VM. H. LEE, C. E. C
Executive Conncil Chamber Que-bec, 28th October, 1862.
Dépêche de Lord Monck au Duc de Newcastle (*)
Government House,
Québec, October 30, 1862.
My Lord Duke. — Your Grâce is already aware of the receipt by me of your despatch No. 163, of August 21st, on the subject of the Militia organization in Canada.
2. Immediately on receiving that despatch I referred it to my Executive Council for their considération and report. I did not press for any immédiate answer, as the subject is one of considérable présent importance, and opens up questions calculated to exercise great influence on the future relations of the Empire and the Province. The récent advent to power of my présent advisers rendered it therefore only a matter of fairness that full time should be allowed them to discuss and décide an issue of so much moment.
(1) Sessional Papers, 1863, No 15, pièce 10.— Sessional Papers, 1868, No 63, page 6.
Lord Monck 3. A short Unie since the Mhiistry announced to me that it was the
to the Hou. intention of two prominent memhers of the Executive Council to
Mr. McDonald, proceed soon to London, as a délégation from the Government
Oct., 18C2. of this Province to Her Majesty's Government, on important
Colonial business. As the departure of thèse gentlemen from Canada would necessarily adjourn the considération of the subject of Militia organization until their return, I requested that before the Executive Council should be deprived of their assistance the Government would furnish me with a report on the despatch of Your Grâce, and a statement of their policy in référence to the matters alluded to in it. Min. of Council. 4. I hâve now the honor to transmit to Your Grâce the accompanying Report of the Executive Council, authenticated by my signature, on the despatch rcferred to it. „
5. I will not enter into the discussion of any abstract théories as to the relation which should subsist between England and her Colonies in référence to Colonial defence, because Your Grace's despatch is professcdly only suggestive, and does not seek authoratively to fix the degree in which the Mother Country and the Colony should each contribute to that object, and the admission on the part of the Colonial Government that anything should be done by them in the way of défensive préparation, is a proof that the différence of opinion, if any, existing between Your Grâce and the Executive Council of Canada is one of degree only and not of principle. I think too that it is my duty rather to apply myself to the practical propositions put forward. I will therefore proceed to put Your Grâce in possession of my opinion as to the efficiency of the plan of organization embodied in the accompanying Report.
6. In order to make my remarks fully understood, I must draw your attention to the présent condition of the Militia Force of the Province, as regulated by the existing law.
7. Your Grâce is aware that what is called the Sedentary Militia embraces the whole maie population of the Colony between the âges of 18 and 60. The men are divided into battalions, regularly officered; but from the circumstance that this battalion organization is territorial in its character, it is obvious that it is not available for the purpose of actual service, because if you called out for service a battalion of the Sedentary Militia you would depopulate of its maie inhabitants the district to which the battalion belonged, and would leave wholly untouched the population of the surrounding districts.
8. It is therefore évident that in the event of circumstances arising which would necessitate the calling out of the Militia for défensive purposes, the regimental or battalion organization of the Sedentary Militia would afford no help towards cmbodying the men in battalions, so as to render them useful for actual service. Some mode of performing this necessary work would havc to be extemporized at a moment of comparative alarm and confusion, and the necessity for this would certainly cause great loss of time, if it would not lead to the entire failure of the attempt to raise an effective force.
9. I hâve entered into this explanation because I am convinced that the want of any preliminary organization pervading the whole country is the great difficulty which would hâve to be practically encountered, if Canada should now be compelled to défend herself against foreign attack, and that any system of préparation for defence which failed fully to meet this difficulty would be comparatively worthless.
10. The plan of the Government contained in the accompanying Report may be stated as follows: —
(1.) Brigade Majors are to be appointed in each district.
(2.) Drîll Associations to be formed of officers and non-commissioned officers of Sedentary Militia, who are to be superseded if they refuse to learn their drill.
(3.) Enrôlaient is to be secured of a fixed quota in each district of first class service men, in companies and battalions, with officers.
(4.) Volunteers in future to be clothed, but none paid.
(5.) Drill rooms, armories, and rifle ranges to be procured for the Volunteers, as circumstances permit.
It will be seen that the Executive Council proposes to deal with the difficulty above referred to in this manner. It proposes that the Brigade Majors throughout the country should securc the enrolment in companies and battalions, within their district, of such quota as should be appointed of the first class service men, unmarried men and widowers without children, between the âges of 18 and 45.
11. Tliis enrolment appears to be entirely independent of the Volunteer or Active Force organisation, and instrad of consolidating and systematizing the voluntary action of the people, appears to me more likely to confuse their minds by the introduction of a third system of enrolment, in addition to that of the Sedentary Militia and the Active Force.
12. This enrolment is meant to supply the wnnt of any organization now in existence by means of winch, on a sudden emergency, a portion of the Militia might be embodied for active service in a short space of time; but unless the men whosc liâmes are enrolled are put on the same footing with regard to their engagement for services as the Active Force, who bind themsclves to serve for five years, there is no security that the enrolment will ever produce any practical resuit, as there is nothing to compel the unenrolled men to serve when called on.
13. There does not appear to be any inducement held out to men to place their names on thèse lists, or to serve ■when called on, in the way of supplying them with arms, clothing, or any other benefit to excite or maintain a military spirit amongst them. It is in fact an attempt to reintroduce, in a worse form, class B of the Active Force, which it is proposed by this Report to abolish, on the ground of the unsatisfactory manner in which the distinction of classes in that force opéra ted. (Class B in the Actice Force is that portion of the Volunteers which has hitherto served without pay, in contradistinction to Class A, which received a certain amount of pay cach year.) I therefore think the measurc would prove entirely nugatory, and that without some inducement no men would give their names, and that it will therefore fail to provide what I feel certain is the great desideratum of the défensive force in Canada, namely, a machincry crected in time of peacc by means of which, at the approach of war, an organized and embodied force could be at short notice turned out.
14. The plan proposed does not, as regards system or organization, touch the Volunteer Force of the country at ail ; nor does it propose to give any effectuai form or direction to the excellent spirit by which the people are animated.
15. On the whole, I cannot conecal from Your Grâce my opinion that, as regards the cardinal necessity of the time — a systematic organization of the Forces of the Colony for défensive purposes, — the plan indicated by the Government contains no principle calculated to produce effective results, and that the only attempt made to grapple with the difficulties of this portion of the subject will prove completely illusory.
16. With respect to the other proposais of the Government I do not find any fault. It is highly désirable to foster a military spirit in, and to promote the acquisition of military knowledge by a people circumstanced as the Canadians are, and the measures proposed to be adopted seem to me, as far as they go, calculated to promote thèse ends.
17. I entirely approve Of the abolition of the distinction between Class A and Class B in the Active Force, and of the proposai that in future the Government shall supply to the Volunteers everything necessary for their equipment and drill — Class A of the Volunteers giving up for the future their distinctive claim for pay, and being put on the same terms as Class B.
18. The question of Militia organization has been argued ail through this Report as if the only choicc that existed, consistent with the maintenance of a moderate expenditure on the Militia, was between the plan indicated by the présent Government and that brought forward by my late advisers and rejected by Parliament. In order that there may be no misapprehension on this point, I beg leave to place before Your Grâce the enclosed "Heads of a plan for the organization of a Militia Force of 50,000 men", a copy of which I gave the head of the Government when I desired a report on your despatch.
19. It will be seen from the estimate appendcd to this mémorandum that, supposing the expense to be spread over a period of five years, the annual cost to the Colony of this system would not be much, if at ail, beyond the sum appropriated for Militia purposes in the last session.
20. Although the supply of men by means of the ballot is named in this mémorandum, as an alternative if a sufficient number should not be produeed by the plan of volunteering, it forms no esscntial part of the scheme, and my own confident conviction is, that so loyal is the spirit of the people, and so strong their désire to put themselves in a position effectively to défend their homes and institutions, that the number of men proposed to be raised would hâve been easily obtained by the voluntary action of the population.
21. Under this plan it was proposed to leave the drill to the spontaneous désire of the people for learning it; to provide them with ail the ineans of acquiring military knowledge, and permit them to adopt the times and seasons most convenient to themselves for its acquisition.
22. I hâve a strong conviction that if this or some similar plan were put in operation, a very large ameunt of drill would be voluntarily submitted to by a considérable proportion of the inhabitants of Canada. The Citizen Soldiers of the Province would become personally interested in improving their discipline, and increasing their knowledge of the military art; a spirit of émulation amongst différent corps would arise. The complète battalion organization would enable the différent régiments to turn out for field exercise on holidays, and other periods at which they might désire to do so. And on the first outbreak of war the Province would hâve an army possessed, not only of the will, which is common to ail Canadiaus, but of the power to insure that an enemy should not obtain a footing in the country before aid is fortheoming from other portions of the Empire.
23. And ail this would be done by mcrely giving systematic form to the voluntary action of the people, without in any way interfering with their industrial pursuits, trenching on their Personal freedom of action, or imposing additional pecuniary burdens on the Province.
24. With regard to the suggestion contained in Your Grace's despatch as to the consolidation into one force of the Militias of the British North American Provinces, I did not fail to consult the Lieutenant-Governors of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, when they were hère last month. The conclusion we arrived at is similar to that expressed in the Beport of the Executive Council of this Province, namely, that the means of communication are not as yet sufficiently easy to enable the three Provinces beneficially to avait themselves of the services of a common head to their Militia Forces; so that even if other difficultés in the way of the plan did not suggest themselves, that would in itself be a bar to the scheme for the présent.
I do not myself believe that the move would be acceptable, either to the Canadians or to the inhabitants of the Lower Provinces.
I hâve, &c,
(Signed,) MONCK.
Dépêche du Duc de Newcastle à Lord Monck (*)
(No 197) Downing Street, 20th December, 1862.
My Lord, — I hâve the honor to acknowledge your despatch of the 30th of October, forwarding a Report of your Executive Council upon my despatch of August 21st, accompanied by observations of your own upon that Report, and especially upon the plan which it contains for the further organization of the Canadian Militia.
I greatly regret to find that that plan, while effecting some improvements in the présent system, will yet, as regards the systematic organization of the Force of the Colony for défensive purposes, prove, as you observe, "completely illusory."
You also lay before me heads of another plan for the formation of a Militia Force of 50,000 men, which I concur with you in regarding as a measure of a more substantial character, and more worthy of the great Province of Canada than that proposed by your Executive Council.
I shall not attempt to discuss the détails of either of thèse schemes. I will only express an earnest hope that the patriotic spirit which animâtes the Volunteers of Canada may be turned to the best account for the defence of the country — an object which I conceive would be most effectually attained. by forming them into battalions of the Active Militia Force, within defined divisions of the Province; not indeed to the exclusion of other volunteer associations, but with an eye in the first place to the complction of that territorial organization, which is, as you justly term it, "the cardinal necessity of the time."
(1) Sessional Papers, 1863, No 15, pièce 14. — Sessional Papers, 1868, No 63, page 8.
I turn for a moment to thc connnents madc by thc Executive Council in their Report upon my despatch of 21 st of August last, one or two of which call for some observation from me.
The Report asserts that, "in thc opinion of your advisers, no Government could exist that would attempt to carry out my suggestions" for thc raising of a force of a least 50,000 "partially trained" Militia.
A sufficient answer to such an opinion is contained in thc document with which you have furnished me, shewing how the number mentioned could be provided at a cost which ,if spread over five years, would scarcely exceed in any onc ycar thc small amount voted for Militia purposes in the last Session. Nor can I believe that the Canadian people would condemn a Government which should effectually provide for the defence of their country, even if the necessary expense should exceed the sum of £50,000 per annum.
The Report expresses great surprise at a suggestion made by me, that the charge for the Militia, or for a fixed portion of it, should bc voted for a period of three or five years. Such a measurc they say "will never, and ought never to be entertalned by a people inheriting the frecdom guaranteed by Rritish institutions." If there are any reasons in its favor, they think that they are "in every sensé as applicable in England as in Canada," and they conclude with the sentiment that "popular liberties are safe against military despotism wielded by a corrupt Government, only when they (the people) have in their hands the means of controlling the supplies required for the maintenance of a military organization."
I beg you will point out to your Ministers, in reply to thèse observations, some material circumstanccs which have escaped their notice. The terms of my despatch show that I was well aware that the course in question, if adopted by the Législature, would be, to a certain degree, a surrender of the strict constitutional rights of the Représentatives of thc people. It would probably, however, occur to them that popular liberties would bc in little danger from a body of citizen soldiers while there remained within the Province, not only without exciting any such fears, but with the hearty approval of its people and Government, a force of regular troops, whose number would be fixed at the discrétion of the Impérial Government, and whose cost would be defrayed by the Impérial parliament. Again, if the number of Impérial troops were made to dépend, by agreement with the Canadian Government, upon the number of Militia maintained by the Province, there would be nothing unreasonable in such an arrangement, and the Home Government might fairly (I do not say would necessarily) require that the funds for thc purpose should be somewhat more permanently secured than by annual vote.
It is far from my wish (as seems to be suggested by the Report) to diminish the control of the Canadian Parliament over their own affairs; but on the other hand, the amount of exertion -which England could make with any advantage must dépend very much on the manner in which that control is exercised — that is to say, on the disposition to protect the Colony which îs shewn by the Provincial Government and the people of Canada.
It is difficult to see how, when my despatch contemplâtes législation on thc subject of thc Militia by the Canadians, and not the Impérial Parliament, the Executive Council can justify such grave appréhensions of an Invasion of their liberties.
Thèse considérations will show that the gênerai doctrines referred to by the Report have little application to the présent peculiar case of Canada, and little force against the suggestion of my despatcli, wliich. however, I have no désire to press upon the attention of your Govemmrnt, upon whom and thc Parliament of Canada must rest the responsibility of providing adéquate means for meeting the efforts of the Mothcr Country to secure thc safety of the Province.
The report dwclls at length upon the fact that the policy of the Empire in ail its relations with forcign powers, upon which peacc and war dépend, is regulated by the Impérial Government and Parliament, over which Canada has no control. I agrée with the Executive Council in regarding this circumstance as one of primary importance, as lying indeed at the very root of the relations between thc Mother Country and her Colonies with respect to military and naval defences. They cannot fail, however, to see that Canada, though liable, as they repeatedly point out, to be involved in Impérial wars in which she may have no immédiate interest, has yet a manifest interest, under ail circumstanccs, in contributing to maintain the power of thc Empire of which she
forms so important a part, and with which the maintenance of her own independencë and of her commanding position in the world is so essentially connected.
The main security against aggression which Canada enjoys as a portion of the British Empire is the fact known to ail the world, that war with Canada means war with England; not in Canada only, but upon every sea and upon the shores, wherever situated, of the aggressive power itself. It does not therefore follow that this country can consent or afford to maintain an imlimited numher of troops in Canada at her own cost, even in time of war, much less in time of peace, and it remains true that the defence of Canadian territory must dépend mainly upon the Canadian people itself.
I hâve, etc.,
(Signed,) NEWCASTLE.
Loi de la Milice, 1863 0) (Extraits)
An Act respectins; the Militia.
[Assented to, 15th October. 1863.]
2. — The Militia shall consist of ail the maie inhabitants of the Province of the •»He of eighteen years or upwards and under sixty, not exempted or disqualified by law.
3. — The Militia shall be divided into three classes, to be called respectively first class Service Men, second class Service Men and Reserve Men : the first class Service Men shall be those of eighteen years of âge and upwards, but under forty-five years, who are unmarried Men or widowers without children, and the second class Service Men shall be those between the âges last aforesaid who are married Men or widowers with children, — and the Reserve Men shall be those of forty-five years of âge and upwards, but under sixty years.
17. — The Commander in Chief may call out the Militia or any part thereof for aotual service, whenever it is in his opinon advisable so to do by reason of war, invasion or insurrection, or danger of any of them.
33. — The Militia, so called out, may be marched to any part of the Province, or to any place without the Province bat conterminous therewith, where the enemy is, and from which an attack on this Province is apprehended.
