Introd. chap. xi, 1 ; Bowring, vol. I, p
15. Radical Reform Bill, Appendix ; Bowring, vol. III, pp. 593-594 : B} définition seems commonly to be understood, the exhibition ol some word of more extensive signification, within the significatiou of which thatof the word in question is included, — accompanied with the designalioa of some circiimstance,whereby tbe object designated by it stands distinguished from ail others that are in use to be designaled by that more extPi-
(P. Ml) NOTES. 467
«i¥e appeUatHre. — Mais il ajoute en note : « But words tbere are, and in no small abundance, of wbicfa définitions of this sort are frequently undertaken to be given — or which are suppoaed to be as clearly and generally understood as if définitions in this forui could be and had been giveo of them — but for which, ail this while, no sucb more extensite denomi nation is afforded by this or any other language : and among them, words wbieb, in law and politics, are in continuai use, and upon tbe signification of which questions of prime and practical importance are eontinually turning. Take, for instance^the words rigM, power, obligation. — C'est le cas des fktUiom erUities par opposition aux real entUies (mtui, animaly substanccy etc.)... For expounding or explaining the import of any one of thèse names of ilctitious entities, the nature of the case affords but one resource ; and that is, the finding some class of real entities, which is more or less clearly in view as often as, to the name of a dass of fictitious entities, any clear idea stands annexed, and thereupon framing two propositions: one, in which the name of the fictitious entity is tbe leading term; the otber, in which the name of a oorreaponding clase^ eitber of real entities, or ofoperaHoiu or other motions of real entities, is the leading term : — this laat so ordered, that by being seen to express the same iraport, it shall explain and make clear the import of the first. This mode of exposition bas been termed paraphnisis — paraphrase : giving phrase for phrase. •— 11 conrient d'ajouter que ,1a définition proposée par Bentham dans son Fragment on Government, chap. v, § VI (Bowring, yoI. I, p. 293), de la définition par paraphrase, conviendrait pi'esque à la méthode de Mill ; mais il n'appartenait pas sur ce point à Bentham de développer toute la pensée de Bentham. « To deftne or rather (lo speak more generally) to expound a word, is to résolve, or to make a progress towards resolving, the idea belonging to it into simple ones... A word may be said to be expounded by paraphrasis^ when not that word alow; is translated into other words, but some whole sentence of which it forma a part is translated into another sentence\ the words of which latter are expressive of such ideas as are simple, or are more immediately resolvable into simple ones than those of the former. Such are those expressive of substances and simple modes, in respect of such abstract terms as are expressive of what Locke has called mixed modes. This, in short, is the only method in which any abstract terms can, at the long run, be expounded to any instructive purpose : that is in terms ealculated to raise images eitber of substances perceived, or of emotùms ; — sources, one or other of which every idea must be drawn from, to be a clear one. — Mais, pour juger de ce qoe devient remploi delà définition par paraphrase, voir Table of theSprings of Action, Bowring, vol. I, p. 208 ; la définition des motifs. (Motives) 1. Synonyms to the vford motive, t. Inducement. 2. Incitement. 3. Incentive. 4. Spur. 5. Invitation. 6. Solicitation. 7. AUurement. 8. Enticement. 9. Temptation.
16 Rat. of Jud. Sv., Book X, ci^p. uf BowriDg, vol. Vil, p. 567
468 NOTES. (Pp. 282-292)
17. IrUrod.y chap. X, § vu; Bowring, vol. I, p. 47; — Table of tke Springs of Action, I ; Bowring, vol. I, p. 205.
18. An Essay, etc., Book II, chap, xx, § 6. — Mais, demande Benlham {Deonlology, Part 1, chap. V), si cela est vrai, le malaise accompagne toujours nécessairement raction, et un homme doit être dans un état de malaise toutes les fois et aussi longtemps qu'il agit. Mais quel est le sentiment que Locke appelle uneasiness ? Ce n'est pas un sentiment pénible, ce n'est pas le malaise, c'est la sensation, le pressentiment d'une aptitude à jouir dans un temps à venir, d'un plaisir qui n'est pas actuellement présent.
