REPORT

In obédience to the instructions which we hâve received, wc bave inquired into and considered the relations of the Colonies of Great Britain to the mother country, as regards the expenditure on their military defence.

The duties imposed on us were explained in a letter from General PEEL (2), to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 14th March, 1859, in conséquence of which the committec was appointed.

The principles suggested by General Peel, as the basis of such arrangements, arc as follows: —

1. England should assist in the defence of her Colonies against aggression on the part of foreign nations, but in no case, except where such Colonies are mère garrisons kept up for Impérial purposes, should she assume the whole of such defence; but, on the contrary, she should insist, as a condition of her aid, that the Colony should also contribute its share by maintaining at its own expense a local force; or if circumstances appear to make that impossible, by paying part of the expense of the Impérial garri son; and

2. Military expenditure, for purposes of internai police, should be defrayed from local funds, there being no grounds for drawing any distinction between a Colony and an independent nation in this respect, and the préservation of internai peace and order being propcrly thrown on local authorities, both because it dépends upon their own législation and management, and because the local population is mainly, if not exclusively, interested in it.

The first point to which it is our duty to call attention is the fact that the Colonies of Great Britain may be said, speaking gcncrally, to hâve been free from the obligation of contributing, either by personal service or money payment, towards their own défonces — a state of things which wc believe to have no parallel or précèdent in the case of any other organized coin mu nity of which the history is known.

We subjoin a return of the military force and the expenditure for military purposes in our Colonies for 1857-58, the last year for which wc have complète accounts. It will be seen that, including the cost of the Cape German Légion, the military expenditure amounted to £3,968,599. Of this only £378,253 was contributcd by the Colonies, being less than one-tenth part of the whole; and of that contribution about two-thirds were paid by three Colonies, New South Wales, Victoria, and Ceylon. It is rcmarkable that no Colony except Canada, and, to a very small extent, Victoria, the Cape, and one or two of the West India Colonies, had organized a militia or other local force.

We consider that this immunity, throwing as it docs the defence of the Colonies almost cntircly on the mother country, is open to two main objections. In the first place, it imposes an enormous burden and inconvcniencc on the pcople of England, not only by the addition which it makes to their taxes, but by calling off to remote stations a large proportion of their troops and ships, and thereby wcakening their means of defence at home. But a still more important objection is, the tendency which this system must necessarily have to prevent the development of a proper spirit of self-

(1) Sessional Papers, 1862, No. 17, — deuxième partie.

(2) Ministre de la guerre dans le second cabinet Derby.

reliancc aiuongst our Colonists, and ta enfeeblc their national character. By the gift of political self-Kovemment, we hâve bestowed on our Colonies a most important élément of national éducation; but the habit of self-defence constitutes a part hardly les» important of the training of a frec people, and it will never be acquired by our Colonists if we assume exclusively the task of defending them.

Next to the inadequacy of the contributions of our Colonies towards their defences, the most conspicuous defect in the présent system is its inequality as among the Colonies themselves.

Nor is the inequality in our mode of treating our Colonies less remarkable than that of their contributions. For example, though the people of Victoria contribute, as we hâve shown, most liberally and largely, we hâve lately, at great expense and inconvenience, removed part of the régiment quartered there, on the express ground that Victoria refused to pay for more than four companies, to Tasmania, which not only does not pay for those troops, but contributes nothing in any shape to military purposes. Again, we hâve removed the troops from Antigua, on the ground that the Colony would not provide barracks for them, to Barbadoes, where we provide barracks for them ourselves. Again, Canada is the first British Colony which has set the example of organizing a militia ; she has done this entirely at her own expense, including the arming and clothing of the men, and we hâve refused to contribute anything towards it, going so far as to demand payment for some great coats and smooth-bore muskets, which happened to bc in store on the spot, and which we hâve issued to them. Yet at the same time, we are distributing, gratis, from the store at Québec a large quantity of the best Enficld rifles to Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland, for the use of volunteers, although we hâve never been able to induce those Colonies to organize a militia or to contribute one farthing, in any shape, towards their own defence.

Having pointed out, as above, the evils of the présent system, we proceed to submit our proposais for altering it. Before doing so, it will be convenient to state the gênerai principles on which we believe such altération should be founded.

In the first place, while we recognise to the full extent the obligation which devolves on Great Britain of assisting her Colonies to défend themselves against foreign enclines, we maintain also that this obligation is discharged by doing or offering to do so on fair and libéral conditions, and that she is by no means bound to relieve them of the whole responsibility of self-defence. It must be borne in mind, that the interest of the Colonists in repelling aggression upon them is primary and direct; that of Great Britain indirect and secondary. While, therefore, it seems right that the Colonists should, as a rule, décide on the extent and nature of their own defences, and hâve generally the control and management of them, it is unjust to throw the whole burden of expense on the less interested party.

In the second place, we submit that a system of defence, based upon the présence of Impérial garrisons in every part of the empire, is as inefficient as it is burdensome: and that the right system would be one based on local efforts and local resources.

Ail history shows (what is indeed évident à priori) that the maintenance of dominion over scattered and distant territories dépends either on the nature of the countries and their population, or upon the command of the sea.

We hâve said that, so far as assistance from the mother country is concerned, the chief thing which most of our Colonies must look to for defence against foreign enemies is our navy. But a more efficient safeguard for most of them is to be found in their situation, and in the numbers and character of theic population. Take, for example, the case of the provinces of British America, which are the only Colonies exposed to aggression by land. Of thèse the whole question of the successful defence dépends on the wishes and feelings of the people themselves. If they were ill-affected, or even indiffèrent, no possible military efforts on our part could défend them in the case of war with America. On the other hand the America us could never subdue and retain in subjection the British provinces, so long as the latter are determined not to accept their dominion. It is quite true that we could assist the Colonists very materially, but

it is not necessary to keep up garrisons in time of peace for that purpose. No invasion •f Canada by any power but the Americans is cven conceivable; and no serions invasion of Canada by the Americans can be mode without many months of préparation. They hâve no machinery or organization for such an enterprisc: while in much shorter time we could send troops there, if we wished it and could spare them. Against incursions by "filibusters" or "sympathisers," the Canadians ought to be, and are, quite able to protect themselves. Indeed, it is a remarkable fact, that no Colony having more than 20,000 European inhabitants has ever been conquered by a foreign enemy, except in the single instance of Canada itself of which the population, at the time of its conquest, was 60,000; but which was in the singuiarly unfavorable position of being the only Frcnch colony in that part of the world, and attacked, therefore, not only from the seaward, by a power superior at sea, but by a warlike population of British colonists on its land frontier.

We repeat then that the real and sufficient protection to the independence of our Colonies consists, either first, in their remote and insulated positions, which make it highly improbable that any power could or would organise naval and military expéditions sufficiently powerful to take and keep them, or, secondly, in local circumstances, such as the nature of the country and the character and numbers of the population, which render it practically impossible to invade and conquer them, at any rate before assistance would arrive from this country. The West Indian Islands corne under the first category; British North America under the second; Australia, New Zealand, Tasmania, and the Cape under both.

Thirdly, we dissent front the argument founded on joint interest. If England was considered bound to contribute towards the defence of her Colonies merely because she is interested in their defence, it might fairly be argued that the obligation is reciprocal, and that the Colonies, being deeply interested in the safety of England, ought to contribute systematically and habitually towards the defence of London and Portsmouth. But the ground on which we hold that England is bound to contribute towards the defence of her Colonies is, that the Impérial Government has the control of peace and war, and is therefore in honor and duty called upon to assist them in providing against the conséquences of its policy.

Finally, we believe that if we take upon ourselves the initiative in the defence or our Colonies, by assigning to them garrisons, however small, those garrisons will be taken as symbols of our responsibility, and their présence will tend to perpetuate the main evil of the présent System, namely, the dependence of the Colonies on the mother country for defence, and their neglect of local efforts.

Having corne for thèse reasons to the conclusion that it is not désirable to confirm and extend the arrangement referred to, we submit, as the resuit of careful and anxious délibération, the following plan for the considération of Her Majesty's Government: —

We propose to divide the Colonies (so called) into two classes. The first class would consist of military posts, in which, for objects altogether independent of and distinct from the defence of the particular countries in which they are situated, the Impérial Government thinks it necessary to maintain garrisons — such as Malta, Gibraltar, Corfu, Bermuda, and a few more of similar character. So long as thèse posts are held at ail, they should be adequately fortified and garrisoned, but we are of opinion that as the garrisons of them are maintained without référence to the wants and wishes of the inhabitants, they should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any gênerai scheme of Colonial contribution.

The second class would comprise ail the rest of the Colonies, that is, ail those where troops are stationed primarily, if not exclusively, for the defence of the lives, liberties, and propertics of their inhabitants- We propose that, as regards thèse Colonies, the System of defence should be founded on two simple principles, colonial management, and joint contribution at a uniform rate. We propose that the Impérial Government should call upon each Colony to décide on the nature of its own defences, and the amount of its garrison, and should offer to assist it by bearing a share (say, half, or any other portion which may be fixed), of the entire cost; specifying at the same time a maximum sum beyond which this country should not be called upon to contribute without a further agreement.

There is one objection which is likely to be urged against our plan, which we think

it better to notice by anticipation. We mean an objection to laying down a uniform rate of joint contribution. It may possibly be said that one Colony is more exposed to foreign aggression, or less able, through poverty or the nature of its population, to provide against it than another, and that wc ought to apportion our aid to the wants of each, not to the amount of its own efforts. The objection in question is founded on a différent view of the nature and ground of the obligations of the mother Country from that which we entertain and hâve endeavoured to express. We consider those obligations to be founded on the peculiar relation between the mother country and the Colonies, by which the exclusive control over peace and war is vested in the former, and that relation, it is needless to observe, is uniform and common to every Colony in the empire; but it is not in accordance with possibility that we should equalise the natural advantages and disadvantages, whether in relation to military or civil affairs of the différent Colonies respectively. Just as the richer and more favorably circumstanced among them are able to hâve more expensive and complète Systems of civil administration, more highly paid officers, better schools, hospitals, and gaols, so it is natural and inévitable that they should hâve, if they please, more effective and costly defences. Poor nations, like poor individuals, must be contented to be less well off than rich ones; and, as regards the particular disadvantage now in question, it is to be observed, that the poorer the Colony the less is the temptation to attack it. Practically, too, the difficulty of estimating the respective needs and resources of Colonies would be so great, that any System of defence, founded on such estimate, would lead to as much injustice, discontent, and unsettlement as that under which we now suffer; while the plan of apportioning our contributions to local efforts would hâve a direct tendency to effect our main and primary object, the encouragement of the latter.

In conclusion, the principal advantages of the plan which we recommend are as follows: — "It would involve a great saving to the Impérial Exchequer, not only through the direct contribution of the Colonies, but also, as above intimated, by the gênerai réduction of Colonial garrisons which would inevitably follow. At the same time no inordinate burden would be imposed upon the Colonies, seeing that it would rest with themselves to détermine the amount of their respective armaments.

It would be equally applicable to peace and war; a Colony finding itself exposed to danger, would increase its military force, either by asking us for more troops, or by local measures of defence, of which the mother country would bear its fixed share of the expensc.

It would stimulate the patriotism, self-reliance, and military spirit of the Colonists, by throwing on them the responsibility of directing their own military affairs.

Above ail, it would convey, in the most marked and emphatic way, the détermination of the mother country, that the Colonies should be governed through and for their own people. It would show that we rely on their loyalty and attachment, and on nothing else; and that we hâve no wish to préserve our connexion with them by force; and that, therefore, we regard not only without jealousy, but with sympathy and pride, the growth of their military strength, and the cultivation of that martial spirit which is their best defence. It is in this point of view particularly that we consider the question, whether, in the organization of Colonial Defences, the mother country or the Colonies should take the initiative (that is, whether we should défend them with their assistance, or they défend themselves with ours), to be of the utmost importance; to dépend, in fact, upon whether one or other of two opposite views of colonial policy be délibéra tely adopted; and we emphatically repat, that it is mainly with référence to thèse fundamental principles, and not to a calculation of how much money we can obtain from the Colonies, or save to Great Britain, that we recommend the plan proposed and explained in this Report.

One member of the Committee, Mr. Elliot, finding himself unable to agrée in the whole of our Report, and consequently to sign it, lias appended a Mémorandum, explaining to what extent he differs from us, and his reasçns for doing so.

(Signed) GEO. A. HAMILTON,

24tli January, 1860. " JOHN ROBERT GODLEY.

Rapport de M. Elliott 0)

(Extraits)