THE CONSENSUS GENTIUM

The universality of the belief in God is now seldom called in question. The cases mentioned by Lubbock can have little weight against such a mass of testimony as comes to us from all ages and from every land. Plato says that the belief in the gods is a natural and universal instinct, Aristotle says that all men have an opinion or belief regarding the gods. Cicero states the same thing at greater length. Calvin and Grotius give much evidence of the same nature. In modern times we find evidence of importance coming to us from two sources. In the first place, we have a vast mass of facts gathered by those who seek to explain the phenomena of religion by naturalistic methods, and according to the principles of scientific evolution. If there is one thing more than another that positivists and evolutionists have done during the present century, it is to show that the belief in deity, and the prevalence of the sentiment of worship, are found everywhere among men. We may borrow this material from the positivists for our present purpose, and return them our sincere thanks for the use of the same, In the second place, the study of what is now termed the science of comparative religion has added much additional force to this form of the evidence. The religious systems of ancient and modern times, of savage and civilized peoples, have been carefully studied. The sacred literature of these religions has been minutely examined, and their religious rites and elaborate ceremonies have been analyzed. From the religions of Egypt, Grecce, Rome, India, China, Persia, Scandanavia, with their respective litcratures and rites of worship, we have a vast mass of material put at our disposal. We gladly use it in the present argument, for it is casier to make bricks when we have the straw gathered for us. Among ruder tribes of the race we also get facts of a similar kind,

Travellers in uncivilized countries incidentally state many interest. ing things in this connection, ‘The Indian tribes of our own continent, the savage tribes of Central Africa, and the inhabitants of the South Sea Islands alike supply us with material out of which to frame an effective inductive proof in favor of the theistic conclusion.

What then is the proper inference from these facts? Is it enough to stop with a simple enumeration of the facts, or must we enquire for their theistic significance? Those who adopt the principles of the positive philosophy will say that we have finished our task when we have discovered and classified all these facts. We have no warrant, they say, to enquire for causes, or even to raise a metaphysical question at all. This of course would make religion pure materialism, and God will be either shut out of view altogcther or he must be a creation of our own, This way of explaining the problem cannot satisfy human reason, and it is rejected without any hesitation, It is a mere natural history of religion, as we have scen in another connection, and utterly inadequate as a philosophy of it.

À careful examination of the vast array of facts now before us goes to show that the consensus populorum has objective validity. It contains not merely a subjective sentiment, but it also involves a belicf that the deities worshipped have a real objective existence. This isa very important point, and its significance is sometimes overlooked. Man's religious instinct, as shown by the facts before us, is not a mere idea or feeling of the mind, but it reaches forth and rests on an object beyond itself. This gives an important hint. It may not prove absolutely that there are deities, but it at lcast shows that men be/zeved that such deities did exist, and that they acted as if they were convinced that these deitics were not merely the creatures of their own minds. This fact has great argumentative value.

But we need not enlarge on this method. Its inference is a simple induction from the facts. These facts call for an e::plana-

tion. The theistic hypothesis is an all sufficient explanation. The supposition that there is a God is sufficient to account for the universal belief in God, and the gencral observance of religious rites and ccremonies as expressions of the sentiment or instinct of worship. No other hypothesis will suffice to explain allthese facts, and so we rest in the theistic inference. It may be added that we cannot suppose that all the races and tribes have been under a delusion along the ages in regard to the dictates of their religious nature, Is it likely that there would be in man those almost universal sentiments were there no real existing object corresponding to them? It can scarcely be conceived that man would possess in the first instance, and retain during successive ages, the instinct of worship, if there were no real deity to be worshipped.

Another remark may be added. The argument from the consensus gentium gives hints of a primitive monotheism. As stated in a former part of the essay, the science of comparative religion not only brings out the fact that religious sentiment is universal, but it also shows pretty clearly that the carliest primitive belief was monothcistic rather than polytheistic. The primitive religious belicf of India was no doubt monotheistic, and so with that of other countries. Polytheism seems to have been a ‘ater degradation of an early monotheism. Now, this primitive Theism could not result from education, nor is it all likely to have been an invention of man himself. The natural inference from such a univeral belief is that the primitive belief was monotheistic. And the reasonable conclusion from such a universal and primitive belief or instinct is, that the Being to which it testifies, and before whomit bids us bow down and worship, has real objective existence,

SECTION II