LETTER III

Snt,

My last parallel between Swedenborg and Spino* ta was Bumbered XXVIII. and I now proceed to

XXX. Swedenborg. '^ That which a tnan loves a^ bove ail things is continually présent in his thooght, because in his vill, and makes his veriest life. As for example, he who l&ves riekeSj whether money or pos^ sessions, above ail things, continually revolves in his mind how he may procure them for himself ; he inwardly rejoices when he çains ; he inwardly çrieyes when he loses ; his heart is in them. * * "» Âll the delight, pleasure, and happiness of every one, are from his ruling love, and accoiding to it ; for that which a man loves, he calls delightful, because he feeb it ; but tfaat which he ttiinks, bat does not love, he may aiso call delightful, but it is not the delight of his life. The délighi of the love is whai ta good to a man^ and the apjwsite iê what is evil to him. * « * « A man is alto* gether such as tfie ruling principle of his life is; bjf this he is disting%rished ftofm others ; according to this his heaven is made, if he is good, and his hell, if he is evil ; it is his very will, his proprium [that which belongs peculiarly tp him], and his nature ; for it cannot be changea, because it is the man himselfl" T.C.R.

Spinoza. " For we hâve proved above that we do not désire a thing because we judge it to be good, but on the contrary, we call it good because we désire it, and eonsequently we call what we are averse to evil ; 80 that every one judges or estimâtes what is good, what bad ; what better, -what worse ; what best, what worst ; according to hîs own passions. The miser

24 SPINOZA AND SWEDENBOBO IDfiMTIFIED.

ihinka a plenty offnoney ike best iking^ and the want of U the worst. The ambitious," &c.£c. Ethics, part 3, prop. 39, schol. — and the schol. to prop. 61, p. 3, remarks — ^' Hence when we covnpare men togeùier^ tte distinguish them by the différence of their affections alone/^

Hère are in fact three points of contact instead of one ; to wit, that our love or désire is the foundation of our judgment of what is good : 2d, the love of weaUh and the miser, taken as an illustration : and lastly, the notion of each writer, that men are tobe distinguished from each other by their passions, loves, affections, and not by reason, which is uniform in ail men.

XXXI. Swedenborg, " For those who put reward in the first place, and salvation in the second, thus, this for the sake of that, invert order, and immerse the interior desires of their mind in their proprium, and in the body défile them with the delights of their flesh."

True C. R. page 310.

Spinoza, after proving that virtue and religion are their own reward, remarks, that ^'most penons seem to tihiink themselves free only when they are allowed to consult their own pleasure, and feel as if they were surrendering something of their riehts when they yieid obédience to the divine law : as if the service of Gtod were not perfect freedom and perfect happiness. Piety then and religion, and in short whatever belongs to fortitude or strength of soûl, are looked upon as bnrdens, which they hope to lay aside after death, and receive the reward of their services, to wit, of their piety and religion." Ethics, part 5, prop. 41, schol.

XXXII. Swedenborg. " It is quite otherwise with those who regard reward in works as the end itself. Thèse are like those who enter into friendship for gain, &c. * ♦ * The case is similar with those who claim recompense for their merit in the things of salvation."

True 0. R. page 310.

I^noza. This is but a répétition, with the particular allusion to interested friendship ; in regard to which Spinoza says, in prop. 71, part 4, that '' the mutual kindness or favor of men, who are govemed by blind désire, is a trade or traffic," &c.

SPWOZk AND SWEDENBOBO WBNTtFtBS). 25

XXXIII. SwêdepAarg. *' Qui akme aeiSj and man suffers hinself to be acted npon^ and coopérâtes in ail appearance as from himself, allhough inwardly firom God." True G. R. page 397.

Spinoza. '^ God aloiie ad» by the sole neeeisity c4 his owB nature, and therelbre God alone is a £pee cause," Ethics, pari 1, prop. 17, ooiol. 2.

Yet it should be remarked, that Spkioza contends for a freedom in man in so iecr as he aots from ade<^uafe ideas referred to God aa their cause ; bot he considers that in so far as ma» is aetêd «pou by extetnai causes, blindly, unconscioas of the esûstence of thèse causes in God, he is not free, but a rimve. But eyen hère there is an opening for freedom in the man who will turn towards and recognize God im ail thèse extemal causes, and when by hve to Ood he yields joyfiilly to tbeÉtk\ convertinff them as it were into' his own acts, by re^ sarding them as God's acte, wiih ^hich his love of Uod places him in harmony, in relation or in eonjonction. See No. YI. first letter.

As a further iUustvatidn of Ae abOTo, l tako the fol^ lowing psssago from

Swedenborg. " Conoeming the élection of tfle itlterior of a man's mind^ this also is to be obsenred ; there ia fïom God in every created thing a re-action : Liie alone has action, and re-action is excited by th^ aotioa of life : thia re-action appoars as if it belon^^ to the creaied thing, because it exista when the beutg ia aeted npon ; thus in man ic appeara as if it irere his own, because he does not perçoive any otherwise than that life is his own, when neyertheless maH is only a récipient of life. From this cause it is, that man; m>iti his own hereditary evil re-acts against God ; bot [and* hère is the doctrine assimilated to that of Smnoza] so* far as he believes that ail his life is from God, and eT> ery good of life from the action of God, and every evil of life from the re-action of man, re-action becomes cmrespondent with action, and man acts with God. as firom himsel£ The equilibrium of «11 things is from action and jomt re-action, and every thing must be in equilibrium." Angelic Wisdom cono. Dtv. Love, p. 23:

XXXIV. Swedenborg. " It is to be known that the faculty of elevating the understanding, even to the intelligence in which the angels of heaven are, is from création inhérent in every man, in the bad as well as the good." True O. R. page 397.

Spinoza. " The intellectual love of God, (the perfection of the mind) is etemal," and ''the mind has eternally those perfections we hâve supposed it to acquire." Ethics, part 6, prop. 33, schol.

XXXY. Swedenborg. " But yet no one can be said to be reformed by the mère knowiedges of truths ; for man, from the faculty of elevating the understanding above the love of the will, can apprehend them (truths) and also speak, teach and preach them. But ne is reformed who is in the affection of truth for the sake of truth." True Chr. Relig.

Spinoza. This is but a répétition of the doctrine in No. XXYIL though its similitude to Spino2sa's prop. 14, part 4, is more clear and striking.

XXXVI. Swedenborg. "It is commonly believed, that life is in man his, so that he is not only a réceptacle of life, but also life. That it is commonly so believed is from appearance, because he lives, i e. feels, thinks, speaks and acts, altogether as from himself."

T. C. R. page 335.

Spinoza. This is a répétition of XIV. The essence of man, according to Spinoza, does not involve necessary existence, and men believe themselves free, of themselves (and not from God), because " they are conscious of their desires, but not conscious of the cause of them."

XXXVII. Swedenborg. " Most [men] at this day are natural, and few spiritual ; and the natural man judges from appearances, and thence fallacies, and thèse are diametrically opposite to this truth, that man is only a réceptacle of truth." T. G. R. page 335.

Spinoza. This also is a répétition.

XXXVIII. Swedenborg. " God, because he is infinité, is life in itself. This he cannot create, and thus transcribe into man, for this would be to make him God." T. C. R. page 336.

Spinoza. See No. IX.

XXXIX. Swedenborg. Speaking of the conjunction of man with 6od, and its possibility, Swedenborg says, '' that man does not know this from any light of reason, is because fallacies from the believed appearances of the external sensés of the body overshadow that light" T. C. R. page 336.

SpinozcL This is Spinoza's doctrine, referring to what he calls knowledge of the first kind, (see No.III.) which is sensuous, and foimded on the images of things from without ; which, so far from giving us a knowledge of God and divine things, obstr\ict8 that knowledge, and never leads toit" Ëth. p. 2, pr. 41,42.

XL. Swedenborg. "For the principal cause and the instrumental cause act together as one cause, ac- Gording to a maxim known \p the leamed world."

True C. R. p. 336.

Spinoza must be considered as included in what SwMenborg calls the leamed world, for this is his doctrine. Many philosophers speak of two causes, the efficient and the occasional or spécial or transient cause, but Spinoza, with Swedenborg, knows of but one cause, and that is God.

XLI. Swedenborg. " Who dénies, or can deny, that ail the good of love, and ail the truth of wisdom, are solely from Gkxl ; and that, as far as man receives them from God, so far he lives from God, and is said 10 be born of God, that is, regenerated. And, on the other hand, as far as any does not receive love and wisdom, or, what is similar, charity and faith, so far he does not reçoive life, which in ii^elf is life, from God, but from hell, which is no other lije than inverted life, which is called spiritual death." T.C.R* 335,6.

Spinoza^s language whoUy differs from this, but nevertheless the idea conveyed above corresponds to the doctrine of the Ethics,as far as I can make out what was intended, and it may be stated something after this manner : God is the sole absoluiely Infinité Being, with attributes, as before stated (No. XV.) ; not absolutely infinité, but infinité in their own kind. Of thèse attributes man is acquainted with but two,

thought and extension ; and this for the reason, that he is composed of thèse. Thought and extension are both infinité, but man is not thought and extension iu self, or in himself ; but he is a modification of thèse attributes, and may conceive himself in two ways, as ncUure active and neUure passive. In the first case, man conceives himself as existing in God, " in whom are ail things," and in so far as he does this, and acts from this idea (reason), he is nature active ; he is Bomeibing positive a^d free. But man does not stand alone in the worid ; he is surrounded by infinité other Ihings, every one of which bas, as well as himself, a nature active ; and no^, in so far as man loses sight of the idea of God, as He " in whom are ail things," find is acted upon by outward things, he représenta nature passive ; i. e. he does not oe^, but receives an action^ and in so far as he does thia, he is a slave and not a free maa. When man is thus overcome by i utward things, and is swept ç^long the tide of lime without carrying with him the idea of God, the man is blind, ^nd a slave, ^nd it may answer, as a figure, to say, as Swedenborg dœs, that he then acts from hell, and the idea of God being lost, he may be said to be spiritually dead. He can only be brought oui of this State by recoverîng the idea of God, &c. See XXXUI.

XLH. Swedenborg. ^^ AU that a man loves, ud from love wills is free ; for wbatever proceeds from the loye of the internai will, is the oelight of his li£é ; Qind beçause the sam/^ is the eses of his li£B, it is aiso bis proprinm, (that wbich is himself,) wbieh is the cauçe th^t that which is received in a free state irf* this \iriU remain^, for it adds itself to the proprium. The contrary is the case, if any tbing is introduced not in a State of freedom^" T. C. R. p^ge 347.

Agaii^ : " AH freedom, whkh is &om the Lord, is real freedom, but that which is from hell, and thesce with man, is servitude." Ibid»

Spinoza's définition of action and passion is in the 3d part of the Ethics, as foUows : ^' I say that we act, (are in a 9tate of action) when any thing takes place either within us or without iis, or which we are the adéquate cause ; that ia, when any Uiing fbUows from

SPmOZA Ara> SWEDENBORG IDENTCFIED 29

our nature, either within us or without us, which can be clearly and distinctly understood from our nature alone. On the contrary, we are passive, f ve suffer, receive an action) when any thing takes place in us, or when any thing foUovs from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause." His doctrine upon this is, that ail we do in rirtue of our own essence, referred to God as the cause, is free and necessarily good, but that many things dane unto tu, where we are acted upon by outward nature, are limitations upon us, and are called erils, and are felt to be such so long as they are not themselves referred to God.

I présume it will hardly be questioned by any one that a yery clear and manifest similarity has been 8bown,by the foregoing extracts, between the doctrines of Swedenborg and Spinoza, so far as they appeal to our natural faculties. The dissimilarities between the two men may be still greater in the estimation of some, though it is not easy to see how men, whose groundwork, in a scientinc point of view, is so nearly the same, can very widely separate ûrom each other without subjecting one of the parties at leasc to the charge of inconsequentiality or mconsistency. Spinoza certainly made no daim to any peculiar insight into the spiritual world ; no claim beyond the power of man's natural fSiCulties ; and it may be doubted whether the admirera of Swedenborg do not claim for him more than he erer claimed for himself ; by no means an unusual case. I believe that many passages from his own writings may be adduced, givins a decidedly natural aspect to ail his pretensions. Thus, he speaks of the knmriedge of his day having attained an eieration •ttitably preparing the world for the truths he was oommissioned to tea<m. He speaks of Calvin's conduct on earth after he became an angel, showing that regenerated men are oonsideied as angels before death,£e.4M:. but I do not design to discuss this point

There are three opinions with respect to Swedenbor^s claims to intercourse with the spiritual world, entitled to considération.

Ist The followers or admirers of Swedenborg, for the most part, believe that he was actually inspired by God, in an espeeial manneri for a divine purpose ;

30 SFIIf 0SS4 ànd swsdbnbobo idbntifibd.

i^nd. thc^ most intelligent among them défend this opinion, not by an appeal to miracles or ontward signa, but by 8^n appeal to tbe truths discloaed by him, which they think of snch a character, tbat man in a state of nature oould not hâve diacovered thesn, thongh they aiBrm that men may, by their naturel faculties, perceive i^d reoogni^e dieir truth. It ia therefoie strictly by what ia called an internai arguaient, that Swedenbprg'a pretensicHis are defended. This migbt be answered by an appeal to Spinosa's Ethics, where most assuredly the scientific grounds of Swedenborg weie anticipated by nearly two hundred years, as must be OTident from the foregoing extrada.

2d. Anolher opinion has been presented in a syatei^atic form by Herder, who supposes that Swedeat borjg's fancy had been so long and so intœsely indulged in a parlicular direotion, that its subjective opératioE^s became to him unconsciously objective : that, without the smallest intention to deceive others, be gave out that he had intercourse with the spiritual world, and talked with spiritual beings, while in faet he only held conversations with hisown spirit, the op* erations of which became obgective to him. Hence he made Cicero and other ancient philosophera, as Herder intimâtes, talk Swedenborgiamsm.

3d. There is still one other opinion, which has not y et had time to make its way in the wof Id, that of Robsetti, a learned and ingenious professor of Italian lU* erature in King's Collège^ Bngland. RosseUi supposes that a secret soci^ty has existed in Itaiy, embr»cifxg, members in every part of Europe, since as fiu back ai least as a. d. 1000 : tbat this society waacomposed of the most learned and scientific men, whose mlelligeivM was in advance of the world, enablîng them tp see the errors of the Roman church, which howeyeç by its power controUed and restraiaed thèse men from the free expression of their opinions : that, in conséquence, of this, the literary menof those âges avoid^d persécution, imprisonment and death, by the use of a conventional language, the exoteric or outward impoct of whioh appeaved ifriendly to. the party in Power, wbjle its esoteric ot secret meaning was in dixect hostility tQ thechuicb, and so^clearly understood by

SPINOZA AMD SWEDSNBOB0 IDENTIFIBD. 31

the initiated. Rossetti has employed great iugenuity in explaining the writings of Dante, Petrarch, Boccacioy and otheni, in conformity with his theory ; and he intimâtes a rather decided opinion, that Swedenborg was a member of that society, which he thinks is stm in existence. Rosaetti asks, with a good deal of point, in référence to Swedenborg, '* Haa the thought never occurred to any one, that the man who displays ao much vigor in a yariety of works on poetry, phiiosophy, mathematics, and natural history, and who apeaks continually of the language of correspondence, which gives a secret meaning to the smallest trifle, on the System of the ancient schools of the EasI, which he lauds to the skies ; that a man, in short, who even in his most extravagant fits, diq>iays an immense store of sacred and profane leaming, and an imcommon share of pénétration, deasgnediy concealed a profouad meaning under his delusiye language ? Whoeverreads his wons, and attentively wei^is his words, will see the real meaning of the language, which did bira so much diseredit, as well as of his jonmeys to heayen and hell, and his conversations with the angeis and demon^ and will finally perceive that the ravings of the mnà* maa explain the fictions of the sage." [Disquisitions on the Ântipapal Spirit which produeed the Reformation, etc. by Gabrielii Rossetti, translated by Miss Waid, vt>l 8, p. irz.J

In addition to thèse three ezplanations, (saying nothÎBg of the charge of iaaanity) I wouk) refer to the conclusion of my second letter for a mère suggestion, and, without further comment, take leave of the subject, to^ which I meiety designed to call attention.