XXVIII. Swedenborg, 'ly^^^l'l

the mind, to which somethmg m the body does not

ao flratoxA AifD swisMemcao smsntifisd.

oorrespoad ; and this which correspoads may be called the «ubodying of that" T. Ç. K. page 267.

This is a very important propositioa, and it has a xemarkable parallel in Spinoza ; but to see it, the notion o£ Spinoza mnst be stated, that the mind is ike idea of a body erisHng. This idea ia not single, but compounded of many ideas. Then foUows the 12th prop. part 2, Ethics, namdy,«" Whatever takes place in the object of the idea constituting the human nûnd, [i. e. the human body] must be perceiTed by the human mind, or, the human mind will necessarily bave an idea of it"

Spinoza elsewhere states, that mon is constituted by modifications of tviro attributes of God, to wit, thought and extension, i. e. mind and body ; but, because thèse are, in the absohUe nature of God, a unity, they must be developed under the same uniform law, and hence their opérations or manifestations are simultaneous, or, in a certain sensé, the same, only regarded in tvo vays, one as thought, the other as body. And by this would be explained the curious problem touching the correspondence between the môst abstruse mathematical results, arrived at in the closet, and the motions of the physical heavens, or beavenly bodies ; for they are the same essence manifested in two ways, and make but one, as ail thiugs make one in God.

It is not my object to exhibit any thing more than the likeness between the two writers; but at this point, I cannot help suggesting that possibly, in the curious proposition above stated, may be found the true ground of Swedenborg's visions into what he calls the spiritual world ; for it may not be impossible that some men may so habitually contemplate the physical things of the world in their essence, i. e. in God, as measurably to cease to regard them in their inferior character as tnodes or modifications ; and as ail things in God are etemal, thèse modifications may be regarded as etemal, when thus recognized by the intellect, instead of being regarded simply by the sensés as mtsre appearances. In this way, whatever is the object of Imowledge, even throu^ the sensés, becomes, when seen in the iatellect, spiritual and etemal ^ and hence

SPINOZA AND SWED9BNBOBO IDBNTIFIED. 21

man, if he can conceive himself thus to see things in their essence, may speak of this vision as a vision of the spiritual world. The spirits of departed men, as Plato, Cicero, Luther, Calvin, &c. may be considère as seen in their works, which hâve corne down to usd through which we become acquainted with them, as we do with Uving men. The spirits of departed men are Ihen seen in their essence, i. e. our knowledge of them is thus seen and regarded as etemal. This may be considered as a tolerably legitimate resuit of Spino* za's doctrine ; for by prop. 22, 23, 24 of part 1, Ethics, be undertakes to deroonstrate the etemity of modes or ihingSy not regarded as things^ but as seen in the intellect, and referred to God. It should be recoUected, that SwcMlenborg saw, in the spiritual world, whatever is seen on earth, and no small power of ridicule bas been expended upon him for alleging, that in the spiritual world there are a sun and earths ; with inhabité ants in cities, having dwellings, with every species of fumiture, &c. ; in short, our own natural System seen in the spirit, i. e. referred to Grod as the sole cause of bodi the essence and existence of ail things, and thus conceived under the form of etemity, as Goid is etemal.

'' In the spiritual world," says Swedenborg, '' or, in the world where spirits and angels are, similar things appear as in the natnral world, or where men are ; so similar^ ihai as to extemal aspect there is no différence J'

Heaven and Hell, para. 682.

And again : '' It is not yet known that tne Divine Providence, in ail progression with man, looks at his etemal state ; for it can look at nothing else, because. the Divine is infinité and etemal ; and Ûte infinité and etemal, or the Divine, isnatin time, and hence ail future things [and so also ail past things] are présent to it And because the Divine is such, it follows, that in each and every thing which it does is the etemal. Yet they who thùûcfrom time and space^ perceive this wiih difficutty^ not only because they love temporal things, but also because they think from the présent in the ^corld, and not from the présent in heaven ; this is as absent from them as the end of the earth. But they, who are in the Divine, do also think from the eternal when from the présent^ because from the Lord, saying

22 SPINOa^A ATŒ) SWEDENBOiUS IDSNTIFIED,

with themselves, What is that which is not etemal 7" &e. Angelic Wisdom concerning D. Prov. par. 69.

It would be easy to multiply passages like thèse from the writings of Swedenborg. They are profusely scattered throughout bis works, and if they signity sxiy thing, it must be on the supposition that Ûxe universe is identified in some wajr with God, 'notas he is infinité^ [Spinoza] but as be is manifested by the universe, whkîh is to be seen truly only when seen in God ; in which case, '' each and every thing" becomes invested with a divine aspect, and bas the signification of eternity. In the last of the above passages, Swedenborg bas wamed us that those who think from time aiM space can with difficulty perceive this. He may as well hâve said, at once, that they cannot perceive it ail, and then hâve added, that, neither can those who think from time and space, judge of the doctrine of either bimaelf or Spinoza.

As the friends of Swedenborg consider bis doctrines or révélations, as ojQTering a great problem to be sol ved, and call upon us to enlain it naturally, or admit his claims to inspiration, I suggest the above for the con- «ideration of those, who thiuk-the matter worth investigation, and will bere close this letten In my uext, I propose to point ont some fie^rthei resemblaoces betweea Swedenborg wd Spinoza

SPINOZA AND SWEDENBOBO IDENTIFIED. 23