MARS

“ 9th,' 18 “six 1% “ Andre reçu ne f aucune € bail qu'il par écrit able ann dans une entre les en preuv article de ainsi cond “ Trustees “ consider dans cet a déclarant là évidemm banc (peu d'être cons parlant di de voter à déclare qu là encore fixer la du:

nuellement avoir une ni dans l’a tion de dét certaineme ce sujet, n faire, parce celui qui lc membre de ger d'église bail parce ( pour un ter le paiement a été interp de la mani, que c’est l’u dite de la t prouvé au d qué par A] point comm clusion que

ntihat nin ectline ra anc.

1 fit jant du consynu'ils quelplus rent enfin CA l1aussi cn° ' une nière pracyear, 1inathey

Ils r un , le 7 k pas sein lant grenées, tant préacite ment dans qu'il n ne és à dant Ils

ler :

"St. Andrew’s Church. No. 1.,.. 8 66.50 Montreal, Jan. “ Oth, 1872. Received from James Johnston the sum of sixty “six 5% dollars, being rent of first class pew No. 68 in St. “ Andrew’s Church, Beaver Hall, for the yeur “1872”. Ce reçu ne fait preuve que du paiement pour 1872 ; il ne contient aucune expression qui puisse faire voir quelle est la durée du bail qu'il fuit nécessairement supposer. S'il y avait eu un bail par écrit de ce banc pour dix ans, pour la même somme, payable annuellement et d'avance, le reçu aurait-il été conçu dans une autre forme ? Certainement non. Le bail intervenu entre les parties en cette cause n'a pas été mis par écrit, [l est en preuve que ce n’est pas l'usage de les faire ainsi. Le seul article des règlements concernant les aux 2st l’article 10 ainsi conçu : “ Any person who shall lease a pew from the “ Trustees, for one year, and pay the rent in advance, shall be “considered a Pewholder.” Le terme d'une année mentionné dans cet article n'est pas pour déterminer la durée du bail, en déclarant qu'il ne sera pas de plus d’une année, mais il n'est là évidemment que pour définir la qualité de locitaire de banc (pewholder) qui donne à celui qui la posseue le droit d'être considéré comme membre de l’église. Le même article parlant d'une autre catégorie de membres, ceux qui ont droit de voter à l'élection du comité chargé du choix d'un ministre, déclare qu'ils devront avoir payé trois années de loyer ; mais là encore c’est pour définir une qualitication, non pas pour fixer la durée du bail. Au contraire, l'obligation de payer annuellement et d'avance n’implique-t-elle pas que le bail doit avoir une durée indéfinie ? Il n’y a rien, ni dans ces règlements, ni dans l’acte d'incorporation qui fasse voir qu'on a eu l’intention de déterminer la durée des baux. Ce silence n'exclut pas certainement le droit des syndics de faire des règlements sur ce sujet, mais il indique clairement qu'on n'a pas voulu en faire, parce que l’on a sans doute agi sur la présomption que celui qui loue un banc, le prend pour tout le temps qu’il sera membre de la congrégation. Il n’est pas supposé devoir changer d'église comme de logement. On n'a pas fixé je terme du bail parce que l’on a considéré que de sa nature il doit être pour un terme indéfini ; on n'y a mis qu'une seule condition, le paiement d'avance. Jusqu'ici c’est ainsi que le règlement a été interprété et mis en pratique. La preuve établit ce fait de la manière la plus complète. La prétention des intimés que c'est l'usage de louer les bancs annuellement a été contredite de la manière la plus formelle. Bien au contraire, il est prouvé au delà de tout doute, que de tout temps l’usage invoqué par l’Appelant a prévalu. Je considère la preuve sur ce point comme suffisante pour me justifier d’arriver à la conclusion que le bail fait à l’Appelant, en l’absence de toute

preuve contraire, est conforme à l’usage constant depuis l’existence de la congrégation. Dans l'acte d'incorporation, pouvoir est donné aux syndics de faire des règlements, ete, pourvu qu'ils ne soient pas contraires aux lois de la province, ou aux autres dispositions de l'acte d'i incorporation ou à la constitution de l’Église d'Écosse telle qu'établie par la loi, en Écosse. L'article Ler des règlements déclare que l'église de St-André conservera la forme de culte et de gouvernement de la dite Eglise Etablie d'Écosse. Cette déclaration ne justifie-t-elle pas de recourir aux usages suivis dans cette église concernant la location des bancs et d'en faire l'application dans ce cas ? Je le crois, pourvu qu'il n’y ait point conflit entre ces usages et les lois du pays. Iln'en existe certainement pas. Car d'après la preuve faite en cette cause les usages suivis à ce sujet en Écosse différaient peu de ceux qui le sont généralement dans la Province de Québec. Ils ne sont en contradiction directe ‘avec aucune des lois de cette province. Pour expliquer un contrat, on peut invoquer l'usage tel que le permet le code civil, qui à conservé la maxime du droit romain: Zn contructibus tacitè insunt que sunt inoris et consuetudinis. En consultant ces usages d'après la preuve, on voit que l'église St-André à adopté celui de l'Église d’ Écosse, de louer les bancs à des membres de la congr égation, sans terme défini, à la condition de payer le loyer d'avance, Pour toutes ces raisons tirées de la nature du bail, de l'usage de louer les bancs dans l’église St-André, de l'usage suivi en Ecosse, et que l'on peut invoquer dans Îles circonstances particulières de cette cause, je crois que l'Appelant était légalement en possession du banc n° 68, dont il a été injustement dépossédé. Cette manière d'apprécier la nature du bail en question étant incompatible avec l’idée d’une facite reconduction, je rejette la prétention émise à ce sujet par lAppelant, Les Intimés ont essayé, mais :n vain, de prouver que la conduite de l'appelant dans les assemblées de la congrégation et de l'église avait été telle qu'ils étaient justitiables de Jui enlever son banc, Comme les faits ont été mentionnés en détail par ceux qui m'ont précédé, je m'abstiendrai de les répéte r. Sila conduite de l'appelant méritait une censure, ce n'était pas aux intimés à la lui infliger, mais c'est devant un tribun spirituel, le kirk Session, qu'il devait être traduit pour en vépondre. Cet avancé n'a été fait par les intimés, que pour essayer de pallier l'abus de pouvoir qu'ils ont commis par leur résolution du 7 décembre, refusant de louer un bane à l'appelant pour supporter l'action de la congrégation et le forcer de résigner sa charge d'elder et le priver du droit de prendre part aux affaires de l'église. C’est pour arriver à ce résultat qu'ils ont eu recours à T'expédient de lui refuser un

bane, le 1 intimés, o tendent q ni aucun conme m ils dérive dent n'av mis, dans membres :

ce sujet le ‘common ‘rights r “when th “not be « ‘these rio ‘terms an “ grewatiot “the rules Je concours Banc de |:

d'avis que de dommi a dans cette HENRY, .

session of à during the February, 1 ed in his P months nai books, cushi in intimatir The Appel] whom the church (L).

several yeai years 1869 October, 1$8( 1870, the A that time t January, LS but no wri annually ma to Year to advance, TI Stances the

(1) See Art, I:

eXor rvu aux itu- )SSE, idré dite pas it la Je s et près ‘t en dans recte "un code trac- En lise 3E les fini, à s r'aibancs e l'on cette

e res Induite et de

lever

banc, le mettant de cette manière hors de l'église. Mais les intimés, oubliant qu'ils ne sont que des administrateurs, prétendent qu'eux seuls forment la corporation et que l'appelant ni aucun autre ae peuvent réclamer l'exercice d'aucun droit comme membre de là congrégation (corporator). Cependant ils dérivent leur pouvoir de ces mêmes membres qu'ils prétendent n'avoir aucun droit; ils ne sont que leurs agents, soumis, dans bien des cas, au contrôle des assemblées dont les membres sont les vrais propriétaires de l'église, Je répèterai à ce sujet les paroles de l'honorable juge en chef Dorion : “ As “ commoners, the members of this congregation have certain “rights resulting from the implied contract entered into “when they joined the congregation, and of which they can- “not be deprived arbitrarily by the Respondents. Among “these rights is that of obtaining seats and pews on the same “terms and conditions as all the other members of the con- “ sregation, and of retaining them as long as they submit to “the rules and usages of the Church.” Pour ces motifs, je concours dans le jugement infirmant celui de la Cour du Banc de la Reine renvoyant l'action de l'appelant, et je suis d'avis que les intimés doivené être condamnés à payer $300 de dommages, avec tous les frais tant en Cour Inférieure que dans cette Cour.

HENRY, J.: The Appellant having been in the legal possession of a pew (No. 68) in Saint-Andrew's Church, Montreal, during the year 1872, and during the months of January, February, March and April, 1873, complains of being disturbed in his possession thereof, on several occasions during the months named by the Respondents, they having: removed his books, cushions, &e., therefrom, and by placing placards therein intimating that the pew should be reserved for strangers. The Appellant is shown to be one of the congregation for whom the Respondents, as Trustees, held the title of the church (1). He had been the holder of pews in the church for several years, and of the one in question (No. 68) during the years IS69 and 1872. The church having been burnt in October, 1869, and not rebuilt and occupied till November, 1870, the Appellant occupied No. 66 instead of No, 68, from that time till the end of 1871, reiurning to No. 68 in January, 1872. The rents of the pews were paid annually, but no written leases were granted, and no letting was annually made, but those in possession continued from yeur to year to pay the rent, sometimes but not gene ally in advance. The Respondents contend that under these cireumstances the leases terminate every year, that no notice to

(1) Sce Art, 12 of the by-laws,

quit is necessary, and that they, as trustees, could be justified, the day after the expiration of the year, in turning out, without any previous legal notice to quit, without any other legal justification or necessary explanations, the books and furniture of any of the pewholders. If they have that abstract right, we cannot, in an action like the present one withhold from them the defence which that right enabled them to set up. The arbitrary and improper exercise of à right so peculiar as that claimed, would lead to the most unpleasant consequences, and the existence of it would enable the trustees, without legal restraint, to unseat and drive from their pews any number of the pewholders they pleased to injure, without a moment’s notice. All that would be necessary for them would be on the first day of January, in any year, to say to À, B,C, or D: “ We have decided that although you are an elder and communicant of the church, and one of the parties for whom we are trustees, you shall no longer hold a seat in the church” Can any one say that such should be the relative position occupied by Respondents and those for whose use they hold the title in trust ? The Respondents do not avowedly claim that position, but give a reason for the commission of the acts complained of, and make an insufficient attempt at a justification. Their justification for the acts complained of, on the ground of alleged improper conduct of Appellant, must wholly fail, for neither the law nor the constitution of the church, empowers them to refuse the continued occupation of 4 pew to which the party holding it was otherwise entitled, because they might have objections tc his moral character or conduct. By their ple: they attempt a justification on the ground that to the best of their judgment, before the 31st of December, 1872, it had become undesirable and inexpedient to let the said pew No. 68 to the Appellant for the year commencing the first day of January 1873, or for any other time, and in the exercise of their discretion, and in good faith, without malice or any other than conscientious motives, and with a desire to fultil their duties, and for the preservation of peace and harmony in the congregation, the Respondents did, to wit, on the 7th day of December, 1872, decide and determine not to let & peu (that is, any pew) to the Appellant. For the sake of the Respondents, it is, perhaps, to be regretted that it having become “undesirable and inexpedient, to the best of their judgment, to give any sitting in his own name in the church, does not constitute them the judges in such à case; nor does it allow them, “in the exercise of their discretion,” to take the stand they did ; and although they acted in good faith and withont malice, &e., there is no justification under this plea; and it is

to be fu scientiou arbitrary lessening congreca directly À quently n conduct, « and by & been Gep:

versed the to him of church, ax standing, :

right to e refuse hn juigment, they thou the Appell them, they ing to usui the churel whose dec duced litior harmony expected, to disrate t that the ati the Appell properly, :

have been hold the ti have limite upon the co thereupon d be to strike create an 4 of strifes n tification, I other pleadis of this case, an many p4 Case previou:

Points and :

l'consider ut must govern righéfully it TOME

ied, out, her and hat one bled of à unable rom > in- 2CESany ough ne of neer such and Resve à and justi-

leged

thont it is

to be further regretted that the course they adopted (conscientiously, no doubt), resulted, as in many other cases where arbitrary power is exercised or attempted to be used, in lessening instead of increasing the peace and harmony of the congregation. The by-laws and constitution of their church directly vested the power, not in the trustees (who are frequently not persons capable of deciding questions of moral conduct, &e., or versed in church discipline), but in the session and by appeal, in the Synod. The Appellant had recently been äeposed as an elder by the Session, but the Synod reversed the action of that body; and, at the time of the refusal to him of a seat in the church, he was, by the rules of that church, and by a decision of its highest court, an elder in full standing, and one in regard to whom the trustees had no right to exercise their judgment or discretion so far as to refuse him à seat for the reasons pleaded ; and if,in ther judgment, in a matter in which they had no legal control, they thought it “undesirable and inexpedient” not to leave the Appellant in the enjoyment of his rights, but invaded then, they must abide the consequences : and if, by attempting to usurp power that properly belonged to other bodies in the church, and by disregarding the action of the Synod, whose decision should have been respected, they have produced litigation and otherwise increased discord and want of harmony in the congregation, it is but what might have been expected. The attempt by the Respondents and the Session to disrate the Appellant having failed, we can only conclude that the attempt to do so should not have been made ; and if the Appellant, after the judgment of the Synod, acted improperly, à fresh case, before the proper authorities, should have been brought; but to permit the trustees, who merely hold the title for the benefit of the congregation, and who have limited powers only, as their dealing with it, to decide upon the conduct of one of its members, and an elder too, and thereupon deprive him of à pew or seat in his church, would be to strike at the root of all proper church government, and create an dinperium in inmperio calculated to create all sorts of strifes and conflicts. Having thus disp:sed of this justitication, [will now consider the case as presented by the other pleadings. Much has been said at the several arguments of this case, à good deal of irrelevant testimony introduced, ant many points discussed, in the judgments rendered in this case previous to the appeal to this Court ; but many of those points and arguments, and à great portion of the evidence, l'consider unnecessary to refer to in my view of the law that must govern the decision. The Appellant claims that he was rightfully in the possession of the pew in qnestion when the TOME XXIV.

trespasses and wrongs were committed, 1st. Because, having been in possession in 1872, he was entitled to three months notice to quit, and without which he could hold over for the year 1873, during which year the trespasses complained of were committed. 2nd. That having continued in possession eight days after the first of January, 1873, under art. 1609 Civil Code Lower Canada, he could hold possession on paying the annual rent in due time for that year by tacite recondur.tion. The Respondents.deny the correctness of these positions and contend, as to the first, that no notice to quit was necessary, and, secondly, that, they having given the notice of the 7th December, 1872, and subsequently refused to receive the rent, there was no tacite reconduction. Tam of opinion that there was no renewal of the lease by tucite reconduction, and that the notice referred to, and the refusal to receive the rent, destroy the Appellant’s contention on that point. See articles 1609 and 1610 Civil Code (L. C.). I will, therefore, proceed to consider the Appellant’s first position, and in doing so must, in the first place, solve the question as to the nature of his holding. Was it by a lease ? I feel bound to decide that it was, and by a verbal ome, for the receipt for the rent for 1872 does not constitute a lease, 1t is merelyan acknowledgement of the receipt of the rent for the year, signed on behulf of the treasurer, and would not be incompatible with a holding by lease, written or unwritten, for life, or from year to year, or otherwise. Besides the treasurer had no authority to lease or let pews or make any contract therefor. The letting was a verbal one by the Respondents, as trustees, to the Appellant, but it has been adjudged that, if it were a lease, it was not of the ordinary kind. Mr. Justice SANBORN properly says :....“In St. Andrew’s Church in Montreal some persons “have a proprielary interest in pews...others, as Appellant, “hold only by lease, having no ownership in a pew ;” and adds :....“ As the rights which ownership of pews gives to “the owner are peculiar, and not subject to many of the or- “ dinary incidents of property, so what is termed leuse is not “an ordinary kind of lease.” And further : “ It is a means of “contributing to the support of the Gospel.” I cannot conceive that in the relation of the parties here now,the object for which the pews are let, or the purpose for which the rent is applied, can in any way affect the character of the holding, or that {he application of the rents can in any way affect the rights of the tenant who pays them ; nor can it legally affect those rights, whether they are merely trustees or owners; nor are the trustees the less lessors in the ordinary sense, as between them and their tenants, because the funds derived from pew rents are only received in trust for the

benefit « the sup him, M who sa; “des ch “propre

“ donné “(not a} mais @« This do churches churches churches In this s more pe as those Pothier civil COTp as if ow and thos enforced comprehe and Low.

with r'esp the Juris} Establish see of the resides at upon, sub the sancti or lower Sustainabl done to hi though re Powers of “of the con © Corporat “in their c

exXercised which thei be differen Ject to the lessee in ei for the tin declared b

(1) 2 Ntep.,

ing ths | of sion [609 ying ducons eCeSthe > the that and the Dee ifore, doing «ture > that at for ledgejehc lf holdear to ty to tting e Apase, it sperly rsons allant, ” and ves to he or- 18 not Ans of conobject e rent holdaffect egally ees OT inarÿ funds

r the

benefit of the congregation, and as “means of contributing to the support of the Gospel.” In support of the view taken by him, Mr. Justice SANBORN quotes Pothier (Louage No. 4). who says:...."*On tolère néanmoins le louage des bancs et “des chaises dans les églises; on peut dire que ce n’est pas “proprement un contrat de louage, et ce qu'on donne n’est pas “ donné comme le prix d'usage de ces choses qui ne sont pas “(not applicable, as the Judge quotes him, but wppreciable), “mais comme une contribution aux charges de la fabrique.” This doctrine ïs held and may be properly applicable to churches under the laws of France and to roman catholie churches in Lower Canada, and be totally inapplicable to churches held by a civil corporation like the one in this case. In this and other countries, churches are owned by one or more persons noë necessarily belonging to the same religion as those who worship in them, and surely the doctrine of Pothier cannot be held applicable to them. If owned by a civil corporation, the same principles, I take it, would govern, as if owned by an individual, except as being the trustees and those for whom they hold. But if French law is to be enforced in one respect, why not take it in its integrity and comprehensiveness ? We would then have, under the French and Lower Canadian parochial organization which prevails with respect to the Roman Catholie Church, and even under the jurisprudence in England and Scotland in regard to the Established Church there, to decree to the Appellant, as lessee of the pew in 1872, the right to retain it as long as he resides at Montreal, on pay ment of the rent originally” agreed upon, subject to the right of the Respondents as trustees, with di sanction of the two-thirds of the Congregation, to ruise r lower it. In that view the Appellant’s action would be UN LS to recover by law compensation for the damages done to him. The trustees in this case hold the titles, and ‘al though restrained in some respects, they have the ordinary powers of trustees to lease : and can do so “within the terms “of the constitution and by-laws and as incident to their title. “CU orporations ageregate may make what estates they please ‘in their church or other lands.” (1) When that power is s0 exercised by them, 1 can see no ditference in principle by which their leases would, as between them and their lessees, be different from other leases by other trustees, or be sub- Ject to the application to them of différent rules of law. The lessee in either case obtains the right of possession and user for the time, and pays the rent agreed on. The trusts are declared by the conveyances, the acts of incorporation, and

(1) 2 Step., Com., 733.

its aimendment and the by-laws, and the trustees have to uccount in the ordinary way to their cestui que trust. After full consideration of the position of the Respondents, in regard to their lessees, I can come to no other conclusion than that it is one incident to any ordinary civil corporation and that the Court, without in the slightest degree trenching on the religious rights, privileges or responsibilities of the trustees or congregation, or with any discretionary power of the former, is empowered and bound to deal with the subject matter, as one purely of civil contract, and in that view to consider and adjudge the rights of parties as in regard to the proprietorship and leasehold of pews. The exercise of this power will not trench on the rights of spiritual jurisdiction, nor Will it in any way affect the contracting powers of the trustees. It only, in this case, is invoked to decide upon the contract made, and for an unlawful interference with the rights of the Appellant under it. To sustain the proposition that the Appellant held by lease, and not a mere easement or licence, it is necessary, first, to show that the subject matter is capable of being leased, and if there be no legal, prohibition, the understanding and expressed views upon that point of the parties themselves, may aid in ascertaining t} air respective rights under the cireumstances. À lease is well defined at Common Law to be: “A conveyance by which à man grants lands or tenements to another for life, for years, or at will” (1). In ordinary legal intendment, tenement includes not only land, but rents, commons, and several other rights and interests issuing out of, or concerning lands (2). By article 1605 C. C. (L. C): “AIl corporel things may be leased or “hired, except such as are excluded by” their special destin- “ation, and those which are necessarily consumed by the use “ made of them.” By article 1606: “Incorporeal things may “ also be leased or hired, except such as are inseparably at- “tached to the person, &e” The pew in this case is, in my opinion, a subject of article 1605, and under that article may be leased for any term within the trust. If a subject of article 1606, it might also be leased. By the 10th article of the by-laws: “Any person who shall lease a pew from the trus- “ tees for one year, and pay the rent in advance, shall be con- ‘“sidered a pew-holder. The rents of pews and sittings are to “be paid annually in advance, from the 1st day of January, “and are to be considered then due, &e” I have before stated that in regard to the church temporalities, the en Rs here not being an ecclesiastical one, but the creature of :

(1) Step., Com., 512.

(2) 1 Step., Com., 170.

“in the m

special à ordinary exhausti point, I that the the pew:

got a le:

OCCUpPY à the App lies not i not be € “right 0 “tam ot “appurte “dvidua takes t] rather “same.” lowe) (2) “in land, “ deed, “ Jicense Easement ‘ütle; p : purpose by the “js in wi “of the revokable fore the 1] under a lessee un trine that in this ca tainment its act of :

necessary Ultra Vi “Ownersh

1Cfter r'ehan and œ on rusthe >ject v to ) the this tion, f the a the the ition nt or atter hibi- Joint r re- Il deman or at s not and ticle

use may

special act of incorporation, partakes of the character of all ordinary civil corporations, and I have so decided after an exhaustive search for the leading principles to determine that point. If correct in the positions taken, it necessarily follows that the trustees had power to lease for à year, or for years, the pews in the church, and that the party leasing from them wot a leaschold title, and not x mere easement or license to occupy and use, which was revokable, The right acquired by the Appeilant was not, therefore, an easement ; an easement lies not in livery, but in grant; and a freehold interest cannot be created or passed otherwise than by deed ; “and the “right of profit à prendre, if enjoyed by à holding of a cer- “tain other estate, is regarded in the light of an easement “appurtenant to such estate ; whereus, ifit belongs to an in- “dividual distinct from any ownership of other lands, it

takes the character of an interest or estate in the lunds itself,

rather than that of a proper easement in or out of the “same” (Washburn, on Easements (1); Grinstead vs Marloue) (2). “ Easements, that is such as stated, being interests “in land, can only be acquired by grant, and ordinarily, by “ deed, or what is deemed to be equivalent thereto, a parol “license being insufficient for the purpose.” (Washburn, on Fasements, (3). “ No servitude can be established without a

“title ; possession even immemorial is insufficient for that

“purpose.” (4). “As regards servitudes the destination made

“by the proprietor is ‘equivalent to a title, but only when it

‘is in writing, and the nature, the extent and the situation

“of the servitude are specified.” (5). À parol license being revokable, no term of holding could be created, and therefore the holding by the Appellant cannot be an easement or under à mere license. His holding must, therefore, be as à lessee under a verbal lease. It is now the settled legal doctrine that a corporation, just as the Respondents” corporation in this case, has all such authority as will conduce to the attinment of its ends, save such as are, by direct provision in its act of incorporation or other constating instruments, or by necessary inference from the same denied it. (Bryce, on Ultra Vires. 38 et seg., where some decisions are quoted.)

“Uw nership is the right of enjoying and of disposing of things

‘in the most absolute manner, provided that no use be made

“of them which is prohibited by law or by regulations.” (1) Then, I take it that not only had the Respondents as trustees, by the express terms of the by-laws, by the Civil Code, but also by the late decisions, the power of granting leases of pews, and that such would bind the congregation their cestui que trust. T will apply but two more tests : st. Could not the Appellant have had recourse for dumages, if the Respondents, during the year 1872, had ejected “him from the occupation of the pew, or have interfered with his proper use of it? Having received the rent, would they not be estopped from saying he hell only by “license” when their contract was irrevokable for that year ? Were they not bound, under the ard section of article 1612 of the Civil Code, to give ‘ pouces able enjoyment, &e., during the continuance of the lease ?” And 2ndly. Had not the Respondents, in the language Of article 1619, for the payment of their rent and obligations of the lease, a privileged right upon the moveable effects which are found upon the property leased, upon which they had à privileged daim for any rent falling due. Having disposed of the question as to the lease, the next point for consideration is the nature of the lettings as to the term granted. I have already characterized them as ordinary leases, and can find no law to make them otherwise. We have now to consider the nature of the holding of the pews for over forty-nine years up to 1872. The trustees let the pews originally for a year, and for rent in advance, and the pewholders, whether the rent was paid or not in advance, were allowed to become lessees for a second year by {ucite reconduction and so on from year to year, Art. 1609 provides : “If the lessce “remain in possession more than eight days after the expira- “tion of the lease, without any opposition or notice on the “ part of the lessor, a tacit renewal of the lease takes place “for, another year, or the term for which such lease was “ made, if less than à year, and the lessee cannot thereafter “leave the premises, or be ejected from them, unless notice has “been given with the delay required by law.” This article clearly “applies to all holders of a pew for over a year. qu Appellant was a lessee of No 68 for two years ( 6S- *69), and during the latter year was clearly entitled to notice. He resumed possession of it in 1872, having occupied No 66 in 1871 at the same rate as he previously paid, without any new bargain or arrangement, so far as appears. What then was, under all the circumstances, the nature of the holding under the contract ? Would it not be a fair inference that he resumed his former position as to No 68 and which was the

sine as And wa occu pat] Did not tice 18 t you sba holding having 1 can, by until we proper t that, hac in an E plied co found nt Canada In that « to quit, positivel lease de] do so, T uncerbait By articl “the lea ‘neither the payable “ payabl ‘be reg the lease ten lease party ma is also 4 ginally « and noth Code, un wise bet\ was inter a compr plainly that, for leave so solved by evidence) and that Legislatu cases of

(1) rusode, s Of stui ould Res-

the use »ped r'act ider œive

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sue as that of all other pewholders who held for over a yeur ? And was it not the true understanding of the parties that his occupation should be identical with all the other pewholders ? Did not the Respondents virtually say : “The rule and practice is to let pews, for rent payable annually, in advance, and you shall have the same tenure as all the others, which is a holding as long as you pay the rent in proper time; and we having now adjudged you as a fit person to hold a pew, you can, by paying the rent in advance, continue to hold the pew until we give you notice to quit, or you are declared by the proper authorities not a fit person to do so?” I feel satistied that, had such been submitted for the consideration of a jury in an English Court, and they found that such was the implied contr: act, the verdict would be sustained, and I have found no law or rule which would prevent a Judge in Lower Canada finding the sane under the Code-of Civ il Procedure. ln that case the Appellant would be entitled to à legal notice to quit, It is not, however, necessary, in my opinion, to decide positively that point ; although, did the determination of the lease depend solely on it, I would not have any hesitation to do so. That in «ll cases of verbal leases, and where the term is uncertain, à notice is necessary, appear to me unquestionable. By article 1657 : “ When the term of a lease is uncertain, or “the lease is verbal, or presumed as provided in article 1608, ‘neither of the parties can terminate it without giving notice “to the other, with a delay of three months, if the rent be “ payable at terms of three or more months; if the rent be “payable at terms of less than three months, the delay is to ‘be regulated according to article 1642.” When the term of the lease was uncertain. This is clearly applicable to a written lease where the term is not stated, and under which x party may hold by the year, quarter, month or otherwise. It is also applicable to verbal leases, where the term is not originally agreed upon, for the word “ lease ” applies to both; and nothing further was necessary to be provided for by the Code, unless a distinction were intended to be made otherwise between written and verbal leases. The Code evidently was intended to go further, and adds, “or the lease is verbal,” a comprehensive term embracing all verbal leases, and so plainly mandatory that I feel bound to the consideration that, for good reasons (one of which may have been, not to leave so important à right as the ending of a lease to be resolved by verbal proof, subject, as it would be, to conflicting evidence), the framers of the Code used the words advisedly, and that they, in the employment of words so piain, and the Legislature, in adopting them, intended them to apply to «ll cases of verbal le: ises, and to those where the term is uncer-

tain. Such being my opinion, L um necessarily bound to declare that, as no legal notice was given to the Appellant, ns required by the Code in the case of verbal leases, and where the term is uncertain, as £ maintain it was in this case, the Respondents were not justitied in the trespasses and grievances comimitted by them, and that the appeal should be «llowed, with costs, and that the Respondents should be adjudged to pay to the Appellant the sum of 300, damages for the injuries compluined of, Appeal allowed. (18 J., p.113; TR. Cour Suprême, p. 235).

D. MACMASTER, Attorney for Appellant,

Cross, QUINN and DAVIDSON, Attorney for Respondents.