Introd. View., chap. xxxii; Bowring, vol. VI, p

41. Rat. ofJud. Ev.y Book VIII, chap. xxiii; Bowring, vol. VU, p. 308.

42. Rat. of Jud. Ev., Book VIIl, chap. xii; Bowring, vol. VII, p. 246.

43. Preuves judiciaires, liv. IV, chap. i; vol. 1, p. 249. — Rat. of Jud. Ev.j Book IV, chap. i; Bowring, vol. VI, p. 508.

44. Rat. ofJud. Eu., Book IV, chap x, § 2; Bowring, vol. VI, p. 573.

45. Rat. of Jud. Ev. ; Book 11, chap. vi ; Bowring, vol. VI, pp. 308 sqq. — Preuves judiciaires, \\y. Il, chap. xii (vol. I, pp. 176 sqq); Cf. liv. II, chap. VI (vol. I, pp. 132-134). — Cf. Traités, Principes du Code pénal, 4« partie, chap. xviii. — Cf. Judicial Establishment ; Bowring, vol. II, pp. 381 sqq. — Pétition for Justice; Bowring, vol. III, pp. 45i-467.

46. Rat. of Jud. Ev.y Book VIIl, chap. xx; Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 305-306. — Preuves judiciaires, liv. IX, chap. ii, m ; vol. Il, pp. 262 sqq.

47. Introd» View.f chap. viii; Bowring, vol. VI, pp. 25, 33, 34. — Rat,

(Pp. 145-146) NOTES. 425

of Jud. Ev.y Book III, cbap. xviii; Bowring, vol. Vï, p. 409; Cf. Book VI, chap. II et VI ; Bowring, vol. VU, pp. 125, 136. — Preuves judiciaires^ liv. III, chap. IX ; vol. I, pp. 227-229.

48. Preuves judiciaires^ liv. III, chap. viii; vol. I, p. 220. —Introd. View^ chap. viii; Bov?ring, vol. VI, p. 25. — Rat. of Jud. AV, Book II, chap. ix, § 4; Bowring, vol. VI, pp. ^5 sqq.

49. Rat. ofJud. Ev., Book IX, part. U Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 343 sqq.

— Preuves judiciaires, liv. Vil, chap. iv; vol. II, pp. 100-102.

50. Rai. ofJud. Ev., Book X; Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 563 sqq. — Preuves judieiaireSy liv. Vil, chap. xv; vol. II, pp. 157, 158, 159.

51. Preuves judiciaires, liv. VII, chap. viii; vol. II, p. 118.— Cf. chap. v; p. 105 : Mais dès que vous voulez écarter les témoignages non pertinents et les témoignages superflus, vous donnez au jage un pouvoir sujet à de grands abus; car celui qui peut décider des questions de cette nature est mattre de la cause. Je réponds que ce pouvoir n'est pas plus grand, ou qu'il n'y a pas plus de danger dans ce pouvoir que dans la plupart de ceux qu*il faut nécessairement laisser au juge et qui sont de l'essence de ses fonctions. La publicité est le préservatif de Tarbitratre. Ce pouvoir de prononcer sur des témoignages, de les écarter comme non pertinents ou superflus, n'en est pas moins nécessaire, quel que soit Cabus dont il soU susceptible, — La pensée de Bentham, sur ce point, s'est fîxée de très bonne heure. V. Mss. Univ. Coll. n' 46, un essai intitulé « Of Evidence, or Proof », et dont voici les premières sentences : 1. Ail persons wbatsoever may and shall be admitted to give their testimony : unless in certain cases which are enumerated ; parties themselves as well as others. — 2. Ail persons whatsœver may and sball be compelled to gfve their testimony : unless in certain cases which are enumerated, the parties as well as others. — 3. Hearsay évidence shall not be admitted : unless in certain cases which are enumerated, viz. 1. D(dth; 2. Expatriation. — 4. The testimony of one simple witness may be sufflcient to warrant a conviction. One witness is sufficient to convict. — 5. No number of witnesses, be the multitude of them evcr so great, deposing to the charge, shall oblige the Judge to convict; nordeposing to a fact incompatible with the charge, shall oblige him to acquit. No évidence shall be conclusive upon the Judge. — 6. Prescriptive (inferential) proof may be sufflcient to convict without positive.

— 7. No proof in writing shall be sufficient to convict, unless where the perion whose writing it purports to be can not be examined : except in cases of certification etc., given in the course of office, where in the nature ofthings nofurther particulars are to be coUected by examination.

— On voit sur quel point Bentham a varié: dès le début désireux de voir accueillir tous les témoins, il hésite à accueillir les preuves en l'absence des témoins. Mais l'inspiration delà doctrine est déjà la même :... I am inclined to think, says Voltaire, that every witness ought to hâve a hearing ; this one doubt is worth ail the doctrines of the Lawyers. — What

i26 NOTES. (Pp. 148-155)

then shall IheLegislator do ? —Do nothing. — Do hère as he shoald do in Heresy, Impuoity, and so many other cases in wliich be bas been ao mifitakenly and so mischevously officions. On this subject for the Legislator thcre is notbing to do at ail ; for the Jurist nothing (Tar. little) but to show the impropriety of mnch that bas bcen done.

52. Edinburgh RevieWj n» LX.KIX, mars 18Î4, art. vni, sur le Traité des Preuves judiciaires. — Westminster RetHew, n" XI FI, janvier 1827, art. IV, sur le discours de Peel pour la réforme du droit criminel. — Notes de Stuart Mill au Rationaû of JudicicU Evidence, Book IX, part. l\\ chap. V ; Bowring, vol. Vil, pp. 476 sqq. (le témoignage de Tavocal doit-il être admis contre le client?) et 486 tle témoignage du mari doit-il être admis contre la femme et réciproquement ?; ; Book IX, part. V, chap. i; Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 487-488 (le témoignage de Vaccusé doit-il être admis contre lui-même?).

53. Trcàtés, Principes du Code pénal, liv. lY, chap. xiv; Bowring, yU. \f p. 558. — Cf. Rat. of Jitd. Ev., Book IX, part. VI, chap. i ; Bowring, vo\. VU, p. 522) : The giving security to the innocent, is the object and final cause of this ill-considered scruple. Of wbat description of the innocest? Of those, and those alone, to wbom, by false testimony,itmight happen to be subjected to prosecution in a court of justice. On the other hand, those to whom, in conséquence of the licence granted by this same rule, it might happen, and (if the rule were unÎTersally known) coold not but h^pen, to suffer the same or worse punishment at the hands of malefaelors, axe altogether overlooked. The innocent who scaroely présent themselTes by so much as scores or dozens, engross the whole attention, and pass for the whole world. The innocent who ought to bave presented themseUes by millions, are overlooked, and left out of the account. — V. Blackstone, JV Comm. 352 : Âll presumptive évidence of felony shoald be admitted cautiously : for the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons esciipe, than that one innocent suffer. — Et Paky, Moral and PaUtical PliUosophijj Book VI, chap. ix, sub finem.

54. Hat. of Jutt. Er., Book IX, Part. IV. chap. m; Bowring, vol. Vïï. pp. 4^5 sqq. — Book, IX, Part. V, chap. i; Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 488 sqq. — Prpures judiciaires, liv. III, chap. i (vol. I, p. 192); liv. VU, chap. xi ivol. II, pp. 124 sqq.). — Cf. Weslm. Rev. n* XIII, janv., 1827, art. IV, pp. 96 sqq. ; et un article d'Albany Fonblanque, England under seven administrations, vol. 1, pp. 184-lb7. — On retrouve la môme opinion exprimée, de la môme façon, dans des manuscrits datés 1780-1785 (Mss. Univ. Coll. n» 46) : Ostensible reasons for not examining a Défendant. 1. That it is hard. 2. That it is not fair (Box-match. — Fox-chace).

55. Montesquieu : Esprit des Lois, liv. Xll, chap. m. — Beccaria, Traité des DélUs et des Peines, chap. xiii. — Blackstone, IV Comm, p. ^0- 351, ajoute : c But this seems to be carrying matters too far : for tbere

are some crimes, in which the very privacy of their nature excludes the poesibility of having more than one witness : must thèse therefore escape unpunished ? Neither indeed is the bare déniai of the peraon accu&ed équivalent to the positive oath of a disinterested ^tness. > Blackstone adopte la règle, d'accord avec la loi angUiae, pour les cas de <r trahison », et aussi de « parjure »; car dans ce dernier cas c there is only one oath against another. » — Hat. ofJud. Ev,, Book IX, Part. VI, chap. i; Bowring, vol. VII, p. 521 : The accomplice, >\ho is sufficient to enable a man to commit the crime, not being sufficient to produce, by the testimony of his lips, his conviction of and for such crime, — each malefactor has thus a ticket of exemption to dispose of, in faveur of any associate who may be disposed to join wilh him in any forbidden enterprise. — Bentham (pp. 522- 523) avance la thèse que « it is to this ill-considered scruple, that the European nations hâve been indebted for the use of what is technically called torture\ I mean in the most usual, and most exceptionable, application of it. The testimony of a single witness was not sufficient for the conviction of a défendant; but, in a case capitally punished, it was sufficient to warrant the opplying torture to him, for the purpose of compelling a confession. Combined with this tremendous exercise ofseverity, what then was the effect of this false tendemess? — Preuves judiciaires ^ liv. VU, chap. m, vol. II, p. 99.

56. Dès 1790, Bentham a déjà, dans des papiers qui sont restés inédits, développé son système naturel de procédure et d'organisation judiciaire. — V. JudkkU EstabHahment, chap. I, tit. 1 ; Bowring, vol. IV, p. 319 : This (raasistance des parties dès le début des débats) is but one feature, though that œrtainly a capital one, in the System ofnatural or domestic procédure, which I adopt in ail it points : ail technical ones being absurd and pemicious, as J shali show in due fiwe, in proportion as they départ from it. I introducethe article hère... V. encore chap. ii, tit. II; Bowring, vol. I, p. 325. The question as to the number of judges actiog together in the same court, seemed of such importance as to reqnire discussion too long to appear in form of a note. I hâve accordingîff dismissed the full considération of it to a separate essay. The resuit is.... — V. encore chap. II, tit. 11, p. 324 : contre l'institution des jurys. The grounds ofthi% opinion uriU be amply sei forth iit a dissertation on purpose. — Voir plus bas note 75.

57. Conslitutional Code^ Book II, chap. xii sqq. ; Bowring, vol. IX, pp. 454 sqq.

58. Rat. of Jud. Ev., Book VIII, chap. m ; Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 212-213 : That, against the malpractices committedby individuals under the System, no tolerably efficacious remedy can be applied by the punishment of those individuals— that the root of the evil lies in the System itself... Hence the injustice of imputing any especial or peculiar personal blâme to this or that individual functionary, on the score of his having, on this or that

428 NOTES. (Pp. 156-161)

occasion, pursued the dictâtes of that sinister interest which the sjstem îtself, in the state in which he found it, planted in his breast. — The fhalt lies not in the individual, not in any peculiar taint of improbity seated in the bosom of the individual, but in the System itself — the System ioto which he enters, and under which he acts. Amend the System, yen amend the individual. Render it his interest to pursue the ends of justice, the ends of justice will be pursued; the ends of judicature will be broogfat to a coïncidence with the ends of justice.

59. Bat, ofJud. Ev., Book VIII, chap. ii, m; Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 197 sqq. — En note : Définition of a fee: — Money or money*8 worlh recelTed at the expense of the suitors in a caose (ail or any of them) on the occasion of a mass of writing written or supposed to be written, or otber act done or supposed to be done, in the course or on the occasion of it. — RaL of Jud. Ev.^ Book II, chap. vi, § 2; Bowring, vol. VI, p. 311. — Scoich Refomif letter 1; Bowring, vol. V, pp. 5-6. — Justice and Codification Pétition; Bowring, vol. V, pp. 444 sqq.

60. Rat. of Jud. Ev., Book VIII, chap. iv; Bowring, vol. VII, pp. 215 sqq. — Indications conceming Lord Eldon; Bowring, vol. V, pp. 348 sqq.

61. Const. CodCy Book II, chap. xii, sect. XXVII, art. 21 ; Bowring, vol. IX, pp. 524-525.

62. Rat, ofJud, Ev,, Book VIII, chap. xix; Bowring, vol. VU, p. 288. — Judicial Establishment; Bowring, vol. IV, p. 328 sqq. — Justice and Codification Pétitions; Bowring. vol. V, pp. 481 sqq. : Jurisdiction hts two fields — the local and the logical : the locale or say teniloricUy divided into tracts of terntory ; the logical, divided into sorts of ctises. In the loca» field, that which the interests of justice require is, as hath been seeo, tnultiplicity ; in the logical ûeld, as will be seon, unity. So much for reason; now for practice. Where, by the interests of justice, multiplicity was required, the interest of Judgc and C^ established, as bas been seeo, the unUy : where, by the interests of justice, unity was and is required, the opposite interest of judicature, that is to say, that same sinister interest will now be seen establishing multiplicity. — Cotislilutional Codtr^ Book II, chap. xii, sect. VI; Bowring, vol. IX, p. 473.

63. Judicial Establishment, chap. ii, lit. Il, 1 ; Bowring, vol. IV, pp. 325 sqq ; — Scotch Reform, letter II ; Bowring, vol. V, pp. 16 sqq ; -— Const, Code, Book II, chap. xii, sect. v; Bowring, vol. IX, pp. 470 sqq. — Dans le Const. Code, Book II, chap. ix, section m, Bentham énonce et justifie le principe du juge unique, sous la forme du principe, plus général, du fonctionnaire unique (Bowring, vol. IX, p. 214): Art. 1. In each officiai situation functionaries no more than one. Ratiocinative. Art* 2. Short reason, hère as else where, ofTicial aptitude maximized; expense mifàmizei.

6i. Esp. des Lois, liv. VI, chap. ii.

(Pp. 161-167) NOTES. 429