OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED

These objections may be divided into two classes. In the one class the /ogical form of the argument is impugned, and in the other its subject matter is questioned. Advocates of the former line of attack maïntain that we cannot by a strictly logical process reach the conclusion which the teleo-theistic method seeks to establish. Those who call the subject matter in question claim that all the facts of adaptation can be accounted for apart from the hypothesis of all intelligence beyond nature,

In regard to the logical objections we need not say very much. All objections based on the supposition that the proof is merely analogical are warded off when we show that the inference is strictly inductive. Analogy cannot prove; it only illustrates, and answers objections. By induction we can solve problems, and tranform a well-grounded hypothesis into a properly reasoned truth. The objection that the argument from final cause puts the effect in the place of the cause is refuted when we see the proper logical form of the proof, and understand what is meant by final as distinct from efficient cause. The only logical objection which requires further notice is that pressed by some recent writers, especially by Hicks in his “Critique of the Design Arguments.” The position taken is that the teleo-theistic argument cannot be stated without assuming the conclusion it professes to establish. They admit that the eutaxio-theistic argument has logical validit ut assert that the teleo-theistic has not. The former does not assume intelligence, but the latter does, The facts of order justify the

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inference of mind, but the facts of adaptation assume intelligence, The former is logical, the latter only reaches mind by being illogical,

In answer to this objection we remark that if it be valid it proves too much. If adaptation takes intelligence for granted so also does order. If special order assumes mind so also does general order. If the teleo-theistic method is illogical so is the eutaxio-theistic. If Hicks has swept away the one he has destroyed the other, But the true view is that both are logically valid. The mistake Hicks makes consists in taking the two methods to be generically distinct, He also confounds the inductive and deductive process involved in this method. Dsduction starts with principles which are stated in the premises, and we can never get anything into the conclusion which is not at least tacitly in the premises. Hence, if the fact of intelligence be not in the premises it can never get into the conclusion, according to the deductive method which merely unfolds analytically the content of the premises. By means of induction, however, we are able to reach a conclusion beyond the facts, and synthetically discover a law or principle. In both the eutaxio-theistic and teleo-theistic methods we proceed inductively in establishing the premises. These premises are really the conclusions of inductive processes. When the premises are thus established a single deduction process enables us to reach the final conclusion of this method. Then, since by the inductive method we get intelligence into the premises, so we are justified in putting it into the conclusion. Both the order and design arguments occupy precisely the same logical position, and hold the same indirect relation to the principle of causality. Both are also logically valid. In the one we observe marks of order or plan, in the other we observe marks of adaptation or purpose, In both cases we posit intelligence as the adequate explanation, and thus the objection vanishes,

There are three objections bearing on the subject matter of this method which merit attention, The first is related to the

doctrine of sw#ectivity, the second is connected with the theory of inmanence, and the third is involved in the hypothesis of evo/ution, We can devote only a brief paragraph to each.

The objection which springs from the doctrine of subjectivity does not absolutely deny finality. It simply holds that what is called design is a necessary mental condition in relation to certain facts in nature. In other words, finality is a law of mind rather than a law of things. The observer does not #4 it in nature but he /#inks it into nature. We make two remarks in reply. The first is that it is a mistake to draw the line between the real and phenomenal so strictly as the phenomenalism which underlies this objection really does. There are different kinds of reality and various classes of phenomena. The result of the seperation betwcen the phenomenal and the noumenal, which Kant insisted on so much, is either a scepticism which denies all knowledge of reality or an agnosticism which claims that our powers do not enable us to know the real, or a positivism which asserts that all we know is phenomena and their laws. In the second place, if the argument be inductive in its form, finaiity cannot be merely subjective, By the inductive process we observe 27 nature certain marks of purpose and adaptation, and thus we begin in the objective sphere, If finality were merely a mental principle then it would have the same necessity and universality that causality has. We would then see design in everything. But as a matter of fact we do not observe finality in everything in nature. We see it in some things but not in others, and their must be an objective ground for this distinction, Finality is in things, we observe it there, and by induction we postulate intelligence as its only proper explanation,

The second objection is connected with the theory of immanence, This objection admits that finality exists as a fact 2 nature, but it asserts that we do not require to go beyond nature itself for the solution of finality. Design in nature is admitted, but extramundane intelligence is denied. This objection is connected

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chiefly with the name of Hegel. Some who hold this theory of immanent finality regard it as connected with absolute reason. This absolute reason may be viewed as conscious or unconscious, and and advocates of this objection differ on this point. The worldsoul of the Stoics and the Hegelian doctrine of immanency incline to the view that it is conscious, though in some places Hegel denies that it is either conscious or free. Schopenhauer who admits a kind of finality maintains that it is unconscious though immanent. Two remarks may be made in refuting this objection. In the first place, the notion of unconscious immanent finality must either deny intelligence altogether or perish in a contradiction. Unconscious intelligence is an utter contradiction in terms. In order to give the objection even the appearance of cogency it must admit a measure of intelligence, and a degree of consciousness in the inner activity of nature which this theory says is sufficient to explain the facts of adaptation. In the second place, the advocates of immanent finality admit that design or purpose is a fact in nature. The only question is as to the manner in which this finality is to be explained. Isa mere immanent intelligence conscious or unconscious sufficient, or must we go beyond nature? Almost everything that the upholders of immanency maiïntain may be admitted and yet the material of the teleo-theistic method would remain. This immanent intelligence itself needs an explanation, and thus the theistic hypothesis is necessary, for an explanation which needs explanation can never be final. Hence, we conclude that the thcory of finality neither destroys nor supersedes this method. The last objection comes from evolution. This important hypothesis calls for careful consideration at the hands of both science and theology. Many of its advocates are anti-Christian, and some are avowedly atheistic. On the other hand, some able and thoughtful Christian men are prepared to admit that the main positions of scientific evolution are not inconsistent with Theism. At present we have to deal with the bearing of evolution on the telco-theistic

method, Doss evolution destroy, or enable us to dispense with the theistic inference connected with the design argument ?

In answering this question we have to distinguish between the earlier and cruder forms of evolution, and its later or scientific forms. Wallace and Darwin are types of the former, Comte and Spencer of the latter. The former deal, chiefly with evolution in the biologicai sphere, but the latter seek to embrace all the sciences under the principles of the evolutionary method. Our space permits only one or two critical remarks on a vast topic.

In regard to the Darwinian form of evolution, we observe that while it professes to supersede finality, yet it constantly falls back on the facts of teleology. The Darwinians speak constantly of selection, adaptation and fitness, terms which denote the very facts to which finality relates. If we take the law of tendency to vary in all directions, we are on the ground of the doctrine of chance already considered. If we take the law of natural selection, by means of which the variation is modified under given conditions, the question at once arises, why does the variation take one line rather than another? Only the answer of the teleo-theistic method is sufficient here. In short, every upward movement in the progress that evolution describes presents problems which demand the teleo-theistic inference. Of course, if evolution in any form essays to explain the origin of things it goes beyond its province, and will assume an atheistic form.

The Spencerian evolution is bolder in its claims than the Darwinian. It claims to be encyclopædic. It is really a vast effort to build up a purely abstract monism. It is doubtful if Spencer has succeeded as well as Spinoza, who long ago made a similar attempt along other lines. In Spencer’s hands the principle of evolution becomes a kind of transformism, It assumes atoms and force ; and a not very clearly defined relation of co-ordination between the homogeneous and the heterogeneous is taken as its fundamental principle, Even if we admit that Spencer’s system gives a sound

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natural history of the development of the cosmos from its original condition of stable equilibrium in the homogeneous, the question still arises, how does the first step in the movement towards the hetcrogeneous take place? Is it fortuitous? Is it necessary ? Both these views have been disposed of in the previous chapter. Then, again, does the homogeneous contain within itself the principle of its own development? If s0, we have merely the doctrine of immanence in another form. This principle still requires explanation. No explanation short of the hypothesis of an intelligent power will account for the movement of the homogeneous in any, much less a given direction. And, further, it is to be observed that all along the line of development, evolution gives rather the natural history than the philosophy of the process. In order to defend the teleo-theistic method from this objection we do not require to refute Spencer’s doctrines generally. We need only show that even if truc they do not supersede this method. Even if evolution be admitted as a history of nature’s development, that development itself, in its origin, direction and progress, demands explanation. It is evident that the series in the cosmos can neither originate, direct nor continue itself. The ground of its explanation must lie beyond the series,