G TOULON ET LES ANGLAIS
and much more his assuming to exercise any funclion Ibère, in a character njt recognized by Ihem, would be agreeable lo Ihe inhabitants of Toulon, or useful to the conimon cause. You are, if you find it ultimately necessary, to state distinctly that you knovv with certainly, that His Majesty's officers are not at liberty to take upon them to admit of Monsieur's landing at Toulon, wilhout express directions to that effecl. You will urge the inconvenience which would resuit, both pcrsonally to that prince, and also lo the gênerai interests, from any éclat taking place on this su^ject, and you will represent to him, that his applying for the previous consent of the powers, into whose hands Toulon has been delivered, would not only be a mark of respect due to them, but also a necessary preliminary to such explanations, as the occasion appears to require, before any décision can be final iy taken on so délicate a point.
If you find that, notwithstanding what you shall hâve stated on this subject, Monsieur still persists in his intention, it is very necessary that you should take the speediest possible method of conveying this information to his Majesly's officers at Toulon that, they may beprepared to exécute the orders which His Majesly has found himself under the necessity of giving to them ; but you will use every endeavour in your power, by respectful and conciliatory représentations, to preveut recourse being had to this extremity, and you will endeavour to persuade the ministcrs of the allied powers at Genoa, to support you in thèse représentations.
(Priva te.)
Henry blindas à sir Gilbert EUiot
Wimbledon, 28,h December 1793.
My dear Sir,
...M. Pitt will, I think, feel less difficulty as to the immédiate acknowledgment of the Régent, but lie sees many inconveniences in admitting him to Toulon, which he thinks would at once supersede your authority there, and, at the same time, deprive us of ail the advantages of holding such an important situation with a vieweither to peace or war. He is likewise strongly impressed both with the possibility and prôpriety of-assembling a large force in the south of France, and maintaining a standard of royalty there, which it
would be very difficult to do without the possession and authority over Toulon remaining with us.
I admit the force of ali that reasoning, and l rather imagine the gênerai voiee of the Cabinet will lean that way. I own I hâve considerabledifGculties, and theleaningof my mind is another way. My opinion leads me to think that we would act wiser in confining our military exertions to Flanders and the Goast, and from those two points to direct our opérations to Paris. I am far from thinking it is not essential likewise to erect a standard of Royalty in the south, but then I conceive that such a standard might be erected and maintained by an assemblage of force acting under Monsieur as the avowed Régent.
I am aware that the whole of this theory rests upon the fact of whether there is such a disposition in the South, towards the Régent, as to make a forcible rising in his favour, and to enable him to hold his ground in the southern provinces. If that cannot be,tobesure it would be very losinggame indeed to put Toulon and the South of France into his hands.
It sometimes occurs to me that a middle course might be followed, which is to leave the possession of Toulon dislinctly wilh us under the terms specified in your déclaration, but, at the same time, either at Marseillesorsomewhere without the fortress of Toulon, to collect a.powerful force wilh Monsieur, aided by one or two good gênerais at the head of it, to contend for the provinces in the south, and to maintain them against the Convenlion army. Under such an arrangement, a very moderate garrison would suffice for Toulon, and therefore we might add to the Regent's army ail our auxiliary troops we hâve collected or can further collect in the south, and I should flatter myself that such a force, in conjunction with such french troops acting under frenchoffîcers, as would rallythemselves under the Régent, might furnish an irrésistible force in the southern provinces, and we being in possession of Toulon and the Mediterranean, there never could be a danger of the want of provisions.
I throw out thèse ideas very loosely, I am in doing so merely thinking aloud, for I am well aware <^f Ihe difficultés which attend the whole question. We are not without suspicion that the Toulonese coming forward as they hâve done in favour of the Régent, and bringing him to Toulon, may be in concert wilh and a part of the spanish intrigue.
It will be too ridiculous if, at the time I am writing this, you hâve been obliged to abandon Toulon.If that should prove to be the case, we shall hâve cause indeed to be dissatisfied with the Austrians, for witholding the promised aid, and still more with sir Robert Boyd's disobedience of our orders.
Lord Grcnville aux Commissaires royaux à Toulon
Whitehall, 30lhNovember 1793.
My Lord and Gentlemen,
... The measures which you will perceive hâve been taken for conveying to the comte de Provence His Majesty's sentiments in respect to his going to Toulon, will, His Majesty trusts, prevent his proceeding thither, but, if those communications which His Majesty has directed to be made should not produce the effect which could be wished, and he should find means of getting to Toulon, it will be the duty of your Excellencies to state to him distinctly His Majesty's détermination upon this point.
The considération which is due to the rank and situation of the comte, will naturally induce you to communicate this détermination in terms of proper civility and respect; but, at the same time, your Excellencies will take care that such communication may also leave no doubt of a détermination on your part to fulfîll your instructions upon this point, and neither to acknowledge any authority he may attempt to exercice, under the character he wishes to represent,nor to admit him, under the présent circumstances, to corne within the town or forts of Toulon.
(Secret.)
