II. MoDBs, according to Swedenborg

'^ With respect to the existence of things, sound philosophy teaches us, that things which are much compounded take their oriffin from things less compounded ; the less compounded from things still less so; thèse from their indi- ▼idual substances or parts, which are least of ail limited ; and thèse again from things simple, in which no limits can be supposed, except one ; from which circumstance a2

aiso they are called simples. But whence is this simple, in which only one limit is to be conceived ? and whence that limit? It cannot exist by itself ; for theîe must be something by which it may exist, if it hâve a limil, if it be simple, or if it be capable of giving origin to two or more limits. Extending the inquiry therefore, by the same philosophy we rationally proceed to the conclusion, that such a simple dérives its existence from the Infinité ; but that the Infinité exists of itself. Again, if we contemplate the successive progression of causes, it will be found highly reasonable to coQclude, that nothing finite can exist without a cause ; that things which are much compounded, or which consist of many individual parts, neither could be compounded, nor can subsist, without a cause, by which they were compounded, and by which they may consist : for a cause always précèdes and aûerwards accompanies that which exists from it The individual parts of such a composite must in like manner be compounded ûf and subsist from, their individual parts still smaller ; and thèse again, by the order of their succession, from things simple. But still things simple can neither exist nor subsist from themseives. Wherefore there must be an Infinité Something ; there must be something iufinitely intelligent, which may be considered both as a cause in itself, and at the same time as an operator of eâects out oi itself ; or as an inhérent force, and at the same time as a positive agent ; or as a power capable of producing, and at the same time as actually producing the existence of othet things. It foUows, therefore, tlicU tkins^s composUe dérive their originfrom things simple; things simple from tlie Infinité ; and the Infinité Jrom itself ^ as being the sole cause of itself and of ail things. It was before observed, that ail finite things came into existence, successivel y ; for nothing can be at once such as it is capable of becoming, except the Infinité. Every thlng finite acknowledges, or is indebted to, a certain mode^ by which it is what it is, and nothing else ; a modey by which it is of such a figure, and no oiher ; a mode, by which it occupies such a space and no other. In a Word, àU finite things are m/ïdified ; and therefore they acknowledge a mode prior to their mod-

ification, and according to which it takes its place : they acknowledge aiso a time, in which thcy were 80 modified. Hence nothing is at once what it ia capable of becoming, except tbe Infinité. Ail finite things must necessarily undergo différent fitates successively ; but Qot Bo the Infinité. And thus we perceive that ail things oui of the Infiniie hâve their modifications^ bui ihat in the Infinité there is no such thing as a mode : He being the original cause of ail modifications."

Principia^ vol 1, p, 47.

HoDfiSi according to Spinoza.

" By a Mode^ I understand the affections of a Sub* «tance, or that, which is in another thing through or by means of which other thing it is conceived.''

Ethics, part 1, <fe/. 6.

Observe, that Swedenborg has said of Simples, ont of which Compounds are made, that they cannot exist by themselvee ; i. e. as Spinoza expresses it, they must be conceived as existing in something else, which something else is in itself^ iùc.

Again (Spinoza says) '^ I understand by Body, a mode by which the essence of Ood, in so tar as he is considered as Extension (res extenaa, an extended thing) is expressed in a certain and determinate man* Der or mode." Ibid. part 2, de/, 1.

Again. '^ Particular things are nothing but affec* tions of the attributes of Gcâ, or modes in which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and deter«> minate manner." Ibid, part l, corol. toprop, 25.

Again. '* The Essence of things produced by God does not iarolve existence." Ibid. part 1, prop, 24.

Again. ^^ There must be a certain cause of the ex« istence of each thing which exista. ♦ # * It musl be concluded absolutely (universally^ that, every thing according to whose nature many individuals may ex- Ut, must necessarily hâve an extemal cause of stidi existence." SchoL prop. 8, /mit/ 1.

Hence, in the Ethics of Spinoza, man and ail things in nature are considered as not having in themselves necessary existence ; but thcy are regardcd as modes, thiuRs existine in another thing, i. e. affections of the attributes of Ood, existing only in God.

Let US now notice what each of thèse extraordinary thinkers bas to say of our knowledge^ and il will be seen that each of them point ont three différent sources or kinds of knowledge, and that the two authors harmonize in a most remarkable manner.