CHAPTER IX MENTAL IMAGES

e For One, The problem is to détermine the eapacity for vivid-. ness of mental images. In perception, which we hâve studied so far, the object is présent to sensé. We see the color, hear the sound, f eel the cold point, etc. ; that is, we refer the mental picture to its object. In memory, imagination, and the varions stages of thinking, the object is not présent, but the mental picture is présent as in perception, although usually less intégral, less vivid, less enduring, and less distinct. This mental picture which re-presents the object is the mental image.*

To illustrate the fact of imagery, recall your breakfast-table as you sat down to it this morning. What is it that you recall ? Is it merely the names for things and qualities, or is it their images ? The whiteness of the china and the linen, the brightness of the silver, the form of the sugar-bowl, the taste, the odor, the temper^ ature, and the hardness or softness of the cereal, — ^how

* "Images, along with sensations, constitute the materials of ail intellectual opérations; memory, reasoning, imagination, are acts which consist of grouping and coordinating images, in apprehending the relations already formed between them, and ii| reuniting them into new relations." (Binet.)

do thèse arise in your memory? Can you image only in certain sensés ? Or are ail thèse expériences abstractions to you? If they are, in what terms do you remember their names ?

If we could compare answers to such questions as thèse, we should find the most astonishing individual différences in capacity for types of imagery. One person is eye-minded, another is ear-minded. One lives in a world of vivid imagery, another lives in a duU and somber world of vague abstractions and names for things. One bas an accurate, serviceable memory, another bas a "misérable" memory. One bas an aptitude for gepmetry, another for music. One bas a fertile, constructive imagination, another is as devoid of imagination as a désert is devoid of végétation. One is sensitive and responsive, another is deliberate and unmoved.

If we were blind, or should walk about with our eyes closed, the world would be différent to us from what it is now. The congenitally blind person is not only deprived of the ability to see color, f orm, and motion, but be is also deprived of the power to remember, imagine, and think of colors and visual forms and movements. His world is not a visible world. Similarly, the world to the deaf person is a world without sound. Helen Keller lives in a world in which there is neither light, nor color, nor sound.* Her world is a world of touch, muscle sensations, smell, taste, température, and pain.

* Helen Keller retained normal sensibility until she was nineteen months old, and she says: "A person who bas ever seen will retain images of light throughout life; sight and sound are, however, of little if any use to me."

Yet she lives a more intelligent and cultured life than the average collège graduate.

This shows what great and varied resourees the mind has. Our worlds of memory and imagination may be built of vastly varied materials, although to serve the same purpose. Miss Keller judges character by the touch of the hand; so also do many seeing persons. Many persons hâve normal ears for hearing, but can recall things heard only in terms of the other sensés. A comparatively small number of persons can remember coffeê in terms of taste and smell.

The différences we notice in the traits of individuals are not due so much to différences in sensory endowment as to différences in the endowment of capacity for representing sensory expériences in realistic, efficient, and économie imagery. Although Aristotle said that one cannot think without a sensible image, it is only a génération ago that the f act of mental imagery attracted much attention. Taine, Sir Francis Galton, FecKner, Charcot, and others found that they had vivid visual imagery, and made investigations which revealed the fact that such imagery is almost universal. Thèse investigations led also to the discovery that some persons hâve auditory imagery. Later, more gênerai inquiry revealed the fact that it is even possible to hâve images in terms of each and ail the sensés.

The main body of this exercise is devoted to a test of the capacity for vividness of imagery.

This is a distinct exercise in introspection. It is best to keep the eyes closed as you introspect. If the observer does not hâve strong imagery he may be lost in

the effort to create an image out of the retinal light. To avoid this, it is best to think of the object as in a distant place ; for example, the rose on the bush.

Sometimes the image comes in the most realistic way when it comes without effort as a sort of a rêverie image which passes the mental horizon. As a rule, it is best not to direct the attention primarily to the détail of the image, but rather to the effort to recall the f act ; when the fact comes into consciousness the character of the image may be observed.

Fix clearly in mind and use as consistently as possible the f oUowing scale of degrees of vividness :