Inlrod.y chap. X ; Bowring, vol. I, p. 46 sqq

147. On Man, Part I, chap. m, sect. I, Prop. LXXX, Cor. 5. When words hâve acquired any considérable power of exciting pleasant or painful vibrations in the nervous system, by being often associatcd with such things as do this, llicy may transfer a part of thèse pleasures and pains upon indiffèrent things, by being at other times often associated with such. This is one of the principjil sources of the several factitious pleasures and pains of human life. Thu?, to give an instance from cbildhood, the words sweetj good, />''cW?/, fine, etc., on the one hand, and the words 6ad, t/{;///, frùjtUfulj etc., on the other, being applied by the nurse and attendants in the young child'shearing almoslpromiscuously, and withoutthose restrictions that are observed in correct speaking, the one to ali the pleasures, the other to ail the pains of the several sensés, must by association raise up gênerai pleasant and painful vibrations, in which no one part can bedistinguished abôve the rost; and, when applied by farther associations to objects of a neutral kind, they must transfer a gênerai pleasure or pain upon them.

14S. Mrod.j chap. X, § xiii ; Bowring, vol. I, p. 49.

149. Ibid. — Cf. Adain Smith, Thecry of Moral Sentiments, Part. VII, sect. II : The ingénions sophistry of his (Mandeville's) reasoning is hère, as upon many other occasions, covered by the ambiguity of language. There

are some of our passions whicb bave no other names except those which mark the disagreable and offensive degree. Ttie spectator is more apt to take notice of them in tbis degree tban in any other.