sense of obligation which we feel we are under to do the right.

We cannot now enter fully into the merits and demerits of the Kantian ethics. There seems much to confirm the opinion expressed by Patton and Schurman, that Kant should not b® classed with the intuitionalists proper, and that in applying the categorical imperative to practical conduct he must surrender to utilitarianism, In regard to the theistic significance of Kant’s doctrine we make three remarks of a critical nature.

The first is, that Kant draws the line too sharply between pure and practical reason. He should not separate between the intellectual and moral faculties so distinctly as he does. If truth be the object of reason and right be the object of conscience, then the theistic inference stands in the same relation to both. If God as absolute right be the postulate of conscience, then God as absolute truth is the postulate of reason. To be consistent, Kant must either allow more significance to reason, or admit less on behalf of conscience in the argument for the existence of God. He cannot barter God away to the sceptic on the ground of pure reason, and expect to have him restored with little difficulty in the domain of practical reason.

In the second place, practical reason, like pure reason, must enter the field of experience before it can have its form filled with content, The categorical imperative is as empty as the categories are prior to experience. To say, then, that practical reason enables us to reach the noumenal more clearly than the pure reason enables us to reach that region iserroneous. In order to have content both pure and practical reason alike must move in the region of experience, where according to Kant all is phenomenal. In this case conscience brings us no nearer to God than reason, and on Kant's premises neither gives anything more than phenomena, In the

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one case it pertains to knowledge, in the other to conduct, but in ncither do we reach the noumenal. Both forms of the proof rightly understood have force, but Kant’s doctrine is clearly inconsistent with itself,

The third remark relates to the precise basis of the moral argument and its relation to the other theistic proofs. In criticising the cosmological proof, Kant confines the conception of cause to phenomena, and refuses it any transcendental validity. Nor does he allow any proper place for the principle of suffcient reason. In this case it is difficult to sce how he can justify the inference of the moral argument. The principles of cause and sufficient reason are at least indirectly related to the moral argument, and if the application of these principles cannot be made beyond experience, then it is difficult to know how Kant can maintain a rational position in the ethical sphere for the proof of God’s existence. He can only do so by falling back on a direct intuition of God, or on mere faith, But we maïintain that if this be a valid procedure in the realm of ethics, it is also good in the sphere of reason. The direct object of conscience is moral principles, and the inference we make does not so much give us the fact of the divine existence, as it will enable us to clothe the first cause with certain moral attributes. Rather than stake the rational justification of the beliefin the existence of God upon the moral argument alone, as based on the facts of conscience, we would put it in its place along with the other theistic proofs, and rejoice that while it rests on some of them, they in turn are helped by it,