MEMORANDUM

Colonial Office, 28th January, 1860.

I greatly lament that I cannot join with my colleagues in their Report on the military expcnditure in the Colonies.

Three main principles appear to me to be laid down in the Report; first, that w cannot expect our colonial possessions to be made def ensible at ail points, and at ail times ; secondly, that some few posts, especially valuable for Impérial purposes, should be dealt with exceptionally, and not included in any gênerai schemc of colonial contribution; but, thirdly, that the wholc remainder of our Colonies, without distinction or exception, ought to pay one uniform proportion of their military expenditure.

In the first of thèse propositions I cordially concur. No success in war, but rather disaster, would be likely to ensue from scattcring the land forces of the empire over the numerous outlying possessions of a great maritime and colonizing State, such as Great Rritain. Her colonial dominion rests on her naval supremacy. The mistress of the seas is mistress of whatever Colonies she pleases to hold or to take; and if ever she ceases to be mistress of the seas, it is not forts or garrisons which will save her Colonies.

From the third proposition I am compelled to differ. I cannot think that the same fixed proportion ought to be contributed by ail Colonies whatsoever, regardless of their inhérent différences.

Suppose that some of the richer Colonies, such as thosc in Australia, particularly require troops, and are willing to contribute two-thirds of the expcnse, must we reject the offer if others contribute only one half? Or, again, suppose that some of the minor Colonies urgently nced troops, but are unable to contribute more than a quarter of their expense, must we cither refuse the troops, or reject the contribution, merely because other Colonies pay more?

Uniformity is good, where circumstances are uniform; but where they differ it serins to me reasonable that practicc should differ also; and as to the equity of the matter, surely it is quite as unjust to apply a uniform rule to différent cases, as to apply a varying rule to cases which are alike.

Now, nothing can be more diversified, and, especially more unequal, than the condition of the British Colonies; they are exposed, some more, some less, to foreign Invasion; some more and others less to périls from natives; the population in one kind of Colonies is dense, in another scattered, in some it is peaceful, in others troublesome, and in a few it sprang from convicts sent out for the convenience of this country; again, in certain Colonies this population is British, in others foreign, in part of them it is wholly white, in part almost wholly colored, and in many it consists of a large proportion of both; above ail, some arc rich, and some are poor; is it surprising with Colonies of such an infinité variety of condition, that both their demands for military assistance should be différent, and their power of contribution unequal?

We are not bound, it is said, to equalisc their advantages and disadvantages ; poor nations, like poor individuals, must be content to be less well off than rich ones. This is perfectly true; but then the Colonies, especially the lesser Colonies, which most call for assistance, arc not separate nations; they are members of one immensely powcrful and wealthy nation, from which they believe that they are entitled to some share of gênerai protection. The question is what that share should be.

The Report admits, in handsome terms, the daim of the Colonies to receive aid in their defence, but rests it solcly on the ground that the Impérial Government has the control of peace or war, and is, therefore, bound in honor to assist in guarding others from suffering by its policy. I cannot think that this is the only ground, and that we

(1) Sessional Papers, 1862, No. 17, — deuxième partie.

must discard that of interest. Suppose that one of our Colonies should yield the longdesired advantage of a field for the supply of cotton, would not England hâve a direct interest in its defence, even fhough it did not contribute a shilling or a man towards the struggle of a European war?

Without dwelling further, however, on abstract discussions, it may be more fruitful of practical conséquences to examine a little more closely some of the facts in the Colonies which bear on their military requirements. For tliis purpose, the Colonies may, perhaps be roughly divided into the following classes : —

lst. Great and unmixed European communities, such as those in British North America and in Australie.

2d. European communities which are large and thriving, but in contact with powerful and warlikc natives, such as the Colonies of New Zealand and the Cape of Good Hope.

3d. Limited numbers of European planters and settlers situated in the midst of large colored populations, such as the West Indies and the Eastern Colonies.

4th. Mère handfuls of white functionaries and merchants dwelling in the midst of overwhelming numbers of black races, both subject and independent, such as the Colonies on the Western Coast of Africa.

I think it will be seen at a glance, that it would be difficult to frame any gênerai rule which should be equally applicable to ail of such dissimilar societies. It seems to me very doubtful whether they ought, on account of any abstract principle, or for mère convenience, to contribute equally to their military expenditure ; it is certain that they could not do so in point of fact.