TOME XXIV

consideration, the prothonotury would, in this case, be liable,

because no judge can authorize him to do a thing expressly forbidden by the code, and here the case of Andrews vs Morris, 1 Q. B., 3, may be quoted as quite in point, In this case, the clerk of the court ordered the arrest of Andrews, without an order of the court. If the arrest had been made under such an order, it would have been valid: and although it appeured that à practice had preva with the concurrence of the judges, that the clerk should . ue attachments Of that kind without any order, it was held that, in doing s0, he was usurping « power which the judges coul not confer upon him, and he was consequently condemnel for trespuss, Therefore, even supposing that the affidavit was establishing all the necessary averments for a saisie conservaloire, and that the writ issued was in fact x saisie conservatoire and not an ordinary saisie-arrét avant jugement, it seems clear that defendants became guilty of gross neglect of their duties and of contempt of the decisions of the courts, by placing their own interpretation of the law above the well settled jurisprudence of the province, and by issuing writs, the existence of which had been denied in the very court and the very district in which they are sitting. Justice TORRANCE entertains in this case a view differen from that

of Justice MACKAY, and, relying on Broom's M is and on his decision in the case of Carter vs Burland ds that

‘the function which the prothonotary performed here may be regarded as à quasi judicial one.” In the case of Curter vs Burlund it does not appear that the magistrate, although acting through bad faith and malice, had committed an in-

justice. Our courts have, moreover, often decided that mag-

istrates were civilly liable to any party aggrieved for their neglect and want of skill. This principle was expressly maintained in the late case of Lacombe vs Sainte-Marie et al. An information for perjury, contained in three depositions prepared by counsel, was laid before two justices of the peuce before arrest. After the arrest, no examination was made of witnesses, nor did the accused confess ; yet he was committed to jail, there to be kept till discharged by course of law. The accused was discharged on Habeus Corpus, and afterwards for want of prosecution. Action in darages against the justices for $5000. Held, reversing the judgment of the Superior Court (TORRANCE, J.), that the commitment not being based upon information reduced to writing before the magistrate, was null, and that the magistrates were responsible for the false arrest. Judgment for #100 and costs. MacKaAY, >ERTHELOT and BEAUDRY, JJ., 22 R. J. R. Q. 103. On reference to Broom’s Legal Maxims, edition 1864, p. 63-64, it will

be liable, expressiy drews vs In this Andrews, een made id; and with the ae attach- 1 that, in ces coul ndemned davit was ie conser- 1e CONSseTqgeiment, it neglect of he courts, above the y issuing the very œ, Justice rom that is and on Ids that here may Carter vs , although ed an inhat masfor their ssly main- Let al. An tions prethe peace made of ommitted law. The fterwards t the justhe Supemot being the magesponsible MacKay, On refer- 64, it will

be seen that the principle laid down by Justice TORRANCE is not supported by the authorities. Public officers performing quasi judicial functions, in fact all those engaged in the udministration of justice, every body, whatever be its name, are bound to obey where the law neither confers judicial power nor any discrétion at all, but requires certain things to be done ; and with the exception of the Legislature and its branches, every body is liable for the consequences of disobedience. “This principle,” it is further observed by Broom, ‘“’applies where persons, required to A ministerial acts, “are at the same time invested with the judicial character.” This language is plain enough, and fully supports the last proposition of appellants, chat had the saisie-arrét of Marcile been issued by an officer invested with the judicial character, he would still be liable in damages, because in this particular case there was no discretion to exercise. Nay, more, a judge ordering the issue of a suisie-arrét under the circumstances, would likewise be respoasible, because Lo. the wrong would have been caused by his negleet and want of skill, and 20. because he would have acted without any jurisdiction in the premises. Under the French law, there cannot be any doubt that public officers performing judicial or quasi judicial functions are accountuble in damages for their neglect and gross violation of their duties, Article 8, tit. 1, of the ordonnance of 1667, enacts: “ Déclurons tous «rrèts et jugements qui “seront donnés contre la disposition de nos ordonnances, ‘édits et déclarations, nuls et d2 nul ejjet et valeur, et Les “juges qui les auront rendus, responsubles des dommages et ‘intérèts des parties, ainsi qu'il sera avisé.” Besides this seneral enactment, the ordonnances and several other declurations, edicts, etc., specify many cases in which judges may be tried by reason of their judicial acts. The ordonnance de Blois, art. 147, declares that they will be answerable “/ors- ‘qu'ils auront jugé par dol, fraude ow concussion, on que “les cours trouveront qu'il y « faute manifeste du juge, ‘pour laquelle doit étre condamné en son nom.” The Judge in default is to be tried in a special manner, known as lu prise à partie, a proceeding which permitted the aggrieved party to sammon the judge to answer for his proceedings before à superior tribunal. In the case of à prise à partie against the judges of courts of final jurisdiction, the complaint is to be made to the Privy Council. The prise à partie can only be made against a judge; grefiiers and other public oficers performing ministerial or judicial functions or both are responsible in à direct ordinury action. “ Z! résulte de “toutes ces lois,” observes Pigeau, vol. 1, p. 372, “que lu “prise à partie ne doit avoir lieu en général que duns les

“ cas de dol, fraude ou concussion, contravention aux lois ou “ faute manifeste, etc. Ainsi, elle ne doit pas étre admise “ pour erreur dans le fait ou le droit.” In his commentaries on the ordonnance of 1667, page 444, Jousse says that the prise à partie lies “dans les cas d'abus d'autorité, comme “lorsque le jage excède son pouvoir, en connaissant des “affaires qui ne sont pas de su compétence.” Such has been the law in France for centuries. See Toullier, Dr. Civil, vol. 11, p. 251 et seq; Code de Procédure, art. 505 ; Sirey, Codes Annotés (Gilbert’s ed), Code de Proc. p. 348 ; Pothier, Proc. Civile, p. 152; Merlin, vo. Garantie des Fonctionnaires Publics; Guyot, vo. J'uge ; Jousse, p. 444-446 ; Serpillon, Ord. de 1667, p. 473-477. The reason of these enactments against judges is thus given by Toullier, vol. 11, p. 268 : “ Lorsque Le “ préjudice causé pc: la faute grossière, par l'ignorance “crasse d'un juge. peut-etre intérieurement méchant, est “arréparuble, il serait évidemment injuste et contraire «u “ droit naturel de refuser à la purtie lésée un moyen de “réparation par la prise à partie. out fait quelconque de “l'homme qui cause du préj judice à à autrui, oblige celui par “la faute duquel il est arrivé, à le réparer,” Git l'art. 1382: ‘ilne dit pas seulement “ par Le dol ou lu fraude de qui il est “arrivé.” Merlin, vo. Quasi Délit, no 11: “ Le juge est cou- “ puble d'i ignorer ou de violer la loi, cur en se chargeant cle “la fonction de juger, ü « promis les qualités nécessaires “pour la bien remplir. Il ne faut pas entendre par impru- “ dence dans le juge, une inhabilité absolue ; car alors su “faute serait plus qu'un quasi délit, à suffit qu'il se soit “ écarté de ces règles dont le bon sens ordinaire doit garantir “un magistrat.” There is no doubt that this law detining the responsibility of judges was in force in this province up to the time of the cession to Great Britain. It is in our Statute book, Æd. et Ord., vol. 1, p. 184, 185 ; it was enforced by the highest court in the colony in the celebrated case of the prise à purtie of the Governor, reported at page 55, vol. 2 of the Ædits et Ord. It is true that its provisions have not been reproduced in our Code of Civil Procedure, but, at the same time, it must also be adinitted that they have not been repealed. The repeal was not express ; and, in face of article 1360 (1), how can it it be pretended that it is tacit and 1implied. That article says: “The laws concerning procedure im “ force at the time of the coming into force of this code, are “ abrogated : 1. In all cases in which this code contains any “ provision having expressly or impliedly that effect; 2. In “ all cases in which such laws are contrary to or inconsistent

(1) Art. 1 C. P, C, de 1897

QUO colo cert are Case R.

lead Sol WI ° sh “Ja

unten que d relati sembl

Fe tel

lois ou admise entaries hat the comme ant des as been vil, vol.

v, Codes r, Proc.

nnaires on, Ord.

against rsque le norance ant, est aire ‘tu oyen «le mque de elui par t. 1382:

qui il est est Ccotgeunt «le "ESSAÎTes impruulors su L se soit parantir detining vince up

in our nforced case of 55, vol.

ave not ,at the hot been article and imdure in ode, are ins any b: 2, fo nsistent

“with any provision of this code, or in which express pro- “vision is made by this codé upon the particular matter to ‘which such laws relate” But not only the Code of Procedure contains nothing contrary or inconsistent with the prise à partie or the old law concerning the responsibility of judges ; the Civil Code by expressly declaring i in article 1053 that every person is responsible for the damage caused by his J'uult to another, whether by positive act, imprudence, neglect, or avant of skill, has affirmed in a general, but in à most positive manner, the principles of the old French law on the subject under discussion. It may perhaps be asserted the Act respecting the independence of the judges (C. $. L. C., c. 81) has virtually repcaled this old French law. That statute contains, however, no such provision. It declares that the judiciary shall be independent from the executive power; it enacts that the judges shall not be removed except by impeachment, upon the address of the House of Commons and cf the Senate of the Dominion: but it does not say that they nill be above the law which it is their duty to adininister ; it does not contain à single word concerning their civil responsibility to the public. That act clearly has reference to their removal and recusation only, and to nothing else. It may be said finally that the responsibility of the judges of a british colony is to be governed by the rules of the English law. But the question under consideration is not à question of political law aflecting the Crown ; it is a question of private right or wrong, in short, of private civil law which should be decided according to the principles of the municipal laws of each colony. ‘And again, what is the rule of the English law concerning the responsibility of judges ? Does it hold that they are legally impeccables, as Justice FLETCHER argued in a case for Le brought against himself, and reported i in Î R.J.R. Q. 254 (1). Appellants will merely quote from a leading case decided in 1850. Æoulden v. Smith, 14 Q. B, S5l, per PATTESON, J.: “ Here the facts of the case, which “ were befure defendant, and could not be unknown to him, : showed that he had no jurisdiction ; and his mistaking the “law as applied to those facts cannot giv e him even a primé ‘fucie jurisdiction, or semblance of any. . Although it is “clear that the Judge of a Court of Record is not answerable “at common law in an action for an erroneous judgment, or

(1) Les tribunaux sont incompétents à connaître d’une action en dommages intentée contre un juge, pour des actes faits par lui en sa qualité, non plus que des jugements rendus par une cour, même de juridiction inférieure, et relatifs à des mépris de cour commis contre elle, hors de sa présence ; et une semblable action sera rejetée sur exception déclinatoire. (Dickerson v.

Fetcher, C. B, R., Trois-Rivières, 29 janvier 1828, 1 R. J. R, Q,, 254.)

“ for the act of any officer of the court, wrongfully done, not

“in pugsuance. to, though under color of, a judgiment of x

‘“ court, yet we have found no authority for saying that he is “ not answerable in an action for an act done by his com- “ mand and authority when he has no jurisdiction.” In this case the judge had jurisdiction over the demand, but not to execute judgment, as ordered by him. See Curratt v. Morley, 1Q. B., 18; Watson v. Bodell, 14 M. & W., 57; Miller v. Seare, 2 W. BI, 1141; Culder v. Halket, 3 Moore’s P. C., 98 ; Taaffe v. Downs, ibid, 36, note (a); Louwther v. The Eurl of Radnor, 8 East, 113; Pike v. Carter, 3 Bing., 78; Newbould, 3 E. L, 4 E, 455; Weaver v. Price, 3 B. and Ad, 409: Danbony v. Cooper, 10 B. & C., 237; Fernley v. Worthington, | M. & G., 391; Pricket v. Gratex, 8 Q. B., 1020 ; Leary v. Patrick, 14 Q. B., 266; Day v. King, 5 A. & E,, 359 ; Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, p. 195-224 In a case of Gugy v. Kerr, decided many years ago in this province, Chief Justice SEWELL thus laid down the same rule : When the “ members who constitute a court of justice, of limited author- “ity, err in their judgment, when they are acting within the “extent of their jurisdiction, they are not amenable individ- “ually for their conduct in any shape whatever ; but if they “ assume to themselves « jurisdiction or authority which “they have not by law, they become liable to the parties “ aggrieved, and responsible to them for the consequences of “their misconduct.” (2). What can defendants now urge to

(2) Lorsque, en agissant dans les limites de leur juridiction, les juges d'un tribunal de juridiction limitée commettent quelque erreur dans leur jugement, ils ne sont, en aucune façon, comptables de leur conduice à des particuliers, mais s'ils assument une juridiction ou une autorité qu'ils n’ont pas par la loi, ils sont responsables envers les parties lésées des conséquences de leur conduite illégale. Quand ils agissent dans l'exercice d’une juridiction légale, ils agissent comme juges, et ils ne seraient pas indépendants dans l’administration de la justice, s'ils n'étaient protégés. On ne peut donc rémédier aux erreurs qu'ils commettent que par l'appel ; il n’y a pas d’autre recours : mais quand ils assument une juridiction à laquelle ils n’ont pas droit, ils cessent, quoad hoc, d'être juges, et leurs procédures étant faites, dans ce cas, coram non judice, ils n’ont pas droit à l’exemption de responsabilité envers les particuliers, exemption par laquelle les juges sont protégés, dans l'intérêt public, lorsqu'ils agissent dans les limites de leur juridiction, et ils sont comptables envers les parties lésées, en des dommages qui peuvent être recouvrés par action devant ‘es tribunaux de juridiction supérieure. Dans une action en dommages de cette nature, la déclaration ne doit pas se borner à faire voir l'exercice impropre de la juridiction, elle doit aussi faire voir l'ex ercice d’une juridiction qui n'existe pas, parce qu'autrement le tribunal supt rieur ne peut intervenir. Tout tribunal doit nécessairement avoir juridiction sur ses officiers, et il peut les suspendre s'ils ne paient pas les honoraires qu'ils doivent payer. Si le tribunal leur ordonne de payer des honoraires qu'ils ne doivent pas payer, il y a erreur dans le jugement et exercice imropre de leur juridiction ; et, dans ce cas, le seul recours est l'appel, et non action en dommages contre le juge. La Cour de Vice-Amirauté peut suspendre un avocat pratiquant devant elle, s'ils ne paie aux autres officiers de

cla

mi ind if si the acc ex( the

| cit au sec hel det pau the ap} set aft up pla pal Ap EXT ass.

acc the the the a W Jug the ass e lab last clai { je

la co pas « l'a f (Cru KR. Q

Lo peuv com ver |

one, not ent of «à hat he is 1is Com-

In this te not to Morley, Hiller v.

Earl of ewbould, 9: Danimgton, | Leary \.

; Shear- 1 case of ice, Chief Vhen the d'authorithin the , individut if they ty which e parties uences of y urge to

juges d'un leur juge- \des partis n’ont pas iquences de juridiction s dans l’adac rémédier re recours :

8 droit, ils lans ce cas, ilité envers ns l'intérêt et ils sont nt être re- Dans une

e borner à e voir l'ex bunal supé juridiction honoraires honoraires xercice imppel, et non ; peut sus officiers de

claim an exemption from responsibility ? If they are mere ministerial officers, they are answerable. If they are perforining quasi judicial functions, they are likewise liable. Finally, if they are to be considered as judges, they ure still responsible, because, according to the principles of the French law, they have acted par imprudence, négligence et impéritie, or according to the principles of the English law, they have excecded their authority and had no jurisdiction whatever in the matter.

E. BARNaRp, for respondents : Respondents, in their capacity of prothonotary, issued à writ of saisie conserrutoire against the barge “Guard” belonging to appellants, for the security of the wages of one of the men working on board of her. Under this writ the barge “Guard” was seized und detained for ten hours, and the convay of which she formed part was also detnined for the saine space of time, although the seizure effected applied to the Large “ Guard” only, and appellants now pretend that they sutlered damage in consequence to the amount of $300 altogether. This writ was afterwards set aside by the court, and the action dismissed upon motion, the case not being defended, the counsel of plaintiff having stated to the court that his client not having paid him his fees as promised, the action should be dismissed. Appellants, on the other hand, while they do not attempt to explain how the action came to be dismissed on a motion, assert that the saisie conservatoire was rightly quashed on account of the defects in the affidavit : 1st, because i4 law there is no conservatory process before judgment to secure the privilege given by art. 2383 to the master and crew for the wages of the last voyage; 2nd, because the writ was not a writ of saisie conservatoire, but a writ of saisie-arrét avant

Jugement ; 3rd, because the affidavit did not even allege that

the wages. claimed were for the last voyage. Au:l appellants assert that, under the circumstances, the prothonotary are lable for the whole damage. With regard to the. third and last objection to the affidavit, it is proved that the wages claimed were really for the last voyage. As to the second objection, the blank writ used was that of an ordinary suisie-

la cour les honoraires auxquels cette cour juge qu'ils ont droit, et l'avocat n'a pas de recours par action en dommages contre le juge, même quand ce dernier l'a forcé à payer des honoraires qui n'étaient pas dus ; iln'a que l'appel. (Guyy \. Kerr, C. B. R., Québec, 20 février 1828, SEWELL, J,. en C., 1 R, J. R. Q., 264.)

Lorsque des juges de paix n'ont reçu qu'une autorité restreinte, ils ne peuvent l’étendre à des objets en dehors de leur juridiction, en déclarant comme. un fait ce qui ne l'est pas : et leur mandat, en ce cas, ne peut protéger l'officier qui a agi en vertu d'icelui. (Affaire du vaisseau Æaidee, C. de V.-Amir,, 31 janvier 1860, BLack, J., 10 D. T. B. C., 101.)

œrrét avant jugement, the clerk who prepared the writ omitting to make it applicab'e to the barge “ Guard” only : but, in point of fact, plaintiff never intended to seize, and never did seize, anything else under that writ than the barge “Guard.” The only possible cause of complaint against the prothonotary is therefore reduced to this : that they issued a writ of suisie conservatoire, which was afterwards quashed on the ground that although, in law, there is a privilege, there is no saisie conservatoire avant jugement to secure it, Upon that point appellants insist that the Court of Review had just rendered à decision in the case of Dagenais and Douglas in that sense, that the Court of Appeals has since taken the same view of the law, and that, therefore, the prothonotary have committed à gross error in law. It turns ont, however, that the decision in question of the Court of Appeals was influenced by the fact that the wages claimed were not for the last voyage, and that decision, moreover, was not rendered when the writ now in question was issued. As to the judgment rendered by the Court of Review, it is not even proved to have been known to Papineau when he issued the writ. It seems that, to give to a judgment so rendered, upon x question admitted by all to be a very doubtful one, the force of à rule of practice forbidding the prothonotary from issuing such writs in future, would not be reasonable, and respondents therefore respectfully submit that whatever view may be taken of the law respecting the responsibility of the prothonotary, whether they be considered as ministerial officers having no power to decide contested points, or be looked upon as persons acting in à judicial or quasi judicial capacity, the judgment of the court below disinissing the action should be contirmed. Under these cireumstances it is unnecessary to advert to the proposition of the appellants which would make the respondents responsible for the damage caused by the detention of the convoy. It is evident, at all events, that damages such as these are altogether too indirect and remote to form the basis of a legal demand.

SANBORN, J., while not dissenting, could not but censure the prothonotary for issuing à writ without rending the affidavit. He held that the prothonotary is bound to see that the affidavit is apparently sufficient to justify the issuing of the writ asked for.

Ramsay, J., remarked that the broad rule is that there must be no bad faith on the part of the officer. Here there was nothing to indicate the existence of bad faith, and therefore he thought the prothonotary must be relieved from all responsibility" ,

do cel la da loi ce ju:

Ex ja en ber les iissS l'e; pe

ver téur ons

eux

téri ils & fisa par ner

par cela erci S10!) et d l'ex cice mer peu sens de n gref riels side celle

uné

Ban suiv sent

he writ 1” only:

1ze, and he barge inst the issued a quashed orivilege, secure it.

Review ais and as since the prourns out, Court of , claimed over, Was ued. As it is not he issued rendered, tful one, honotary asonable, vhatever sibility of inisterial ts, or be judicial ssing the ces 1618 ppellants the damident, at r too ind.

censure ling the see that ssuing of

at there bre there d therefrom all

T'ASCHEREAU, J.: La question soulevée sur cet appel est assez intéressante. Elle se résout duns la suivante: 10. Les sreffiers de la Cour:de Circuit sont-ils en loi responsables des dommages causés à une partie par suite de l'émission contre cette partie, par les greffiers, d’un bref de saisie-arrêt simple à li demande d'un tiers, représenté par un avocat, lorsque l'affidavit, en vertu duquel ce bref a été émis, était insuffisant en loi pour les justifier à l’émettre. 20. Elle se résout aussi dans cette autre, savoir : Si les faits de la cause sont de nature à justifier les greffiers et à les exonérer de tout blâme sérieux. Examinant d'abord la 1ère question d'une manière abstraite, j'avoue qu'il est impossible de se dissimuler que les greffiers, en les supposant revêtus d’un pouvoir judiciaire ad hoc, tombent sous l’empire d'une loi, généralement admise dans tous les pays, qui déclare que toutes les jurisdictions limitées qui assument un pouvoir qu'ils n’ont pas; ou qui l’excèdent, ou qui l'exercent de manière à blesser les intérêts des justiciables, peuvent être recherchés en dommages et, comme tels, en peuvent être déclarés passibles, à moins d'une loi spéciale les protégeant dans des circonstances données. Avec cette base, voyons quels sont les pouvoirs possédés par Îles greffiers, et par eux exercés en décernant un bref de capias, ou 1 de saisie-arrêt, contre les biens d’un défendeur. Ils me semblent être ministériels d'abord, avec une addition de fonction quasi judiciaire ; ils sont chargés, sur la production ou l'offre d’un affidavit suftisant, d'émettre le bref de capias ou de saisie-arrêt, dont une partie leur fait demande contre l'autre ; ils ont donc à exaniner cet affidavit pour voir s'il contient les allégations exigées par le Code de Procédure avant que d'émettre le bref, et en cela ils ont un pouvoir judiciaire limité, et, ensuite, vient l’exercice de leurs fonctions ministérielles, qui n’est que l’émission du bref dont ils doivent surveiller l'exécution en bonne et due forme. Ils ont donc üne double responsabilité, celle de l'exercice de leur fonction quasi judiciaire, et celle de l'exercice de leur fonction ministérielle. S'ils faillissent notublement dans l'exercice de l’une ou l’autre de ces fonctions, ils peuvent être recherchés en dommages. Les autorités dans ce sens sont cités au factum des appelunts, et y sont commentées de maniere à ne pas laisser de doute sur la responsabilité des greffiers, et comme juges, et comme simples officiers ministériels. Je ne. prétends pas discuter iei une question que je considére assez oiseuse quoiqu'elle soit remplie d'intérêt : c'est

celle de savoir si les juges des tribunaux supérieurs, ayant uné juridiction illimitée comme ceux des juges de la Cour du ane de la Reine et de la Cour Supérieure, peuvent être poursuivis, Comme partie intéressée, je me refuse, quant à présent, à exprimer mon opinion sur cet intéressant sujet, mais

qu'il me soit peninis de dire que les autorités consultées font,

et avec raison, une distinction importante entre les tribunaux :

d'une juridiction limitée et les tribunaux possédant une juridiction illimitée. Les autorités, sans assurer l'impunité à ces derniers par la voie des poursuites ordinaires, indiquent les moyens de réparation et le recours des parties contre des Juges criminels. En Angleterre, une décision que l’on trouve au 4 vol, du Lower.Canadu Laiw Journul, page 103, comme tirée du Law T'imes, nous donne la mesure du recours qu’un plaideur aurait contre un juge en Angleterre, qui, dans un procès devant un jury, se serait permis des remarques non justifiables contre une partie, équivalent inême à un libelle de la part du juge. Le droit d'action fut dénié comme contraire à l'ordre public, et à la saine et impartiale administration de la justice: “Quel juge,” dit le juge présidant au procès, “pourrait exercer avec indépendance et librement, et sans crainte des conséquences, ses importantes fonctions, s’il était à chaque heure du jour exposé à la crainte d'une poursuite, ete., de la part de tous ceux qu'il aurait pu condamner ?’ Pour en revenir à pos greffiers, je n'hésite pas à dire que, comme exerçant une juridiction très limitée, ils doivent l'exercer avec prudence, et avec les connaissances que !’on doit attendre de personnes chargées de fonctions aussi importantes que celles qu'ils remplissent habituellement. Ceci me conduit à examiner la question de savoir si ces messieurs ont ou non remp'i leur charge d'une manière légale ou non, et s'ils ont encouru quelque censure. Les reproches que les appelants font aux intimés, sont que l'affidavit sur lequel ils ont émis le bref de saisie dont ils se plaignent, n'était pas conforme à l’article 834 du Code de Procédure Civile: que cet affidavit ne constatait pas l'existence d'une créance personnelle du demandeur contre le défendeur, que le défendeur se cachait ou était sur le point de quitter la province, ou recéluit ses biens, ou était sur le point de les recéler. Les intimés ont prétendu que ce n'était qu'une saisie conservatoire que le demandeur avait voulu prendre, que l’affidavit qu'il avait produit était à toutes fins suffisant pour obtenir au moins cette saisie conservatoire, se fondant sur l'article 834 qui déclare que, dans le cas de dernier équipeur, il suffit pour venir en aide à cette espèce de plaideur de déclarer que sans le bénéfice d’un bref de saisie, le demandeur perdrait sa dette, ou souffrirait des dommages. Encore ici les intimés sont en défant, on ne trouve, dans aucune partie de l’affidavit émis, aucune allégation propre à nous faire envisager le demandeur comme dernier équipeur, et, de fait, on n'y trouve pas le moindre indice d'une intention du demandeur de se laisser considérer comme tel; au contraire, on n’y trouve qu'un affidavit pour obtenir une

sais cen don sais

déf

le C'es son qui ren lant cett ren l'a sais Nul les peu

prit

ven

nou des

exo fonc les « tion

pon:

que foi,

ou | Ave asse prés foi dem affid plus que Cod cons côté de r anté de l:

les ç

tées font.

ribunaux :

une jurinité à ces quent les mtre des on trouve 3, COMME rs qu'un dans un ques non hbelle de contraire ration de u procès, , Et Sans sil était à poursuite, r ?” Pour QC, COIMNE l'exercer oit attenantes que conduit à tou non t s'ils ont ants font ns le bref l'article ne condemanou était biens, ou prétendu mandeur it était à e conser- , dans le e à cette l'un bref irait des e trouve, tion prohier équi-

enir une

saisie-arrêt, à la demande d'un matelot, contre celui qui est censé l'avoir employé à bord d’une emburcation dont il ne donne pas même le nom, et sur lequel affidavit est émise une saisie-arrêt, ostensiblement, contre tous les biens et effets du défendeur, et aussi contre la barge qui s’y trouve portée sous le nom de Guard, non que l’on ne trouve pas en l’affidavit. C'est un affidavit insuffisant, je dois le dire, et qui, avec raison, a été mis de côté par le tribunal de première instance qui, en même temps, à non seulement annulé la saisie, mais renvoyé l'action sur une simple motion. Le jugement annulant la saisie est inattaquable, et comme il ne s'agit que de cette procédure, je ne dirai rien de cette partie du jugement renvoyant l’action in toto. Admettant donc l'insuffisance de l'affidavit, et le bien jugé de la cour inférieure en annulant la saisie, voyons si les défendeurs sont passibles des dommages. Nul doute que, par suite de la saisie de la barge en question, les appelants ont souffert $300 de dommages, mais contre qui peuvent-ils les réclamer ? Contre les intimés ? je dirais oui de prime abord : comme juges et officiers ministériels ils ne doivent pas émettre un bref sur un affidavit insuffisant; mais nous avons dans nos statuts, et notamment au chapitre 101 des $S. R. B.-C., un acte qui fait loi en cette matière et qui exonère tous les officiers judiciaires ininistériels et autres fonctionnaires publics, qui peuvent avoir erré et compromis les droits de leurs justiciables par une assomption de juridiction, ou par l'exercice illégal de leurs fonctions, de toute responsabilité sous forme de dommages et intérêts civils, lorsque ces fonctionnaires, en faisant ces actes, ont agi de bonne foi, même dans le cas où ils auraient excédé leurs pouvoirs où leur juridiction et auraient clairement agi contre la loi. Avec une telle législation on peut en venir à une conclusion assez facile en lu présente cause. Les défendeurs ne sont pas présumés avoir agi de mauvaise foi, au contraire, leur bonne foi apparaît Ces messieurs, croyant avoir à rencontrer une demande d'un bref de saisie conservatoire, l’ont émis sur cet aflidavit, Ils se sont sans doute trompés, les tribunaux les plus élevés du pays avaient déclaré, et avec raison je crois, que telle saisie conservatoire n'existait pas, que d’après le Code de Procédure ce mode d'exécution n'était pas prévu, et conséquemment qu'il ne pouvait être exercé. Mais d'un autre côté, la jurisprudence avant le code semblait justifier ce mode de recours, et on peut citer plusieurs décisions dans ce cens, antérieures au code, et depuis même; en consultant le vol. 3 de la Rev. Légale, p. 571, et le vol. 4, p. 3(1),on verra que, si les greffiers ont erré et mal interprété la loi et les règles de la

(1) 2R. J.R,. Q., 445, Graham et CCt!

procédure, ils se trouvent en compagnie très respectable. Ces faits les constituent de bonne foi et enlèvent toute idée de la faute grave, du fait de négligence et de mauvaise foi qu'on leur reproche. En un mot ils ont, suivant moi, agi ayant une cause probable et raisonnable d'en agir ainsi. Les uppelants ont cependaut insisté, et avec une certaine plausibilité, sur le fait que celui des défendeurs qui avait émis le bref de saisie n'avait pas lu l'affidavit, et que les défendeurs ne lisuient Jamais ces affidavits. Je ne puis prendre à la lettre cet aveu : il a été probablement arraché à ce défendeur dans la chaleur de la dissussion entre un avocat habile et zélé et une partie interrogée comimne témoin dans la cause. Mais qu’en réalité l'affidavit ait été où non lu par le greffier, toujours est-il certain que nous avons devant nous un affidavit écrit, signé par la partie, présenté par l'avocat de la partie, et sur lequel cet avocat demande un bref de saisie ; nous ne pouvons mettre de côté cet affidavit sur le principe que le greffier ne l'aurait pus lu, si en réalité on y trouve des allégations telles que des personnes d'un esprit sérieux et de bonne foi auraient pu interpréter comme les justifiant de l'émission d’un tel bref, surtout en face des décisions assez contradictoires rendues par les tribunaux du pays en pareilles matières. Sous un autre point de vue, les défendeurs sont excusables et non passibles de dommages ; quoiqu'ils aient violé les règles de la procédure, ils viennent de bonne foi et nous disent, nous avons agi de bonne foi, nous nous considérons simples officiers ministériels, et du moment qu’on nous présente un aff. davit, nous devons l’accepter et émettre le bref. Cette prétention est probablement ( exorbitante, mais le ch. 101 de nos S. R. B.-C. déclare que même l'infraction et l'ignorance évidente de la loi sont justitiées par la bonne foi. En conséquence, je’ ne vois pas comment les intimés pouvaient être condamnés. Si j'eusse siégé en cour inférieure, j'aurais probablement renvoyé l'action sans frais, mais en Cour d’Appel, j'ai une grande objection, à moins de cause grave, à infirmer un jugement que je considère légal sur une simple question de frais.

Judgment confirmed, ‘“ consider ing that there is no error in “ the judgment appealed from, etc.” "(4 R. L., 140 ; 22 J., 294

23 J., 273; 8 R. C., 74.) GIROUARD & Duas, for appellants.

E. BARNARD, for respondents.

prov tutri ploy:

busir draw

appe to à non thef febrt of K lant, ating her 1 law :

moncé such value Lewi forth Space him,

able. Ces idée de la foi qu'on ayant une uppelants lité, sur le de saisie je Jisaient cet aveu : a chaleur une partie en réalité est-il cersigné par lequel cet ns mettre ne l’uurait es que des iraient pu n tel bref, :s rendues , SOUS un et non pas- >gles de la sent, nous aples offite un aff.

Cette pré- O1 de nos rance évi- En conséaient être ais probar d'Appel, infirner

question

10 error in

MANDAT.—SHERIF.—ACTION EN REDDITION DE COMPTE. Privy Couxciz, 30th november 1844.

Present : Lord LANGDALE, Lord CAMPBELL, Baron PARKE, the Right Hon. Dr LUSHINGTON and the Right Hon. T. PEMBERTON.

FRANCES ERMATINGER, appellant, and BARTHOLOMEW- CONRAD-AUGUSTUS GUGY, respondent.

A, being the clerk and manager of B, the sheriff of Montreal, recuived and paid, inthat capacity, various sums of money, on B’s account, in the course of the business of the office. B brought an action against the representatives of A, for an account of the receipts and application ofthe monies which passed through A’s hands, while in B's othee,

Hell: in such circumstances, by the Judicial Committee, reversing fhe judgment of the Court of Appeals of Lower-Canada,that such action would not lie against A’s representatives. Appeal abated by the death of respondent, whose heirs renounced the succession and a curator having been appointed by the court below, to the vacant succession, the appeal was revived against such curator.

Respondent was the curator of the vacant succession of the Honourable Lewis Gugy, deceased, who, previous to the year 1837, was the sheritf of the district of Montreal, in the province of Lower-Canada. Appellant was the widow and tutrix of the infant children of Francis Perry, who was employed by Lewis Gugy, as principal clerk and manager of the business of the sheritfs office : and, as such, permitted to draw cheques in the name of the sheriff. The question in the appeal was, whether the representatives of Perry were liable to account for the receipts and application of the sums of money which passed through his hands in the office, during the period of his being such managing clerk. On the 1st of february 1837, Lewis Gugy instituted an action in the Court of King's Bench, for the district of Montreal, against appellant, in her quality of tutrix to Jemima Perry, Charles-Ermatinger Perry and Francis Perry, the minor children, issue of her marriage with the late Francis Perry, and his heirs-atlaw ; for an account of all fees, emoluments and sums of money received by him, and of all business done by him, as such managing clerk and agent, and for payment of such value as, upon rendering such account, should appear due to Lewis Gugy. By the declaration in the action, plaintiff sets forth, in substance, that the late Francis Perry, for a long space of time previous to his decense, was, on the retainer of him, and by his appointment, his deputy, and did exercise the

office of deputy-sheriff, and became and was, upon the like retainer and appointment, his agent, attorney, clerk, bookkeeper and receiver; and that, as:'such deputy-sheritf, or as such agent, attorney, clerk, book-keeper and receiver, he, Francis Perry, did receive into his hands divers fees, emoluments, sum and sums of money, belonging or payable to him, Lewis Gugy, as such sherif}, and did various matters of business relative to the atfairs and duties of the late respondent, xs such sheriff: that Francis Perry had died intestate, leaving Jemima Perry, Charles-Ermatinger Perry and Francis Perry, his minor children, his heirs-at-law : and, although, by the law of the land, F rancis Perry was bound to render à just and faithful account of all fees, emoluments and sams of money received by him and of all business done by him, us such managing clerk and agent, yet, althongh thereunto often requested, he did not, at & any time, during his life, render any such account ; and that appellant, his widow, had nc, since the decease of Francis Perry, although thereunto often requested, rendered to him, Lewis Gugy, any such account, but refused so to do. Aprellant tiled a plea of exception, and x plea of the general issue ; these pleas were as follows : “And defendant, for plea to the action and declaration of plaintiff, not admitting any of the allegations in the declaration contained to be true, by this, her exception, saith that Francis Perry was, for a long time, to wit : for and during the time specified in the declaration, the deputy of plaintiff, then sheriff of the district of Montreal, and did keep and superintend the Kkeeping of the books of account of plaintiff, as sheriff, and, during the said time, did receive and pay out for plaintiff, large sums of money ; that the receipts and payments are entered and specified in the books of account, and in certain vouchers and receipts, all of which have ever been and still remain in the possession of plaintiff, and that defendant, by reason thereof, cannot, nor is she bound by law to render an account of the said monies, in mavner and form as the same hath been demanded, in and by the action and declaration ; wherefore she prays judgment, that her exception may be maintained and that the action may be hence dismissed, with costs; and defendant, without waiver of any matter or thing by her, in the cause heretofore pleaded, for further plea in this behalf, saith that all the allegations in plaintiffs declaration contained are, and each of them is, unfounded in fact, false and untrue; wherefore defendant prays that the action may be hence dismissed with costs.” The following admission was agreed on: “The parties in this cause adinit the statement in the plea firstly pleaded contained to be true, and that it be considered and

and car!

tra of p be the pos:

to exc titt) tit:

the sent lant bool affai lant

in t

à the like erk, bookeritf, or as ceiver, he, fees, emolpayable to matters of late resdied intes- Perry and law : and, s bound to iments and ss done by ugh thereng his life, vidow, had thercunto any such a Of excep- 1s were as nd declaraions in the ption, saith »r and durdeputy of d did keep xccount of receive and be receipts books of lof which f plaintif, nor is she monies, in ed, in and judgment, the action t, without ise heretohat all the ,and each wherefore issed with on: “The plea tirstly idered and

held to be evidence in the cause, with this exception, that plaintiff does not admit the aceuracy or sufficiency of the books end accounts, but only that he has them in his possession.” Plaintitf, by his answer to defendant's plea of exception, admitted that the facts therein set forth were true: without this that the books of account, so kept by Perry, were correct, alleging, as he thereby expressly did, that the books and accounts were incorrect and insufficient ; that he was ready and willing to place them in the hands of appellant, and, persisting in the conclusions of his declaration, and by his answer to appellants plea, respondent generally alleged the truth of the matters stated in his declaration. Evidence was gone into on both sides, and, at the enquéte, upon the filing of exhibits, it was admitted by the parties that Francis Perry departed this life at New York, in the United States of America, some time in july or august then last past, that certain cheques (which were produced and tilel), were produced to show the mode in which Perry drew cheques for plaintiff, and that most of the cheques were charged to the persons in whose favour they were drawn; and that Perry received from plaintitf à yeurly salary of £250 currency. It appeared from the evidence of plaintiff, that Perry, as the confidential clerk of plaintiff, was allowed to draw cheques in his name, upon the Bank of Montreal, where his money was placed, and that plaintitf himself also drew cheques in his own name upon the bank. It appeared, also, from defendant’s witnesses, that plaintitf was generally attendant in his office, in which the business of the sheritt and particularly the pecuniary matters relating thereto, was carried on, and that all the books of account and all the transactions of the office, were open to the superintendence of plaintiff; that Perry always conducted himself as liable to be controlled by plaintiff, and that the money received in the office was always at the control and subject to the disposal of pluintiff; that the accounts received and from time to time remaining in the office unapplied, were(with the exception of the process money which was taken by plainti) placed in the Bank of Montreal, to the account of plaintit; that, on the deceuse of Perry, the books and papers in the office were taken possession of by respondent, as representing the late plaintitf. From the examination of appellant on the faits et articles, it appeared that Perry kept no books or accounts, except a book relating to his private affairs and access to which was offered to plaintiff by appellant,

On the 20th duy of february 1838, the cause was heard in the Courtof King's Bench and judgment pronounced,

ee

Ca

whereby it was déclared that, “ adjudging upon the merits of the action of plaintitf, the court doth dismiss the same with costs in favour of defendant, saving to plaintiff his recourse as he may be advised.”

From this judgment plaintiff appealed to the Provincial Court of Appeals for Lower-Canada. The appeal was heard was heard on the 30th of july 1839, when that court reversed the judgment of the Court of King's Bench, and “ adjudged that respondent (the now appellant) shouïd, in her quality of tutrix, make and render to appellant à true and faithful account of all and every the fees, emoluments, sum and sums of money reccived by the late Francis Perry, as the deputy, agent, attorney, clerk, book-keeper and receiver of appellant, as sheriff of the district of Montreal, in anywise concerning the transactions, writs, processes, oppositions, proceeclings, matters and things performed, done and executed or returned by the late Francis Perry, for or on the behalf of appellant, as sheritf, as aforesaid, and generally of the whole administration by the late Francis Perry, had of the atfairs, matters and things aforesaid, which account should be supported by all necessary and proper vouchers, evidence and documents and should pay and satisfy to appellant such balance or sum of money as, upon the rendering of such account, should appear due to appellant, with interest ; and in default of rendering such account, defendant, in her said quality, was thereby “adjudged and condemned to pay and satisfy to appellant th: sum of £5000, for and instead of the balance, sum and sums of money which, if such account were rendered, might be coming and due to appellant ; that the account be so made and rendered within the period of six months next after the day upon which appellant shall have delivered over to respondent, in her said quality, the books, papers, Vanoise documents and receipts, relating to the oflice of sheriff, a aforesaid, between the 1st day of February 1827 and the LGth of july 1836, when the late Francis Perry ceased to have the management and gestion of the aflairs and business of appellant in the office of sheriff, as aforesaid and which have in

any manner or way, come into the custody, power EST sion of appellant or his agent or agents, #1 «mers acting for or under han and which in any way tvo the business and transactions with regard to or ir pect of the o! ce of

sheriff. And Frances Ermatinger, in r said quality, was thereby required, held and adjudged to give security to the satisfaction of one of the judges of the Court oi King's Bench, to return the same when and so soon as final judgment shall have been rendered upon the account.”

From this judgment the present appeal was brought. Pend-

ing Wii con the app pre the tha ns 1

cer the met moy ace r ñ that An i noob only an( emnp such sitio tro], is sh did, suin:

in h Suuis priat the durit of in the aCCOU matt not P ment ring tory ment.

and k time ( appel the l

nerits of me with recounrse

rovincial as heard reversed idjudged uality of

faithful and sumns 3 deputy, ppellant, ncerning ceedings, returned vppellant, e admins, matters ported by ocuments *e OÙ SUM it, should lefault of uit, Was atisfy to : balance, rendered, ccount be nths next ered over vouchers, sheritf, as

the 16th have the of appel-

1 have im

lity, was ty to the s Bench,

ing the appaal, respondent died and his heirs and also his widow, having renouncel suceëssion and the same having, in coaisplenc?, b SOIN > V LCA, Mespon lent was, by an order of th: Court of « Jiecn's Binch of che district of Montreal, duly appoint: | carator of the varant succession; Whereupon, he present: {a petition to Hor Majesty in Council, praying that the appeal and the proceedings therein might be revived aud that he, as such curator, might be à party “thereto and stand as respondent in the place of the late respondent,.

Charles BULLER, in support of the petition, produced the certiticute from the Court of Queen's Bench, of the heirs and the widow having renounced the succession and the appointment of petitioner as curator to the vacant succession and moved that the same might be revived, which was ordered accordingly.

The appeul now came on for heuring.

TeEp, Q. CC. and RENSHAW, for appelant : It is impossible that the judgment of the Court of Appeals can be supported. An action of account cannot be maintained: the parties did not stand in the relation of principal and agent. Perry was only à clerk and servant, in the employment of the sheritf, and any sums of money received by him in the course of his employment, in the office of the sherit, became and were, on such receipt, at the control an | subject to the sheritfs disposition as the principal in the office; and being in such control, Perry cannot be held answerable for their application. It is shown by the evidence in the action, that the late sherit did, in his own person, apply and appropriate some of the suns received by Perry during the p-riod of his employment

à his office and appellant has no means of knowing what suis of money or to what amount, were so applied or appropriated by the sheritf. He was present in his office during all the period for which Perry was employed therein and “had during that period, possession and inspection or opportunity of inspection, of all books an accounts kept in relation to the business of the office and the receipts and payments on account thereof, and had, therefore, full knowledge of all matters and transactions which took place in the ottice. It is not pretended that appellant has any books, accounts or documents relating to the receipts and payments cf Perry, during his employment in the office, or any adequate or satisfactory means of ascertaining what were his receipts and payments. The late sheritf, upon the decease of Perry, retained and kept possession of the books, papers and vouchers relating to the receipts and payments on account of the office and appellant has no means of being satistied that the whole of the books, papers and receipts relating to such payments,