L- s fusils coûtent $18.00 chaque

Les carabines pour la cavalerie coûtent en tout QUANANTE MILLE PIASTRES ($40,000.00).

Les bayonnettes, les fourreaux coûtent quatre piastres.

Puis il y a à acheter —

CINQUANTE CANONS "Maxim".

200 sets de harnais pour chevaux de trait.

400 sets de selles pour cavalerie.

Ca coûtera $100 le set.

On peut en avoir pour $10 ici.

Et CINQUANTE-NEUF MILLE PIASTRES, «09,000.00, rien que pour les harnais.

Pourquoi acheter les harnais à l'étranger'.'

Tout pour les autres, rien pour vous!

Pourquoi le gouvernement Tupper, qui nous vante tant les bienfaits de la Protection pour l'industrie canadienne, a-t-il acheté pour $165,000 de harnais en Angleterre au lieu de les faire fabriquer par des selliers du Canada?

Pourquoi a-t-il payé ces harnais $100 le "set" quand il aurait pu les avoir ici pour $40?

Pourquoi tous ces armements si nous ne sommes pas pour avoir de guerre?

Et pourquoi se battre pour l'Angleterre?

Les électeurs devront se rappeler que ces gros et grands chefs qui sont toujours anxieux de se montrer plus patriotes que les autres, plus loyaux que les autres, et prêts à nous lancer dans des guerres pour le bénéfice des autres, ne seront pas ceux qui supporteront le fardeau.

Ces carabines, ces canons, ce sont les électeurs qui les manoeuvreront. On vous considère bons pour faire de la chair à canon. Les Tupper, les Angers, les Taillon seront dans leurs bureaux de ministres, d'où ils nous enverront à la mort, la joie dans le coeur, le verre de Champagne à la main. Encore une fois, pourquoi tous ces fusils, ces canons, ces bayonnettes, si ces bons Tupper et Cie ne méditent pas quelque mauvais coup de main.

L'on enverra vos enfants en Afrique, en Asie, d'où ils ne reviendront jamais.

Si vous votez pour les candidats bleus, vous approuvez tous ces préparatifs pour la guerre. Est-ce que le gouvernement vient à votre secours lorsque vous êtes écrasés par les taxes de toutes sortes, lorsqu'un malheur vous frappe soit par les ravages de l'inondation, ou d'u.i incendie? Et l'on a dépensé 3 MILLIONS DE PIASTRES pour des fusils.

Votez pour Laurier et ses candidats si vous voulez voir votre pays jouir de la même tranquillité et ne pas vous exposer à partir un de ces bons matins pour d'autres pays, laissant en arrière de vous vos femmes, vos enfants et tout ce qui vous est cher.

Trois ans plus tard, M. Laurier et ses collègues, "chevaliers de ceci, commandeurs de cela", envoyaient "nos enfants se battre pour l'Angleterre en Afrique" — et /'Electeur, tourné en Soleil, trouvait que c'était très bien ... et M. Brodeur, et M. Bruneau, et tous les rouges applaudissaient.

Mémoire du Colonial Defence Committee 0) {Extrada)

Je n'ai pu retracer cette pièce à Ottawa: elle est sortie des archives. Le texte ci-dessous est celui d'une copie que M. MONK m'avait donnée, au moment de la production du document à la Chambre.

ABOUT six years ago the Colonial Defeace Committee drew up a Mémorandum laying down certain gênerai principles which they considered should be kept in view by the various responsible Governments of Australasia in dealing with questions affecting defence.

Thèse principles hâve been generally accepted and acted upon in the Australian Colonies, though at times action is still taken there not entirely in accordance with them, while from other parts of the British Empire proposais are still received based on erroneous conceptions of the truc policy of a great State having vast Interests to défend in ail quarters of the habitable world.

The Colonial Defence Committee, therefore, consider that the time has corne when advantage will be derived from a further enunciation of the principles which hav«» guided and still guide them in making recommendations to the various Departments of State with regard to the defence of the Colonies.

2. The Maintenance of sea supremacy ha» been assumed as the basis of the System of Impérial defence ag-ainst attack from over the sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the whole défensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognized by the Admiralty, who hâve accepted the responsability of protecting ail British territory abroad asrainst organized invasion from the sea. To fulfil this great charge, they claim the absolute power of disposingr of their forces in the manner they consider most certain to secure success, and object to limit the action of any part of them to the immédiate neighbourhood of places which they consider may be more effectively protected by opérations at a distance.

(1) Transmis aux gouvernements des Colonies en août 1897 ; communiqué à la Chambre des Communes du Canada en 1912: — Sessional Papers, 1912, No. 77, not printed.

It is recognized, however, that Hcr Majesty's ships, cngaged in hunting out and dcstroying the squadrons of an enemy, niay not be in a position to prcvent the predatoray raids of hostile cruisers on British ports. The strength of such an attack will vary in the différent parts of the world, according to the strengths of possibly hostile navies, the proximity of their hases, and the troops that are or could easily be brought thero in anticipation of war. It also varies froni time to time with changing political combinations. But it is improbable that a raiding attack would be made by more than a few ships, nor could it be of any permanent effect unless troops could be landed. In no case could a greater force than a few thousand men be collected and conveyed without such arrangements and préparation as would bring the opérations under the category of those dealt with hy the navy. Against a raid of the nature indicated it lias been considered necessary to make secure those places which are essential to the navy for coaling, relfitting and repairing. Ports for this purpose hâve been selected by the Admiralty, and Impérial resources in men and money available for use abroad hâve been concentrated on their defence. Many of the Colonies have contributed largcly to their own military protection. In Australian waters defence for naval purposes has been provided by the Colony of New South Wales in the protection that has been given to the port of .Sydney, while the defence of certain mercantile stratégie positions has been undertaken mainly by the Australian Colonies whose commerce they will protect.

3. Apart from the harbours fortified for the navy, there are other ports which. though they do not enter into what may be called the gênerai stratégie scheme, are also liable from their commercial importance to predatory raids, and which require measures of defence for the protection of the spécial interests involved. The recources of places, which, in the opinion of an enemy, would justify the very considérable risks which a raid on them would involve, are generally sufficient to admit of the provision of local defence by local means, and where the liability to atteck and the resources to resist attack co-exist, it has been hcld to be the duly of the Colony to make provision for adéquate defence.

In dealing with places of this nature the Committee have advocated the création ot sufficient fixed defences to resist occupation by hostile cruisers, but more cspecially the provision of troops sufficient to deal effcctually with such forces as an enemy must put on shore ta enablc him to secure any permanent advantage from his attack. Troops without works may defeat an enemy and frustrate his ohject. Works without troops are useless and delusive. It is necessary to lay stress on this fact, as fortifications give an appearance and feeling of security which is not justified unless they are fully garrisoned by well trained men and supported by mobile forces, and because expenditure on defences involving a heavy outlay at one time and little at another can be more easily fitted into the exigencies of fluctuating budgets than expenditure on troops, which must l»e constant to be effective. When money is made available in time of anticipated war. there is a tendency to spend it in inercasiug fortifications and armaments, sometimes already on an unnecessarily elaborate and extensive scale, while in time of external quiet and internai financial dépression there is a tendency to reduce to a dangerous extent the military forces, which can only be of value if constantly kept up to a state of efficiency in uumbers and training.

4. It is scarcely necessary to point out that the sysleni of defence for the whol* Colonial Empire must take fully into considération the spécial conditions of the various Colonies. The organization of forces in a vast continent like Australia must differ from that of a small body of men whose duty will be to protect the single port of a West Indian Island. The Colonies of Australia should be in a position to al'ford each other mutual support by combined offensive or défensive action. An armed police force, pr.'pared to resist the few troops that might be landed from a single cruiser, may suffice to guard the smaller interests of a West Indian Town. Airain, the defence of Canada, with its long land frontier, obviously requires to be treated on a différent basis from that of the small island of St. Helena.

To enabli' them to deal with thèse varying conditions on the basis of the gênerai scheme for the defence of the whole Empire, the Colonial Defence Committee have recnmmcndcd tliat a Scheme drawn up on certain indicated lines to show the probable slrengtli and nature of attack on each Colony, and how its existing resources could be utilized to the best advantage for defence, should be submitted annually for their considération and remarks. Such Schemes are now regularly reccived from ail the Crown Colonies, and from most of those that are self-governing. The clearer perception of the

stratégie conditions • of each place which is shown in the later schemes, and the increase in their definiteness and practicability as they are revised year by year, lead the Committee to atlribute the greatest importance to them, and strongly to urge those Colonies which hâve not already done so to at once take this step towards informing themselves as to what would be their weak points in war, and what means they hâve for remedying them. Defence Schemes are not of mère académie interest. If-war with a great power were to break out tomorrow there would be no new data available on which to draw up such Schemes if they dit not already exist. They would hâve to be hastily compiled, considered and adopted, and would probably bc considerably above or below the requirements of the case, unnecessarily dislocating the civil progress of the country in the former case, and dangerously risking its safety in the latter.

5. In addition to the Schemes which deal, as above stated, with the orgauization of existing resources for purposes of defence, various animal Reports of the Commandants of the military and naval forces of the self-governing Colonies hâve been referred to the Committee, as well as proposais which hâve been received from time to time by the Colonial Office from the Colonies with référence to altérations in their personnel and matériel. This has enabled the Committee to advise on the orgauization, conditions of service, training and equipment of Colonial military and naval forces and on the fortifications and armament of the many defended places abroad. The Committee can, of course, only advise, and, for reasons of local policy or expediency, or for other causes, it has not always been possible for the Colonial Governments to accept the advice that has been given. The failure to do so has sometimes involved them in expenditure which to the Committee has not appeared essential, whïle sometimes they hâve effected économies which to the Committee hâve not appeared wise, and thus hâve in part marred the completeness of the gênerai scheme of national defence to which so niucli importance is attributed.

Les paragraphes 6 ô 15 sont consacrés à des détails techniques.

16. Certain Colonies bave provided themselves with local floating defences to supplément the fixed defences of their ports. Since the completion of the latter, the Colonial Defence Committee hâve attributrd less importance than formerly to the small colonial navies, considering that it is generally difficult to obtain from floating harbour defences an effect commensurate with the outlay entailed by them. Where, however, there is a sufficiently spacious area of navigable water apart from the fortifications to permit local defence ships to manoeuvre, this objection does not apply. Colonial warships, where maintained, should be kept in a thorougly efficient condition both with regard to personnel and matériel.

17. There are many points in addition to those touched on above concerning which the Colonial Defence Committee hâve offered advice to the Colonies in the past and are prepared to do so in the future, but which it is obviously unadvisable to deal with in a Mémorandum for gênerai information. In this connection they would repeai a paragraph from a former Report. "The necessity for preserving secrecy in regard to the position of guns and détails of defence was brought before the Colonial Conférence in 1887, and has at various Unies been impressed upon the Colonial Governments. It is earnestly hoped that thèse warnings will in future be acted upon."

18. The Committee would also take this opportunity of pointing out that they can more satisfactorily assist the Colonial Governments in dealing with questions of defence if ail gênerai Reports and important proposais of their Military Advisers are referred to the Committee through the Colonial Office as soon as possible after being considered by the governments.

The Committee completely recognize that, for finaneial and other reasons, possibly of a confidential nature, and of a political rather than of a military character, it may often not be practicable to give effect to the recommendations that are made. They think, however, that they would be in a better position to follow and advise upon the gênerai military policy of the Colonies, if the recommendations were always communicated to them, accompanied, if necessary, by the confidential opinions of the Governments and Governors thereon.

19. In conclusion, the Committee are led to refer, by the proniinence which has of late been given to the question of Fédéral [?] dcfence, to the mu tuai co-operation of the Colonies for this purpose in time of war. It will be obvious that at présent such coopération niust be mainly confincd to adjacent Colonies, such as those of Australia, and in a smaller degree those of South Afrlca. In Australia this subject has been considered with happy results by the Fédéral Military Conférences of 1894 and 1896, and more recently at a meeting of Premiers at Sydney.

Doubtless a tinie will corne when the increasing strength and resources of the sclfgoverning Colonies will enable them to materially assist the mother-country, by placing at her disposai for opérations in any quarter of the globe bodics of troops formed from the excellent material of strong, self-reliant Colonists, bat at présent the derelopment of their own vast territories in time of peace, and the effective protection of them in time of war, is undoubtedly the beat contribution the Colonie* can offer to Impérial defence. To this, however, therc is an important exception. England may be engaged in the future, as she has frequently been in the past, in a war which carries with it no danger of attack on the Colonies. In such a case the offer of assistance from them would be prized, as it has been on more than one occasion, not only for its real value, but also as évidence of that solidarity on which the greatness of the British Empire must ultiiiiutely rest.

(Slgned) M. NATHAN,

Sccretary, Colonial Defence Committee.

December 31, 1896.