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much bounà by the account as if he had signed it at the
bottc:n, or as if he had annexed it to the letter, and it, ” had been verified by witnesses, as Lo account annex and referred to in it.Having recognized the payment by her to Wm. sen.,on his account,having charged this amount to Wm.,sen., and credited ihe amount to her, I fail to see how there was any error to be cor:ected, or how there could be, without her consent, any re-charging, because William, sen., may or may not have paid W. Darling & Co. Then, as to the le. 8acy, as I understand the law, until an Executor or any other Trustee acknowledges to hld money which comes into his hands intended for another as the money of the devisee, cestui qui trust, he cannot be sued at law for it ; but when he seis it apart as the money of the devisee, and charges the estate of the testator with it, and credits the same to the devisee, then it is money had and received to the use of the devisee. Now. in the case before us, this appears to have done, On the 14th April, 1860, Isabella Darling was credited with D. Darling’s legacy, $800, and the estate of David Darling was debited 31st May, 1862, with the legacy Of 8800 and interest at 124 per cent., to {4th April, 1860, and 6 per cent. from 14th April, 1860, to 12th September, 1861, $67.73. So here was debiting of the estate of the testator with the legacy, and a crediting of it to the legatee, and an account rendered afterwards, allowing interest on it. I seems to me this enables the legatee to sue the Executor for money had and received. There may be some question how far the interest credited at 124 per cent. is proper to be considered as accruing from the legacy, and as belonging to the legatee. It is stated that there was a mortgage owned by David Darling’s Estate, which it was thought would bear 124 per cent. interest, and this was set aside for the £200 each, devised to the three sisters, and when the interest was paid at this high rate, it was credited to Isabella for her $800, but subsequently, in a proceeding in Chancery, the Court would not allow this excessive interest, and it was
reduced to 6 per cent. by considering this excess as paid on the principal. Notwithstanding this, and the compromise that was effected, the amount still remained to the credit of Isabella Darling in the books of William Darling & Co. until after the commencement of this suit. Perhaps a defense might have been raised as to the excess of interest beyond 6 per cent. credited as the first 4 or 5 payments of interest, if it bad been shown that ihe estate of David Darling had really lost ihe excess. I do not understand that question to have been especially raised in the Court below. The broad question as to William not being liable for the legacy is what was discussed, and that I think was properly decided against him. There is no question raised £s to the solvency of the estate of David Darling, so there can be nc pretence for retaining any portion of the legacy to pay debts. As to interest, the general rule is that the legacy bears interest from the time it is payable, but if the executor uses the funds of the testator for his own business or purposes, the rate of interest will be affected thereby (1 Williams, 1284- 1288). It does not clearly appear at what time David Darling died. His will is dated 9th October, 1856, and the probate is dated the 2nd Jnne, 1857. The legacy to Isabella is payable one year from the death of the testator. The first interest on the 8800 is credited onthe 14th April, 1858, for six months, at 124 per cent., 851.74 and there are five of such payments credited, There is some mistake in this, for six months’ interest at 124 per cent. does not amount to 851.74. If the question had been discussed in the Court below, and it had appeared that the funds of the testator were only bearing 6 per cent. interest or sum credited to Isabella was too much by 6 per ceat., the claim might have been reduced by about $130, and the interest, according to the mode of calculating by the account rendered, and, perhaps, that would be the correct mode to treat this matter now. Assuming, then, that the transaction is to be considered as binding, whether as one of commerce or as non-commercial. If non-
commercial, the entries in the books of Darling & Co., the statement of the account of the 6th December, 1865, and the letter enclosing the same are sufficient evidence of the indebtedness to bind William Darling, and if commercial, equally so. The next question is as to the statute of limutations. If the transaction is non-commercial, then it is conceded on all hands, as 1 understand, that the claim is not barred by prescription. If the matter is to be considered as one of commerce, then is the plaintiffs claimed barred by the statutes of Lower Canada or by the provisions of the Code Civil? The 2270 Article of the Code reads : “ Prescriptions begun before the promulgation of this Code must be governed by the former laws.” The Code came into operation on the 1st August 1866, and the statement of account to which the letter of, William Darling refers is dated 6th December, 1865, from which day the prescription began to run. According to the literal wording of the Code it does not apply, and the case must be governed by the former laws, Under the consolidated Statutes of Lower Canada, in force until the Code was promulgated, cap. 67, sec, 1, it was enacted that “ no action of account or upon the case nor any action grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty, shall be maintainable in or with regard to any commercial matter, unless such action is commenced within six years after the cause of such action.” Under sec. 2 it was provided that ‘ no acknowledgment or promise by words only shall be sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, horeby to take any case out of the operation of the precedi:g section or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise is made, or contained by, or in some writing,to be signed bythe party chargeable thereby.” Is the acknowledgment put forward ou behalf of the plaintiff sufficient ? Ithinkitis, The account is in writing : it purports on the face ofit to show the intebtedness Of William Darling & Co, to Isabella Dariing ; the amountis stated to be, as made up to the 31st December,
1865, $1,912.08. The evidence, I think, as alreaüy stated, leads to the conclusion that Isabella wrote William Darling, asking for the statement of her account, and in the letter, purporting to be dated 6th November, 1865, he sends her that ver, account, saying, “ I now send yo the statement of your account.” Taking both together, both being in writing, and the letter signed by him, I think this sufficiently cemplies with the staiüte. Suppose the amount current had been continued over half a sheet of paper, and the letter foliowed immediately after the striking of the balance,and these had been signed by the defendant at the end of the letter, would there be any doubt that the statute would have been complied with ; or, as already suggested, suppose they had been attached together with a ribbon and the ends sealed with William Darling’s seal unbroken, would it not be said that the two papers were incorporated 1ogether ? 1f sent together, which I do not doubt they were, may they not be considered as one document for the purposes of the statute ? T'think they may. In Hartly vs. Wharton, 11 A. and E. 934, where defendant was an infant when goods were solé to him, it was sought to make him liable on a written promise or ratification under 9 Geo. 4th chap. 14, sec. 5. The written document was in the form of a letter, but was not addressed to any one and contained no date. Lord Denman, in giving judgment, said, “ there is no date to the writing, the Act requires none, but only a promise or ratification made by some writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith. Then it is urged that the party to whom the promise was made is not named. That I do not thick. If such a promise where in a letter the address would.be evidence, and if that were in an envelope evidence might be given to connect the two, anñ so evidence may be given for or to whom the written acknowledgment was made by delivery or otherwise. ” So here we connect the letter and the statement of the account by evidence, and thus connected together they are an admission of the balance due signed by William Darling.
The later cases seem to sustain the view thzt you may use another document or paper referring to the contract to make it binding under the statute of frauds. In a recent case, a learned judge said :—“ On the äocument itself there must be some reference from one to the other, leaving noth.ng to be supplied by parole evidence, except the identiiy, as it were, of the document.” 1 Pinn vs. Carf, L. R. G. B., 117 ; Buck vs. Keep, L.R. T. Exch. 282, If the ob'eci of the statute be taken into consideration, I can haïdly conceive a more satisfactory way of acknowledging an amount due than the rendering of an account showing the balance and a letter accompanving it, saying :—‘ [send you a statement of your account, and this in reply to a written request to send it.” Here there is nothing transacted by ‘ parole ” between the parties. Itis allin writing ; all the act of the party to be charged therewith. Suppose the account had only been running five years, and Isabella had been in Montreal and asked William Darling for a statement of her account, and one had been made out showing a balance due her of $1,000, and this, though not signed, haa veen handed her by William Darling, there is no doubt if she had sued William Darling, within a month for that balance, and have proved just what has been stated, she would have recovered as for the admitted baïance of the account. She could not have recovered after the six years, because the admission is not iv “vriting. But, being sent in a letter signed by him, it then b amean admitted balance under his signature, and so taken out of the statuté—see Bauman vs. James, L. R. 3 Ch. App. 509 ; ‘Maxwell, on statutes, p 262. There is a very late case as 10 an acknow!edgment taking the case out of the statute, in the Exchequer Division Court before Baron Cleasby. It was argued at some length and many cases were referred to. The lsarned Baron adopted the language of Mellish, in the River Steam Co.—Mitchell's claim reported in L. R. 6 Ch. App. 822. There must be one of these three things to take the case out of tue statute. Either there must be acknow-
ledgment of the debt from which a promise Lo pay is to be implied ; or secondly, there must be an unconditional promise t0 pay the debt; or, thirdly, there must be a conditional promise to pay the debt, and theu the evidence that the condition has been performed.
Here there is the clearest. vidence 0° the acknowledgment of the debt, the account current showing the amounts and the balance due. The law then impuies the promise to pay; this was less than six years before the entry of this case into court, and, therefore, considering the matter as a fairly commercial one, and the rules of evidence in commercial cases in England to apply, I think we ought to hold thatthe action is properly maintainable, It was pressed upon us in argument that we should hold that, if the statute had been so as to bar the remedy, the sub$equent admission should not take the case out of the statute, and the debt should be considered as wholly extinguished, The case of Fenn vs. Bowker, 10 L. C.J. 120, was referred to. How far that case may be affected by Walker vs Sweet, in the Court of Appeals in Quebec, recently decided, it is not necessary to determine. Under the decided cases in England there can be no doubt that the legal effect of an acknowledgment of a debt barred the statute of limitations, it is that of a promise to pay an old debt, and for this purpose the old debt may be said to be revived. It is received as consideration of a new promise. If the creditor simpiy acknowledges an old debt, the law implies from thai simple acknowledgment a promise to pay it, for which promise the old debt is a sufficient consideration. ‘This is the language of Vice-Chancellor Wigram, used in Phillips vs. Phillips, reported in 3H. 281, 299, and referred to in subsequent cases, particularly in Bucmaster et al. vs. Russell, 10 C.B., NS. 745. At this late day I do not think we should lay down a different rule as to the effect of acknowledgments, to take a case out oftbe Statute. The evidence showed that Thomas Darling was not the party bound to pay the indebtedness of the firm to
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Isabella Darling, and as to Thomas it was not argued before this Court that the case was not properly decided in his favour ; and as against William, if the evidence to establish liability was sufficient, he, William, being charged as jointly and severally liable, the judgment was proper enough, he being solely liable. As to the first question submitted to this Court, I think there was sufficient evidence of William Darling’s indebtedness to the amount of $2,288,44. with interest at 6 per cent, since {st January, 1871. As to the second, I do not think the explauations given in the evidence in behald of Wm. Darling were sufficient to exonerate him from liability. Third-The articles of the Code as to the prescription of interest to give years does not apply in this case, as the prescription began before the Code was promulgated. Fourth —Whether the matter in question was commercial or not, the remedy is not barred by the lapse of five years before the bringing of the action. Fifth—Six years had not elapsed before the commencement of the action since the written acknowledgment was made by William Darling, which took the case out of the statute. Sixth—It was not argued before this Court that the plea of compensation for board and :odg. ign was extablished by appellant.Ifit had been argued I think the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the plea. The rate of interest in this account was six per cent, per annum making annual reits. In this way the account was rendered by Darling & Cc., and Isabella Darling did not object. It may be considered, therefore, that this was the mode agreed upon between the parties as to the interest, and, according to that mode, the plaintiffs should be entitled to recover. I do not quite understand how the learned judge in the Superior Gourt ñxed the amount to be recovered from the defendant, William Darling, at $1,746.42 balance : 9wn to be due on 31st December, 1863, under plaintiff's exhibit No. 2, with interest on $1,661.23, balance due 31st December, 1863, until perfect payment and costs. I fail to see why the balance on 31st December, 1863, should be fixed as the sum
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due, or why that balance should not carry interest until payment. Ifthe mode adopted of computing interest, and making annual rests anteriu: to 1863, he correct, it seems to me it should be followed un to the time of the bringing of the suit, or Lo the last balance which wonlA have heen struck previous to the brin£ing of this action. iakinz the balance of the account, say on îst. January, 1871, as stated William Darling’s account at 82,535, and allowing for the excess of the five payments of interests credited with the interest thereon computed in the same way, [ make the balance due the plaintiff, 82288.4?, bearing interest om the Ist January, 1871, which I think is the proper amsunt to find against the defendant, with costs.
Rirouis, J., concurred.
STRONG, J., agreed with the Chief Justice. He was fu'iy of opinion that the transaction was not of a commercial character, and the rule laid down in the case of Wishaw vs. Gilmour must be adhered to.
TASCHEREAU, J.—The action in the Superior Court was in. stituted hy George Templeton, as universal legatee of his deceased wife, Isabella Darling. Templeton died during the pendency of the suit; the respondents, as exccutors of his Will, took up the instance in the place of said l'empleton. The action was brought against the appellant and his brother Thomas Darling foi $1,912.08, and interest from 31st December, 1865, as per settlement of account, for loan of movies at different Limes from 1858 to 1860. The appellant fyled several pleas, but only the following need be considered under the present appeal: 1st. l’lea of prescription of 5 years ; 2ud. Plea of prescription of 6 years; 3rd. Plea of compensation by a côënter claim for board and lodging from Septembr, 1858, t& November 1862, at the rate of 8300 per annum ; 41h. The general issue. We are of opinion that the judgment of the Court below should be confirmed. It is evident that the pleas of prescription of five and six years cannot be
maintained for one instant, the debt claimed not being of a DE Lorimien, Bis, vou. 21. 13
commercial nature.lt consists in two separate loans of money bearing interest, made by a non-trader to traders, it is true, but such a loan cannot be considered as a commercial transaction, This proposition was adhered to in the case of Whishaw vs. Gilmour, 15 L. C. L. R. p. 177, and we find the same rule of law laid down in 1! Pardessus, Droit Commercial, pp. 5 to 80 ; Goujet & Merger, Acte de Commerce, p. 15, No. 153 ; 1! Dalloz, Dictr., Acte de Commerce, p. 34, No 456; Ddarride des Commerçants, Nos. 26, 27, 246-247-248 ; Sebire & Carteret, Commerce, p. 560, Nos. 204 lo 267, and the Court of Queen's Bench which confirmed the judgment appealed from assented to same doctrine. Even admitting, for the sake of argument, that the debt claimed was one of a commercial nature, the prescription of five years would not apply as being a new prescription created by the code (which came in force on the ist August, 1866,) and under article 2260. All prescriptions begun before the code must be governed by the former laws. The debt being of a civil, and notofa commercial nature, the prescription of six years Cannot appiy, nor, if commerrial, can the contention of the appellants, that the debt has not been acknowledged by any writing of his, be of any avail, for the entries in his books are, according to our laws, conclusive proof against him unless otherwise explained, or an error is accounted for, and in this case 1 am satisfied that there has been no error. This also disposes of the plea of general issue fyled by the appellant. Now, as te the plea of compensation, claiming $1,200 from the respondent for board and lodging, at different times, from 1858 to 1862, we are of opinion that the claim cannot be entertained. No proof of a contract for board was made; on the contrary, ii seems that it was on the invitation of the appellant that Isabella Darling went to live with him. To show his intention of charging for this board, appellant should have included this item in the accounts he furnished Mr. Templeton whilst she was living with him. If we take into consideration the relationship of the parties, the ren-
dering of the accounts without such a charge, and all the surrounding circumstances, I think we may safely come to the conclusion that no inteution never existed in appellant’s mind to charge board or lodging to a sister wno came to his house by javitation. We, therefore dismiss this plea as not proved, and confirm the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, for the Province of Quebec, with costs in this Court as well as in the other Courts appealed from, with a slight alteration as to the amount.
Fournier, J.—The principal question raised in this case may be resumed in the enquiry.whether the contract upon which the action is based in this case is a commercial transaction or not. It is sufficient to detsrmine the true character of it, and to record a few words as to what has taken place, and the quality of the contracting parties at this period. On third March, 1858, William Darling, merchant, of Montreal, received from Wm, Darling, senior, his f-ther, for the benefit of his sister Isabella Darling, the sum of £120 sterling, equal to $581 Currency ; subsequently the latter became legatee of another sum of 8800, by virtue of the will of David Darling, her brother. William Darling alone was Charged with attending to the execution of this will. These two sums having been left with him by way of a Loan at six per cent. interest per annum, he gave an account of it to his sister up to the 31st December, 1867. At this time he appeared to be by so much indebted, by the books to the firm of Wiliiam Parling & Company, as well as by a statement of account furnish by the said William Darling, comprising therein accrued interest, in the sum of $1,746.72 Currency. [sabella Darling had never done any business, and did not appear to have done anything save placing her money in the firm of William Dariing and Co., with a view to traffic and speculaon. By the mere fact that William Darling was a merchant, did the loan then made to him partake on that account of a commercial character, and be an act to which prescriplion, as established by the 10th and 11th Victoria,chap.11,
became applicable? It is understcod that, on the part of Isabella Darling that the act was not a commercial one- Ii was a civil contract for the placing ot ber fundsina manner with which speculation had nothing to do, and, consequently, removed, in so far as the proof and prescription is concerned, under the rules relating to loans. As will be seen by the following authorities, the contract can be considered in France as a civil operation on the part of [sabella Darling and as a commercial transaction on the part of William Darling (Dalloz, 1st vol. Dictionnaire de Législation, No. 5), “ The same act can only be commercial on the part of one of the parties.” Thus in the case of a sale the purchaser could break an act of sale, whilst the seller could only bind himself to a civil an reciprocal co-operation (De Villeneuve & Massé, Dictionnaire du Contentieux, p. 15, No. 152.) “ The obligations of a merchant for the benetit of a nor-merchant when the case is commercial are cummercial transactions ia regard to the merchant only.” This double character given to the same act in the French Legislation provides for à division of jurisdictions, attributing to a commercial tribunal the decision of commercial matters and to civil tribunals that of cases of a civil nature, There are many cases in France in which is given à coramercial Cia racter Lo an act only to define jurisdictiou. For example, if the loan made to a merchaut is declared to be for him a commercial act, that is to submit it to the jurisdiction of a commercial tribunal which can decree against him contrainte par corps to force him to fulfil his obligations, or declare himself insolvent, But the merchant cannot bring there his opponent. If he or she did not enter into a commercial act, he would be obliged to saummon them before the civil tribunal, which would apply to the contract all the rules of civil law which govern it, This is what Dalloz, vol. 1, Dictionnaire de Législation, No. 207 says : “ but consular jurisdiction does not extent to the lender, who has not personally entered into a commercial act, even when the agreement
tof )ne+ n à nd, ripwill 1 be Isapart gis- | on sale Îler tion 45, it of ner- 1ble tion oid to are Cu:
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entered into between them and the merc: nt had for its object the business in which the latter was engaged.” Goujet & Merger, Dictionnaire de Commerce, No. 2,425, No. 1. “That which gives in general to an act a commercial character is speculation ; every operation with a view to business with the intention of obtainiug benefit from it, constitutes a commercial transaction,” No. 23, 24 Hence, from the same principle, it results that a contract can be commercial on the part of one of the parties, and civil on the part of the other, if one of them only has had in view the realization of benefit. However, there exists this difference between merchants and non-merchants, that the former are, until proved to tbe contrary, supposed to have acted in the interest of their business, whilst the latter are also considered, until proved to the contrary, notto have intended to enter 1pon a commercial operation. In the Province cf Quebec, where this division of jurisdiction does not exist, there is not the same reason for giving to the same transaction this double significance. If the contract is civil in its nature, it does not change its character, because ne of the parties init is a merchant, À question exactly similar to this was decided by the Court of Queen's Bench, in Appeal. It was that of Wishaw vs. Gilmour, 15 L. C. Reports, p. 117. In this case the questian was also of a Lan of a sum of money, by a nonmerchani to merchants, who opposed to the suit the plea of prescriplion of six years, invoked upori the principle, that the transaction was, upon their part, a business act, and it was due to them that this right of prescription si.ou:d prevail. Their pretention was rejecied. Although the judges were divided in opinion, there never was a decision to the contrary, and this point has been considered settled by that
judgment. Tam of opinion that, in this case as in ihat of
Whishaw and Gilmour, the only prescription applicable is that of thirty years. There was also a plea o° :ompensation» which was not like that of prescription. No proof has been made establisbing an agreement that the said Isabella Dar-
ling should pay for her board and lodging in the family of her brother William Darling, and nothing was shown that he had ever the intention of making such an account. For these reasons I am of opinion thet the judgment of theQueen’s Bench in appeal should be confirmed with costs, modified in the marrer mentioned by the Honourable Chief Justice. Hexry, J.—1I agree with the views expressed by the Chief, and my other colleagues,as to the nature of the transaction. The case of Whishaw vs. Gilmour is in point, and the transaction must be considered as being non-commercial, and the only prescription applicable is that of tnirty years. Judgment of Q. B. confirmed.
1 ML. Law Rep., Queen's Bench,p. à) Curateur à substilution C. d’app., M. 1885. Dorion et Dorion. Ÿ —Responsabilité et pouvoirs—Art, 931 C. C.—Intéréts des intéréts—Prescriptions des
intéréls échus avant et après la mise en force du Code.—C, C. 2250 et 2270.
JuGé :—1l° Que le curateur à une substitution n’a aucun droit de rece voir les capitaux appartenant à cette substitution, et dont il doit être fait emploi conformément à l’a iicle 931 du Code Civil.
2 Qu'un tel curateur n’a pas non plus le droit de réclamer les intérêts de ces sommes capitales, ces intérêts élant dûs aux grevés de substi.
tution.
3e Que l'appelant n'ayant recu les deniers appartenant à la dite substitution que comme procureur des grevés, et simple negoliorum geslar, il n'était pas tenu de payer les intérêts des sommes par lui recues si ce n’est depuis la demande qui en a été faite par l'intervention produite par l'intimé ; l'obligation de payer les intérèts des intérèts n'incombant qu’à ceux qui reçoivent des deniers pour des incapables.
4 Que, en vertu des articles 2250 et 2270 du Code Civil, les intérêts échus avan! le ler août 1866, dat? de la mise en force du Code, ne se prescrivent que par trente ans, et que ceux échus depuis cette date, et dont la prescription n'a commencé à courir que depuis la mise en force du Code, se prescrivent par cinq ans.
Appel d'un jugement prononcé par la Cour Supérieure siégeant à Montréal (Marie, J.) le 9 juillet 1883.
Ramsay, J. (diss) :—The appellant was some time curetor to the substitution created by the will of the late Jacques Dorion ofSt. Eustache, Owing to certain family difficulties he ceased to be curator. M. Moreau was then named curator, and in that capacity he brought an action against appellant, the conclusions of which are as follows :—
“ Pourquoi le dit demandeur, en sa dite qualité de tuteur, conclut à ce que le défendeur soit assigné à comparaître devant cette Honorable Cour, pour se voir condamné à rendre immédiatement un compte juste, fidèie, exact et sons serment, de la gestion et administration qu'il a en sa dite qualité de curateur à la substitution créée par le testament du dit feu Jacques Dorion, et des biens d’icelui, avec les intérêts et les intérêts des épargnes, à compter du jour du paiement des différentes sommes d'argent reçues par le dit défendeur, en sa dite qualité,en outre et à produire avec le ditcompte et à son sontien toutes les pièces justificatives d’icelui, comme aussi et à mettre le dit demandeur, en sa dite quahté, en possession de tous les titres, papiers, pièces et renseignements qui regardent la dite succession, la dite curatelle, non-seulement de la sienne propre, mais aussi de celle du curateur immédiat, savoir le dit Charles Dcrion, que le dit demandeur a, en sa dite qualité, droit d’avoir du défendeur, sinon et à défaut par le dit défendeur de satisfaire immédiatement à tout ce que dessus, pour se voir condamné personnellement à payer au dit demandeur, en sa dite qualité, une somme de douze mille livres de cours actuel, pour tenir lieu du dit compte, de la remise des dits titres, pieceset renseignements, et à se faire contraindre par toutes voies que de droit et même par corps, le dit demandeur en sa dite qualité se réservant le droit de prendre toutes et antres nouvelles conclusions, dont il aurait besoin, dans le cas où il écherrait, le tout avec intérèt et dépens, dont les soussignés demandeat distraction.”
The declaration is dated 27th June, 1859,
On the 3:d November, 1863, appellant filed a defence to this action in which he alleges that he has never refused to
render an account, and that being put en demeure to render this account he does s0, and he explains all the items of the account but some interest on a loan to the family Debartsch because his co-legatees 2n usufruit had brought two actions to account against him touching this interest, and that the matter was now in litigation between them.
It will be observed that in addition to his quality of curator of the substitution the appellant was à co-logatee en usufruit, and it is to be presumed that it was in this latter capacity he had this property in his possession, He was thefore account. able to Mr. Moreau for the condition of the property, but Mr. Mor-au had no right or quality to ask him for the property. Th idmitted, but it is said it does not signify as he came in and admitted his liability to pay so much money. AsI understanc the record this is not so, but in explaining incidentally how the estate stoo 1, he admits that he has in hand, on the 3rd November, 1863, £1,640 4s 104.
On the 4th January, 1865, débats de compte were filed by Mr. Moreau ; on the 7th Jaly 1866 respondent took Mr. Mreau’s place as curator to the substitution ; on the 15th May 1867, he took up the instance as curator, and on the 14th September, 1881, he moved that the appellant should be compelled to constitute new attorneys.
On the 1lth September, 1881, respondent in his quality produced the following declaration :
“ Le dit demandeur ès-qualité, par reprise d'instance, de- “ mandant acte de la déclaration faite par le ait J, B,. T, Dorion, en sa reddition de compte, qu’il est débiteur de la ‘ succes-ion de la somme de $8,427.73, déclare qu’il accepte ‘“ Ja reddition de compte telle que produite par le dit défen- ‘“ deur ainsi que les conclusions de sa défense, et en demande “ acte.”
This was preparatory to an inscription for final hearing on the meriis for the 13th Deceivber 1881. On the 12th a
motion was presented to ask delay to plead, (a) that defendant was not obliged to account : (b) new facts. The Court granted
appellant leave to plead new facts, but refused leave to repiead as to the right of respondent to demand an account, inasmuch as appellant “ ne peut revenir sur cette admission et reconnaissance de sa part, i. e., contained in his first piea. The appellant asked for leave to appeal from this judgment because of the limitation as to the re-pleader. But leave was refused,and properly, because the right of action of a curator to a substitution could always come up on final jvdgment.
The appellant then filed a plea containing a variety of allegations. To this, a special answer was made, and the case was inscribed for hearing and was heard.
While the record was en délibéré respondent’s attention seems to have been awakened to the probability that the issues-as to the payment of money for interest in his capacity of curator to the substitution, would go against him, and he filled an intervention as the representative of all the grevés under the authority of a judge in chambers, setting up this right to the balance of money in the hands of appellant as representing, by cession and otherwise, all the grevés. It is plain the judge in chambers had no right to compel the Court to discharge the délibéré, and that if final judgment had been rendered it would have been binding, But the iudge who heard the case did discharge the dé/ibéré, and the appellant filed answers to the intervention.
[ presume that ifit had not been for the appellant having pleaded over, there would not have been two opinions ir the Court. But notwithstanding this sort of acquiescence, I consider the respondenl’s positio® so unfavorable and the order of the judge in chambers so far out of his juridiction, that I think we should dismiss the intervention and give the ‘udgment on the merits the Court below ought to have given. [ have said the respondent’s position is unfavorable; he has been conversant with all the facts for years, andit is not until he becomes aware by the argument that he is going to lose his case, that he seeks to engraft a totaliy new suit on this tedious litigation.
DL D meihane Des Del
de +. 2 1
It is said that when two parties are disputing about a thing the real owner may be allowed to come in and claim his property. But thatis not what took place here. The two parties were discussing a totally differeat thing, and one of them, changing his quality, adds a totally new contestation 10 the great embarrassment of the suit, The equitable desire to admit parties to suits in order to avoid litigation is a very good thing, but it may eusily be ahused. And so it was in the old court of chancery. Parties were put in so readily from equitabie motives that the suit often became unmanageable and ruinous. In addition to this,the case before us had reached a stage were the intervention could not be introduced but by an order of the judge seized withit, The article which says that interventions may be admitted en tout élat de cause must be read subject to the meaning ‘o be attached to the technical terms in which it is framed., “ en tout état de cause,’ in law does nut include en état d’être
jugée. This had been held in everything. In the case of
Williamson & Rhind, Mr, Justice Sanborn, delivering the
judgmient of this Court, said that to permit of proceedings
being taken after the case was submitted ” was against all practice. After a case has been once regularly submitted, ” the Court is seized of it, and it can only be afterwards dealt with by permission obtained from the Court or judge. 22 L. C.J. 167. (1)
En principe, l'intervention est recevable en tout état de cause, c'est-à-dire tant que l'instruction n’est pas close, tant que l'office des avoués n’est p&s terminé, tant que celui des juges n'a pas commencé, en un mot jusqu’au jugement sur
(1) In a case of Lazxler & Dorian, 10 Q. L. R., the Superior Court seemed indisposed to accept the rulingin the case of Williamson & Rhind, on the principle that where the law gave « right the party could not be deprived of it. That is true, but the question is whether the law contemplated judgment beingreserved. The expression of disapprobation by the Court of Review was nunnecessary, inasmuch as it never was pretended that the Court seized with a case might not discharge the délibéré.
le fond ou au délibéré sur ce jugement, etc.” Dalloz, Vo. In tervention No. 102.
SIR À. A. Dorion, J.C. :—Jacques Dorion de son vivant marchand de St.-Eustache, a fait un testament en 1821, par lequel il a légué tous ses biens à son frère Charles Dorion avec substitution en faveur des enfants mâles de ce iernier, tantqu’ily en zurait portant le nom de Dorion. !l est mort. peu de temps après et son frère Charles Dorion seul grevé de substitution, fut nommé curateur à la substitution.
A la mort de ce dernier, en 1840, l'appelant, son fils et l’un des grevés, a été nommé curateur à la substitution.
En 1858 l'appelant a été destitué et Pierre Moreau nommé curateur à sa place.
Ce dernier a de suite porté une action en sa qualité de curateur, par laquelle il a demandé à l'appelant un compte des deniers qu’il avait reçus en sa qualité de curatenr et des intérêts sur les capitaux qu'il avait en mains.
L’appelant n’a pas contesté cette action. Il a déclaré qu’il avait toujours été prêt à rendre compte, et il a produit avec sa défense un compte par lequel il reconnaissait qu’il avait entre les mains une somme de £1.640.4.10, portant intérêt du 14 août 1858, et qu’il devait en outre à la substitution, pour prix d’une mais£n, les deux-tiers d’une somme de sept cents louis, l’autre tiers étant dû par Zéphire Dorion, son frère, et qu'il était prêt a payer ces sommes au demandeur, Pierre Moreau, si ce dernier était autorisé à les recevoir, moins cependant la somme de $70 pour le coût de son compte et des pièces justificatives, avec intérêt du 14 août 1858, moins un sixième de ces intérêts qui lui appartenait, comme étant l’un des six grevés de substitution alors vivants.
Plus tard, Pierre Moreau a été déchargé de sa charge de curateur à la substitution, et l'intimé a été noinmé curateur à sa place. L’intimé a alors repris l'instance, puis il a demandé acte de la déclaration que l'appelant avait faite, par son compte, qu'il devait à la substitution une somme de $8,427.63 avec intérêt du 14 août 1858, et déclaré qu'il accep-
tait cette reddition de compte, ainsi que les conclusions de la défense de l'appelant. Les procédures furent alors suspendues pendant plusieurs années, après quoi l'intimé ayant témoigné l'intention de continuer ces procédures, l'appelant obtint permission de plaider les faits nouveaux qui étaient survenus depuis sa premiere défense.
Ila en conséquence produit une défense additionnelle dans laquelle ii a allégué que, depuis qu’il avait rendu son compte, il avait réglé avec les autres grevés de substitution, qui étaient Charles Dorion, Eustache et Firmin Dorion, pour la part qui revenait à chacun d’eux des fruits et revenus des biens de la substitution ; qu'il avait de plus payé à Sévère Dorion, fils de Sévère, un autre de ses frères, la part qui lui revenait, tant dans les biens substitués que dans les revenus, et que Charles Zéphire Dorion, un autre de ses frères, était décédé le 11 juin 1871, et lui avait légué tous ses biens. En un mot par ce plaidoyer l'appelant alléguait qu’il représentait, comme légataire universel de Zéphire Dorion, la part que ce dernier aurait eu droit de réclamer dans les fruits et revenus des biens substitués, et qu’il avait payé aux quatre autres grevés de substitution la part qui leur revenait dans ces mêmes revenus.
Par sa réponse à cette nouvelle dérense, l'intimé a allégué que c'était lui qui avait payé à Sévère Dorion, fils, la part que ce dernier avait droit de recevoir, non-seulement dans les biens substitués, mais encore dans les revenus provenant de la substitution, et que l'appelant n’avait droit de retenir qu’une somme de $2,000 avec intérêt du 28 novembre 1879, que l'intimé s'était chargé de payer à son acquit, plus la part des revenus auxquels Zéphire Dorion avait droit, et ce qu'il avait payé à Charles Dorion, Eustache Dorion et Firmin Dorion.
Sur cette contestation, les faits n'étant pas contestés, la cause fut plaidée devant M. le Juge Taschereau et prise en délibéré.
Pendant le délibéré, l'intimé préseata à M, le Juge Papi-
neau une requête dans laquelle, alléguant qu’il était devenu le cessionnaire des grevés de substitution Charles Dorion, Eustache Dorion, Firmin Dorion, de Sévere Dorion fils, et de l’appelant lui-même, il demandait à être reçu partie intervenante pour exercer les droits de ses cédants, et concluait à ce qne l'appelant fut condamné à lui payer, tant en sa qualité de curateur à la substitution que comme cessionnaires des grevés de substitution, les sommes que l'appelant avait reconnu devoir par son compte. Catte requête, non communiquée, c’est-à-dire, dont avis n'avait pas été donné à l’appelant, ‘ut néanmoins accordée par M. le Juge Papineau. Pius tard l'appelant présenta une requête pour faire rejeter cette demande en intervention, mais sans succès.
Finalement, la cause fut entendue au mérite devant M, le Juge Mathieu, et l'appelant condamué à payer à l'intimé une somme de quatorze mille et quelques centaines de piastres pour intérêt sur les capitaux qu’il avait entre les mains appartenant à la succession, ces intérêts comprenant les intérêts des intérêts calculés de six moisen six mois, la Cour s'abstenaut d’ordonner le paiement du Capital, et reconnaissant par là que l'intimé n’avait aucun droit de recevoir les capitaux appartenant à la substitution, mais se réservant d'adjuger sur le placement de ces Capitaux.
L’appelant, se prétendant lésé par ce jugement, en a 1ppelé el soumet que la requête en intervention n'aurait pas dû être admise après que la cause avait été prise eu délibéré ; qu’en supposant que l'intimé eût le droit d'intervenir dans la cause, il ne pouvait tout au plus réclamer que cino ans d'intérêts, le surplus ayant été prescrit : que de plus il ne devait pas les intérêts des intérèts.
Sur la première question, M. le juge Ramsay et moi nous sommes d'opinion que la requête en intervention n’aurait pas dû être reçue. En effet, la cause étant inscrite et en délibéré devant un des juges de la Cour Supérieure ; un autre juge de cette Cour, en admettant 12 requête en inter.
vention, prenait sur lui de retirer du délibéré une cause entendue devant un autre juge.
Je ne crois nécessaire de décider qu’il n’avait pas de juridiction. 1l peut y avoir 48 cas d’une urgence telle qu’un juge pourrait peut-être prendre sut lui d'admettre une intervention dans une cause pendante devant un autre juge ; mais ici cette urgence ou nécessité n'existait pas, et il aurait certainement été plns convenable de référer cette requête en intervention au juge qui était saisi de la cause et qui en connaissait tous les incidents, puisque cett: cause avait été plaidée devant lui,
La conséquence de l'admission intempestive de cette intervention a été que la cause a été retirée du délibéré, qu’elle a été subséquemment plaidée üevant un autre juge, M. le juge Mathieu, qui lui-même a déclaré que cette intervention n'était pas tout à fail régulière, etque, néanmoins, il croyait devoir adjuger sur les *°nclusions que l'intimé y avait prises.
Pour ma part je considère que cette intervention était, en effet tout à fait irrégulière.
L'intimé était demandeur par reprise d'instance dans une action où, par ses conclusions, il demandait à ce que l’appelant füt condamner à lui payer 1° les sommes capitales qw’il avait reçues de la substitution créée par le testament de feu Jacques Dorion ; 2° les intérêts de ces sommes.
#4 LE ki È
ES
Or, en sa qualité de curateur à la substitution, il n'avait aucun droit de toucher les capitaux appartenant à la snbstitution, et c’est ce que la Cour de première instance a reconnu, puis qu’elle à refusé d’ordonner le paiement de ces capitaux à l’intñaé.
Si l'intimé, en sa qualité de curateur a la substitution, n'avait pas le droit de recevoir des capitaux appartenant à la substitution, il avait encore moins le droit de recevoir les intérêts de ces capitaux qui appartenaient aux grevés de subsüitution qu’il ne représentait pas. Tout ce qu’il pouvait demander par son action, c'était que l'appelant fut condamné
à rendre compte de ces Capitaux et à en faire le placement, conformément à l’art, 931 du Code Civil.
Par sa requête en intervention, l'intimé demandait donc à faire une nouvelle demande relativement aux intérêts dûs aux grevés de substitution, qu’en sa qualité de curateur à la substitution il a'avait pas pu réclamer.
J'aurais donc été d'opinion de rejeter la requête en intervention de l'intimé et de renvoyer le dossier à la Cour iuférieure, pour y être ordonné que les deniers que l'appelant avait reconnu devoir à la substitution seraient placés, ainsi que le veut l’art. 931 C. C., dans les intérêts des appelés. La majorité de la Cour étant d’une opinion contraire, je ne crois pas devoir différer sur une question de simple procédure comme celle-là,
Ceci nous oblige à considérer la question des intérêts, et nous sommes venus à la conclusion que l'appelant n'avait reçu les deniers appartenant à la substitution en aucune qualité qui pût le soumettre à l'obligation de payer les intérêts des intérêts, L'obligation de payer l'intérêt des intérêts n'incombe qu’à ceux qui reçoivent des deniers pour des incapables ; mais l'appelant n’a pas reçu de deniers pour des incapables.
Il était l’un des grevés de substitution, et, en recevant les sommes dues par les débiteurs de la succession, il n’a fait que recevoir ce que lui-même et les autres grevés de substitution auraient pu recevoir à la charge de placer les deniers, ainsi qu’il a été ordonné par plusieurs jugements produits dans le dossier, Il parait même, par les pièces justificatives prodüites par l'appelant, qu'il a reçu plusieurs des sommes de deniers dont il a rendu compte, sinon toutes, en vertu de procuralions que ses co-grevés de substitution lui avaient données. Il n’était ni le tuteur, ni le curateur de ses co-légataires, et l'intérêt qu'il leur doit sur les Capitaux qu'il a reçus pour eux est l'intérêt ordinaire que doit celui qui a reçu des deniers pour d’autres,
Le jugement de la cour de première instance ne condamne
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