III. Of Kinds of Knowledge, according to Swedenborg

" Moreover, it should be known that there are three degrees of Love and Wisdom. and thence three degrees of Life, and that the human mind, according to thèse degrees, is formed as it were into régions, and that life in the highest région is in the highest degree, and in the second région in a lower degree, and in the last région in the lowest degree. Thèse régions are succèssively opened in man ; the last région, where life is in the lowest degree, is opened from infancy to childhood, and this is done by the sensés. The second région, where life is in a higher degree, from childhood to youth, and this is done by knowledges from the sciences ; and the highest région, where life is in the highest degree, from youth to manhood and onwards, and this is done by the perception of truths, both moral and spiritual. It should be further known, that the perfection of life consists not in thought, but in the perception of truth from the light of truth ; the différences of the life with men may be thence ascertained; for there are some who, as soon as they hear the truth. perceive that it is truth. [This is Spinoza's third kina of knowledge.] There are others who do not perceive truth, but conclude it from confirmations by appearances. [To conclude or infer a truth, means to reason out a truth, and this is Spinoza's second kind of knowledge.] There are others who believe a thing to be true, becouse it was asserted by a man of authority."

IAnd this last answers to Spinoza's first kind of knowedge, which he afterwards shows to be the source of error and falsehood, because things are seen in their apparent order in nature, in which their true causes do not appear ; thèse being only seen by the third kind of knowledge, in the intellect And in this too, the two thinkers agrée, Swedenborg attributing error to

SPINOZA AND SWISDENBORG IMNTIFIED. 9

seeing or jtidging of things ùomappearances as eflBCts, â.nd not seeing them in their causes — as we shall see presently.] True Christian Religion^ page 37.

Of Einds op Knowledge, according to Spinoza.

" We perceive many things and form universal notions from single things represented to us through the sensés, motilated, confnsed, and withotrt relation to the inteUect ; and also from signs ; for example, reading or hearing certain words, we call things to mind, and form certain ideas of them like thosc, by which we imagine things. Thèse I will in future call knpwledge of the first kind. [Swedenborg's lowest degree.] ^ condly, we form them firom our having universal notions and adéquate ideas of the properties of things. Und this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. [This is Swedenborg's second degreeL Besides thèse two kinds of knbwledges, there is a tnird, as I will show in the seqael, which wé will call intuitive knowledge. And this kind of knowing proceeds (or descends) from the adéquate idea of the formai essence of certain attributes of €ro4 to an adéquate knowledge of the essence of things." [This is Swedenbor^s highest degree.]

Both writers make vcry great use of the distinctions abore set forth, of which, one or two examples may Buffice. The above extract is from the Bthics, part %^ acholium 2, prop. 40.

lY. Of THE DIPFBBBNGB OF SBBINe TmNGS IN THSm

BFFECTS Avo IN THEIR CAUSES, accoïdiiig to Swedeoborg*

Explaining his reasons for treating certain matters as he had, Swedenborg says, "Totreat of them other-* wise than from their original source, would be to treat from effects and not from causes ; and yet effects teach nothingbut effects, and when they are considered alone, they do not explain a single cause ; btU causes erplain effects ; and to know effects from causes is to be wise ; but to inquire into causes from effects is not to be wise : because then fallacies présent tbemselres, which the examiner calls causes, and this is confounding wisdom," &c. Angelic Wisdom eonceming Di* vine LovCj par. 119.

On this point, Spinoza, in the 4th axiom to the fîrst

i)art of the Ethics, states his doctrine, that " the know* edge of an effect de^nds upon (or is involved in) a knowledge of its cause."

Y. Of THE Intuitive EInowlbdge, (or highest degree,) according to Swedenboi^.

'' There are two things proper to* nature, space and Hme. From thèse in the natural world man forms the ideas of his thbught, and thence his understanding. If he remains in thèse ideas, and does not elevate his mind above them, he never can perceive any thing spiritual or divine ; for he involves it in ideas which he dérives from space and time, and in proportion as he does this, the light of his understanding is merely natural. Thinking from this merely natural light, in reasoning of things spiritual and divine, is like thinking from the darkness of night of those things which only appear in the light of day ; hence cornes naturalism. But he that knows how to elevate his mind above the ideas of thought which partake of space and time, passes from darkness to light, and l^comes wise in spiritual and divine things. Ibid. par. 69.

Of Intuitive Knowledge, according to the Ethics.

Spinoza, in the Ethics, after stating the three kinds of cognition (knowins) i. e. Ist, from the sensés : 2d, from reasoning : 3d, from intuition, states the proposi<tion, that the third kind of knowing (corresponding to Swedenborg's spiritual knowledge) cannot possibly anse from the first kind of knowledge ; and in varions places throughout the Ethics sets forth the same doc^ trine ; while in his Tract on Theology, treating of the Divine Law, chap. 4, he has the following passage, referring to the impossibility of the natural man's knowing the things of the spiriL

'^ Thèse things cannot but be unintelligible to a car* nal man, and must seem vain and unsubstantial to him in conséquence of his meagre (jejune) conceptions of God ; and because in this highest gooa, cousisting solely in contemplation and pure mind, he can find nothing to touch or eat, or which in any way affects ^ the bodily sensés, wherein he takes his chief'^delight

But they most be the most substantial of ail things to those who kiiow tbat there is nothing more excellent than reason and a sound mind." [Bj reason, is not meant hère the faculty of reasoning (argument), but that élément or principle in man, by which he is man, and without which he would not be at ail — ^in short, the divine in man ; which, as both Swedenborg and Spinoza agrée, is from God.]

The kdmirers of Coleridge will readily see, above, the grounds of the doctrine so zealously set forth by him, i. e. the distinction between the understanding and the reason ; ail knowledge depending upon the first being uncertain and unstable, while throagh the reason, according to this doctrine, knowledge is absolute, and admits of no appeal.

We hâve now seen how nearly similar thèse two thinkers are in their doctrines of God, of things, of the différent kinds of knowledge, and of the imposai^ bUiiy of the naturd man^s Imoiaing the things of the spirit. We will next pass to a vital point, to which particular attention is invited, namely, their doctrine of Salvaiicn.

It is important to observe, that the language of Swedenborg, soon to follow, has a very distinct significa* tion, where he distinguishes the wish of one to make another happy ''from" himself; the idea being, to make another happy with a total disregard of one's own happiness ; àiis being the test of a true love, indépendent of conséquences.

YL Of Salyation, according to Swedenborg.

<' The third essential of the love of God, which is to make them happy from itse^f, is acknowledged from etemal life, which is blessedness, happiness, and felicity without end, which God gives to those who receive his hve in themselvcs - for God, as he is Love itself, is also blessedness itself; for every Love breathes forth from itself a delight, and the Divine Love breathes forth blessedness itself, happiness and felicity to eternity. Thus God makes angels happy from himself, ana also men after death, which is enected by conjunction with them." True Chm. Relig. p. 38.

And again, at page 262, same work, is the foUowing:

'^ If therefore man becomes rational-spiritual, and at tbe same time moral-spiritual, he is conjoined to Cfod^ and by conjunction bas salvation and eternal iife."

Op Saltation according to Spinoza.

" Our intellectual love of God is tbe same love with whicb God loves bimself ; not, as he is infinité, but in 80 far as he can be explained (or represented) by the essence of the human mind, regarded under uie form of etemity ; or, in other words, the intellectual love of themind for God, is a part of the infinité love wiik wbich God loves himselt Hence it foUows that, in se far as God loves bimself, he loves men or mankind, and consequently, that the love of God for men, and the intellectual love of the mind for God, are one and the same thing." [This is the Conjunction of Swedenborg.] '^ We see clearly now wherein consista our salvation or happiness (bliss or blessedness), or, in other words, our liberty( or freedom), to wit, in a constant and eternal love for God, or, in the love of God for men, (God's love of us) ; and the sacred scriptures bave not without reason given to this bve the name of glory.'' Ethics, pari 5, prop. 36.

The brevity of thèse last extracts must présent tbe doctrine of salvation in some degree obscurely, theie being, especially in the Ethics, very many propositions necessary to its fuU exposition ; but a similitude wiU hardly fail to be seen in tlie above extracts.

Hère are certainly shown very remarkable points of ' contact between thèse men, on tbe most essential doctrines, of God, of Knowledge, and of Salvation, sufficient to excite curiosity at least, if not astoniahment, considering the fate, thus far, of the two men ; Spinoza having, until of late years, been reputed an archheretic, an infidel, an atheist ; while Swedenborg is looked upon by many as mspired, and sent into Ihe world by God for the instructi<»i of man.

But besides the above points of similitude, thei?e are numerous others, not at ail less striking, though perhaps of inferior importance. Some of thèse wilf be noticed in a future communication, to show, that even in the détails, the two men were in the main ou tbe same ground.