Lecture X

85. V. Brown, Observations on... Darvnùf préface, p. IX, et Lectures, VIII.

86. AnalysiSf chap. i ivol. I, p. 2) : My object, in what I shall say respecting the phenomena classed under the head of Sensation is, to lead such of roy readers as are new to this species of inquiry to conceive the feelings distinctly. AU men are familiar with them; but this very familiarity, as the mind runs easily from one well known object to another, is a reason why the boundary between them and other feelings is notalways observed. It is necessary, therefore, that the learner should by practice acquire the habit of reflecting upon his sensations, as a distinct class of feelings.— Cf., p. 37 : That we hâve sensations in parts of the body suffering, or approaching to, disorganization, does not require illustration... Thèse sensations are specifically différent from those classed under the several heads of sensé. The feelings themselves, if attended to, are évidence of this.

87. Analysis, chap. ii (vol. I, pp. 61^62) : It is not... necessary in tracing the simple feelings which enter into the more complex states of consciousness, to dwell upon the obscurer classes of our inward sensations ; because it is only in a very gênerai way that we can make use of them, in expounding the more mysterious phenomena... We bave now considered what it is to hâve sensations, in the simple, uncompounded cases. — Cf. vol. I, p. 263 : ... proceeding to the simplest cases first, and by them

462 NOTBS. (Pp. 370-373)

«aBp€Êmding such as are mon oomplicate. — CL ¥oL II, pp. 80^ 84, 106 (chemiOBl oompouad), 113, lU, 143-144, etc. — Cf. Hartl^, chap. I, seeL I, pfop. XII, oor. 2 : to anaiyie ail that vaat varietj of eomplex ideas, which pass under the name of ideas of reflectioii, and inteUeetual ideas, mto their aimple oompounding parts, i. e., into the simple ideaft of sensation, of which they consist.

88. AnalysiSf chap. i, sect. I (vol. I, p. 11) : That which alone is material to our subséquent inquiries — that point of conseiousineas which we denominate the sensation of smell, the mera feeling, detacfaed Anom ererything else. •— P. 12 : a point of consciousness, a thing which we can describe Qo otberwise than by calling it a feeling; a part oi that aeries, that succession, that flow of something, on aocount of which we call ourselves liTing or senshive creatares. — P. 13 : the sucœsBiye points of cooaciouaneas, composiag our sentient being... •— P. 17 : a point of mj oiwn oonsdousness; ... an elementary part of my sensitive being; of that thraad of consdousness, drawn oui in sueoeaBÎon, whidi 1 call myaelf.

89. Les travaux de Fécole anglaise, dans la période intermédiaire entre Hartley et James Mill, avaient tendu plutùt à multiplier le nombre des lois de Tassociation des idées. — Y. Abraham Tucker, The Lig^ of iWofiifv Pursuedf 1168. — Henry Home (lord Kames), Eléments of Criftcîsm, 1762. — George Campbell, The Philosophy of BhetoriCf 1776.

90. AnalysiSy chap. xi (vol. I, pp. 376-377) : ... as if that simplicity, according to which one law is fonnd included in a higher, and that in a yet higher, lill we arrive at a few which seem to include the whole, were not as uiuch to be cxpeoted in the worid of mind, as in the world of iiiatter.

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