CHAPTER V

THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD,

This method bids us enter the wide domain of what has generally been regarded as the sphere of natural theology proper. It invites us to consider what is sometimes called the sign argument, and sometimes the argument from fxa/ cause. Itis, perhaps, the most venerable of all the proofs of the divine existence, It has certainly been the most fully illustrated by a great host of writers in allages, It is the the only argument which is formally stated in the Scriptures, and its influence on the minds of ordinary men has been greater than that of any of the other theistic proofs. Even Kant, while whetting his sword against it, admits that it is an argument not altogether to be despised. This method is at least as old as Socrates, though some writers are inclined to regard Anaxagoras as its father, Plato in the Timæus very clearly unfolded it, and Aristotle set it forth as distinctlyas Paley. In the middle ages we find Sebonde presenting it when most of the Schoolmen were busy with onto-theism, In modern times, after the manner of Niewentyt and Paley, we have a host of writers heaping up illustrations from all sources in support of the inference of this method. For a time it was almost the only proof that theologians relied on in support of Theism. À host of critics have also arisen against the design argument and it has been subjected to severe scrutiny. The result of this criticism, when notirrational or illogical, nas been good ; for

it must be admitted that many writers on natural theology a hundred years ago were more eloquent than logical. They sought to prove an infinite personal God at a single lcap, instead of being content to move on step by step in the line of the various theistic proofs to the desired conclusion. (Criticism has also helped to confine this argument to its proper sphere, and its proof has been made all the more effective in that sphere during recent years, We shall divide our discussion of it into two sections. In the first we shall indicate the scope of the argument, and in the second we shall consider objections to it. Since the most vigorous attacks made upon Theism at the present day are directed against the teleo-theistic method, these attacks demand careful consideration,

SECTION I

THE SCOPE OF THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD.

This method is popularly known as the æszon argument, but the term design sec:..: to be open to the objection that it assumes the main thing to be proved. The reality of design or intention as implying intelligence is the matter to be proved. To assume design at the outset is really to beg the question, The fact of design must first be established ; then from that fact we may make the theistic inference. It must, therefore, be shown that there are those facts in nature which indicate the existence of an intelligence which adapts means to secure forseen ends. The term fra/ cause is also used to designate this method. Janet makes this term the title of his able and exhaustive treatise on this argument. Final cause is to be carefully distinguished from efficient cause, which is the principle of the ætio-theistic method. Efficient cause points to that which brings anything about. Final cause denotes the purpose for which anything exists. According to this view there is

THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD, 89

observed in nature certain adaptations of meansto ends. There is what looks like a plan made beforehand, and then nature seems to be working up to that plan. An ideal future is presented, and then means come into operation to realize this ideal future, AI this, it is maintained, justifies the inference that intelligence stands related in some way to these facts of forescen plan or ideal future.

In regard to the precise logical form of this method an important question arises. Is it entirely a-posteriori, or is there also an a-priori elementinit? Isit merely inductive in its form, or does its inference rest on an intuitive basis? Is the principle of design an intuition, or is it a generalization from experience? Are final and efficient cause the same in their nature? Here opinions differ widely. Reid, Porter and others hold that final cause is intuitive, Mill, Janet and many others maintain that it is inductive, The expositior given in last chapter, regarding the relation of the eutaxio-theistic and teleo-theistic methods to the principle of causality, leads to the conclusion that final cause is not an intuitive principle, and that the inference of the teleo-theistic method is inductive in its form. Finality is a law of nature rather than a principle of reason. We do not ##éuk it into nature as a category, but we find it in nature as a fact. It should be carefully observed that the inductive process in this method has for its special function the establishment of the premises of the argtment. When the premises are confirmed, then a simple deductive process leads to the theistic conclusion. In this conclusion we only analytically unfold what is already contained in the premises. Hence, the vindication of the premises by valid induction is the real task for this method,

Further, in regard to the logical form of the proof, we need to understand whether the proof is of the nature of mere analogy, Analogy is the resemblance of relations between different things. In the theistic controversy the method now under discussion has often been regarded as merely analogical in its nature. The force of the proof has been made to turn on the resemblance between

marks of design perceived in works of human skill and similar marks observed in nature. It is in this connection that the weakness of Paley’s argument appears. Perhaps Janet in the first part of his masterly treatise tends a little in the same direction. Kant cvidently had the element of analogy prominent when he penned his elaborate criticism. While we admit that analogy aids us in illustrating this method, yet we do not think that analogy is the main principle of its inference. Those who present this argument in the form of analogy compare the industry of nature with that of man. They argue that, since any human mechanism such as a watch is the product of intelligence, so in like manner a natural organism such as the eye must also be the result of intelligence.

A little reflection will show that we cannot pass logically from human mechanism to natures mechanism. It will be observed that in reaching intelligence we make precisely the same inference in both cases, only in one case the relation of intelligence to the mechanism is more clearly seen than in the other. From marks of adaptation in the watch we infer that it is the product of intelligence, and from similar marks in the eye we infer that it also is the result of intelligence, So far as logical validity is concerned, it is as proper to reason from the eye to the watch as from the watch to the eye. We infer intelligence properly in both cases, but each inference is logically independent of the other. The mechanism of the watch may #/ustrate, but it cannot prove, that nature’s adaptations imply intelligence. We make these remarks not to weaken the force of the teleo-theistic proof, but rather to fortify it against certain objections which are based on the supposition that it is simply analogical in form. We incline strongly to the opinion that the argument now under review is strictly inductive in its principle, and at the same time capable of ample illustration by. means of analogy. As inductive, it postulates the hypothesis of intelligence as the only adequate solution of the facts of adaptation observed in nature,

THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD. OI

In regard to the subject matter of this method, it need only be remarked that this consists in all the facts of special order alluded to in last chapter, and there distinguished from the facts of general order. We have now before us what McCosh calls “special ends,” and what others describe as features of adaptation, plan, purpose, intention or design. To sketch these facts or features at length is not our purpose in this essay. Only a few typical illustrations may be given, and for the rest we must refer to the ordinary works on natural theology. There are adaptations in particular organs, as in the eye and hand of man, in the wings of birds, in the trunk of the elephant, and in the webbed feet of certain waterfowl. Then there are adaptations of certain organs to each other, as in the case of the heart and lungs in animals, of the pollen in male and female plants, and of the teeth and digestive organs in carnivorous animals respectively. Then, again, there are adaptations of organs to the functions they perform, as is seen in the case of the fect for walking, of fins for swimming, and of the heart for the circulation of the blood. Then, further, we observe adaptations of the organism to its environment, as in the case of birds to the atmosphere, of fishes to the water, and of the heavy fur of the white bear to the polar regions. Then, we might mention the adaptation of parts to the whole, and the evident plan and purpose running through the whole realm of nature on the earth and in the heavens, as composing part of the subject matter of this argument. The phenomena of animal instinct is generally included in the material of this method, but we think it better to deal with its facts under the method of sufficient reason, as we have already done in dealing with the cosmo-theistic method.

We may now state this method in its syllogistic form and indicate its precise import, The syllogism is as follows :—Major premise : The adaptation of means to foreseen ends or results implies intelligence. Minor: The special order of nature presents such adaptation, Conclusion: This order of nature implies intel-

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ligence, If these premises are well grounded the conclusion is valid. In former times the minor premise was questioned, but at the present day the major is more frequently dispute.

At the present day the assertion made in the minor premise involves but little difficulty, It is very generally admitted that nature contains numberless adaptations of means to ends, and marvellous adjustments of parts to parts. This premise simply states the fact that finality exists in nature, but it does not raise the question of the ground or cause of that finality, Only those, perhaps, who hold that nature is the product of the fortuitous concourse of atoms will deny the minor.

Itis when we turn to the major premise that we face the real difficulties in the teleo-theistic method. Many modern writers who admit the minor deny the major. The real question here is: How can we pass logically from finality to intelligence, from adaptation to mind? How are we to go out beyond nature to find an adequate explanation of the finality admitted to be in nature? Or, do we need to go beyond nature at all for the explanation? Is the finality not immanent in nature ; or may it not be merely subjective and regulative of our thinking? It will at once be seen how profound the problem raised by the assertion of the major premise really is, and we must be careful not to assume its truth without examination, We can only in the very bricfest way indicate the path along which the inductive process leads us in establishing the validity of this premise. The problem is to furnish a proper explanation of adaptation and finality, We try different hypothesis in order to get this explanation. Mere mechanism will not suffice, for it can never provide adjustment, adaptation, finality. Nor, again, can an adequate explanation be found in vital processes, or instinctive tendencies, for these simply work from within, and cannot adjust means to ends from without. Hence we must rise above mechanism and instinct, above matter and life, to obtain the solution of finality, We must posit inteuigence, working con-

THE TELEO-THEISTIC METHOD, 93

sciously, adapting means to ends, and adjusting parts to parts, as the proper explanation of finality. The only finality of which we have any knowledge is that of a purposing mind ; and since finality with us implies intentionality, we conclude that the inference from the finality in nature to intelligence or purposing mind is a strictly valid induction.

It only remains to exhibit the content of the conclusion of this proof. The conclusion is that nature involves intelligence or purposing mind, and we must be careful not to put more into this conclusion thar the premises warrant. In the first place, it is frankly admitted that this method by itself does not prove the existence of a Creator. Creation is one thing, and finality is another ; and it is no objection to the argument from final cause to say that it does not prove a creator, when it does not undertake that task. The telco-theistic method simply vindicates the inference of an intelligence other than and above nature, as the proper explanation of the facts of special order which involve the principle of finality. In the second place, this method does not give us an znfinite intelligence, or an infinite personal God. The facts are finite, and do not absolutely require an infinite intelligence to explain them. If, then, infinity is not in the premises we must not insert it in the conclusion, The reality of the infinite can be fully vindicated on other grounds and by other modes of reasoning, but it is not in the conclusion of this method. We are not to conclude, however, that this argument has no value even if has to be understood with these limitations, By confining the proof to its own proper sphere we relieve it from certain objections, and at the same time we concentrate the force of its proof. Within its own domain it is almost free from well grounded objection, and it possesses immense argumentative value, Theism is safe if the reality of an extra-mundane purposing intelligence is established. This we believe the teleotheistic method does very effectively, and it thus supplies one of the most satisfactory lines of reasoning by means of which the reality

of the divine existence is established, and the belief in God is upheld and justified to human reason,

SECTION II