VIII. Pain. — 1. Can you secure a sensory image

of the pain of — (a) The prick of a pin? (6)

Eunning your finger along the edge of a sharp

knife? (c) A toothache or headache? , (d)

The stimulation of a pain spot ?

Compute the averages for ail the answers in each

of the experiments I to VIII. Lay off a plot in pencil

as in Fig. 15, eight blocks long and six high, and number

it ni IV V VI vu viii Fig. 15.

as in this figure, where the vertical séries represents the scale of vividness f rom 0 to 6, and the horizontal séries represents the sensés I to VIII. Plot the averages with ink in a curve as in Fig. 15.*

Thus, we hâve arrived at a very simple and telling graphie représentation of the observeras capacity for vividness of imagery. It is, of course, relative to this

*This model curve is purely arbitrary, and does not purport to represent any particular type of observer. It is inserted merely to show how to make the graphie représentation of the results. It shows an average of 4.4 for I, 1.8 for II, 3.8 for III, .8 for IV, etc.

particular set of questions ; a différent set of questions eovering the same ground might change the curve. A set of questions is legitimate only in so far as it covers the principal types of imageable facts in a f air distribution of tests.

You are f uUy aware of the unreliability of the results. They are unreliable for at least two reasons. First, the power of imagery varies with numerous conditions and attitudes. The method of measuring, crude as it is, is fuUy fine enough to be commensurate with the constancy of the fact tested. Second, the results are unreliable because you were untrained. This sort of introspection is a severe test upon the power of discriminative attention and is made particularly diflScult and uncertain for the beginner on account of the novelty and complexity of the undertaking. Faithful practice in the training of any particular type of imagery is usually rewarded with rapid improvement and increased confidence in judgments. The diflSculties and uncertainties are greatest where there is poverty of imagery.

Such factors as vividness, stability, and integrîty of the image do not necessarily vary together. An image may be very vivid but flitting; it may be complète but faint. For a fuU study of the capacity the above questions might be repeated and answered in turn with référence to each of the variables in the image. This same exercise might be used for the détermination of such factors as the stability of the image, completeness of the image, effort in producing it, etc. In such cases, words representing stability, completeness, effort, etc.,

would be substitiited for the word vivîd in the scale; thus: No image, very fluctuating, fluctuating, fairly stable, stable, very stable, as stable as in perception.

It is customary to speak of organic sensations and organic images, but that is rather misleading; for we then refer to sensation-complexes or perceptions. Thus, the organic feeling of movement in pointing a finger may be reduced to sensations of pressure and strain in the joints, muscles, and tendons. Hunger may ordinarily be reduced to a complex of pressure, pain, strain, and température. It is of course as much casier, as it is more superficial, to say that one has an image of hunger than to trace the pressure-pain-strain-temperature éléments in the composite image.

The sensé of equilibrium is not included in the above list, for the reason that it, more than any other sensé, acts automatically and therefore plays a very small rôle in consciousness.

Normally the image is in the same sensé as the original expérience ; for instance, the memory of a color comes as a color image, the memory of pressure comes as a pressure image, the memory or imagination of taste comes as a taste image, and even when présent, it is of ten overshadowed by the image in another sensé. But this is not always so. One's memory of running blindfolded may be recalled entirely in visual terms; one's memory of the taste of coffee may come in no more significant imagery than sight.

Dream-life is almost purely a life of imagery; and dream images are for many persons as vivid as the perceptions of waking life. They even transcend them,

for we of ten dream of more brilliant colors, more beautiful harmonies, more gracef ul movements, than we ever perceive in waking life.

Hallucinations are common occurrences, although but few persons observe or report them. Who bas not heard a sound where there was no sound, smelled something where there was nothing to smell, seen something where there was nothing visible ? Thèse hallucination images are of ten vivid ; their very vividness makes them deceptive.

This test pertains merely to the capacity for imaging in terms of the respective sensés and does not necessarily reveal the dominant type. Indeed, should the capacity be limited to but one or two sensés, or should there be no capacity at ail, the type would be determined, but such a condition is not a common occurrence. We not infrequently find a record for pain images as high as that for color images, but this does not signify that the world is equally one of pain and of color to the possessor of that curve; for pains do not occur so frequently as colors, and it is customary to translate ail imagery into the terms of one sensé whenever possible.

There are numerous methods in vogue for determining the type of imagery. One of thèse is to proceed as f oUows :

Write, in a column.. a list of thirty words that gîve scope for imagery in the différent sensés about as in ordinary conversation; for example, dog, field, waves, beefsteak, sunset, war, springtime, accident, apple-blossoms, désert. Cover the list with a card and expose one word at a time. As soon as the word has been seen, look away and note the imagery which comes to represent the word and the object it dénotes. Thus, the word dog may be

grasped in terms of visual, auditory, and motor images, and the dog may be imaged as a baying hound close on the scent of a fox, thèse aspects being experienced in terms of visual, auditory, motor, tactual, and pain images respectively. The record would then read:

Word. Word Image. Of^ect Image.

Dog Visual-auditory-motor Visual-auditory-motor-tactual-pain.

If a list of such words is made fairly représentative, the records will furnish a basis for an estimate of the relative frequency of the images of each sensé, both in Word memory and object memory. Thèse records may be reduced to percentages.

To show the significance of the sensé through which the Word is first received, the séries should be repeated, by having the words read aloud to the observer. For most persons this will cause a radical change in the imagery.

The type of imagery may also be determined roughly f rom answers to questions like thèse :

Into what sensé do you normally translate your sensory expériences? ^In terms of what imagery do you normally remember a person? A place? A date? An abstract quality? Can you secure images in any other sensé than sight without also having a Visual image? (This question may be adapted to the other sensés.) Do you visualize the situations as you read a story? Do you find geometry difficult? Do you recall music readily? Hâve you a good sensé of rhythm? Are you moved by realistic descriptions? Do you dream much and vividly? Is there any sensé in which you cannot recall having had a dream image? Is your word imagery conspicuous and helpful?

Among the curious idiosyncrasies which come out în a test like this is that of synsesthesia. Some persons invariably project numbers upon forms or skeletal

shapes which may be maintained constant throughout life. Others hâve colored hearing; when they hear or remember a tone, it seems to hâve color. There are numerous other forms of synœsthesia, and thèse differ very much in force and complexity. Some fairly well-marked form of it may be found in from 5 to 10 per cent of the people in a community. The explanation is to be found in the fact that we hâve a tendency to give fulness to perceptions and images. Synsesthesia is simply a specialized form of this tendency and should be regarded merely as a habit.*

Rêverie also gives opportunity for the flow of realistic imagery. The procession of images moves on without effort as though it were controUed by some external machinery. Rêverie and concentrated attention are the antipodal types of normal expérience. Our ordinary life is a blending of the two, and even the most refleetive student will find upon introspection that rêverie plays by far the larger part. The reading of a passage, the solving of a problem/ the examination of a situation, or any other such activity as requires concentration of attention is accompanied

* Answers to questions like the followîng reveal the présence or absence of the principal forms of synœsthesia: "Do you think of particular colors iri connection with letters of the alphabet, or numerals, or proper names, or musical sounds, or any other unusual connection? Do you think of numerals or names of months, days, or years, or of any séries of words as arranged in any particular shapes, like circles, squares, zigzags, or very long lines? Do single numerals, letters, musical notes, etc., make you think of différent shapes? Do you especially like or dislike any numerals, letters, etc.? Do numerals, letters, etc., seem to you to be like people î" (Calkins, American Journal of Psychology, VII.)

by broad streams of rêverie images. Thèse irrelevant images constitute what we call distraction or mind-wandering ; they are often more vivid and coercive than the imaçes obtained from the object of attention.

CHAPTEE X ASSOCIATION

For Two.* The problem is to détermine certain characteristics of association; namely, rapidity, kind, reinforcement, error, and persistence.

1. Rapidity. — Call ont a key-word, for example "star", and give O exactly 8 seconds, counting from the moment of the giving of the key-word, in which to speak as many disconnected words as he possibly can. Let O Write them down in a vertical column, beginning with the key-word, while they are fresh in his memory. Secure five records, using as many key-words. t Find the total number of words in each column excluding the key-word, and divide 8 by that number to get the average duration of each association.

This experiment might be called chain reaction in free association. It bas three objects: first, to secure

* Provide coins or disks for Exp. 4, and a paper bag and weights for Exp. 5.

f Speed is the aim. O must not stop to consider the fitness, signifîcance, kind of association, or anything else which may impede the rapidity of speaking. There is a great temptation to hesitate. No séries should be considered successful nnless O has spoken at least six words in the allotted time. The only limitation on words is that they shall be disconnected; that îs, they cannot be a sentence, a familiar list of words, a prepared list, or any séries of words which hâve a fixed connection or séquence.

lists of words under definite conditions for use in the f oUowing experiments ; second, to measure the rapidity of association ; and third, to give a glimpse of the existence and natural flow of associations.

The observer is convinced that the associations came much f aster than he could express them. It is equally clear to him that he did not speak as f ast as mère words could be uttered; there was a continuai groping to extract one out of the many more or less remotely available words.

An average observer should secure a list of about ten words in 8 seconds; the average time for each word would then be .8 of a second.

Each Word represents a complex process or act. The average time of such acts varies very much with différent conditions and individuals. We speak of one as having a quick reaction-time, and another as having a slow reaction-time. One is mentally alert, another mentally sluggish, and still another is erratic. Such individual différences can be measured in great détail by reaction experiments in association.*

The more completely the observer foUowed the instructions and abandoned himself in the battle of imagery, the more surprising some of the words were to him. At first thought there may be neither sensé nor order in them, Yet every word came according to law. Thèse laws we shall now proceed to trace.

Associations are modes of connection between per-

* In the laboratory, chronoscopes are used whîch record the time in hundredths or thousandths of a second. One single act at a time is studied, and the conditions are so varied that this act may be separated into its component éléments.

cepts, images, and ideas. There is différence of opinion in regard to the number and kinds of association, but this is largely a matter of how fine distinctions we wish to make. For the présent purpose it is convenient to posit three kinds of association, namely, contiguity, similarity, and contrast, which include ail possible kinds.* Thèse three kinds of association are spoken of as laws. The law of contiguity asserts that things which hâve occurred together in time or space tend to recur together. The law of similarity asserts that things which are alike tend to recall one another. The similarity may be of any kind, — color, form, sound, odor, motion, use, etc. The law of contrast asserts that opposites tend to recall one another. There may be as many modes of contrast as there are of similarity. The use of this classification may be illustrated best by an actual case. The foUowing record was made by the author when writing this section. The key-word was

"fig."

Fig "Fig suggested apple (sîmil.). Tree struggled to

appear as a sépara te word (contig.), but flnaHy fused with apple and formed a compound word de-

Apple-tree noting three distinct images, — apple, tree, blossoms (contig.). The incongruity of apples and blossoms on the same tree was not noted. The images of fiowers were soon accompanied by images of bées ( contig. ) , but as the images came much f aster than

Honey I could speak the words, the image of honey (con-

tig.) was uppermost in consciousness before I could begin to speak the next word. The image of honey made me irresistibly conscious of the

* This view is most serviceable for the elementary analysis of a concrète expérience, regardless of what ultimate theory of association one may hâve. Thorndike's discussion of association in his "Eléments of Psychology" would supplément this exercise very well.

question why honey should hâve foUowed flower (contig.), and there came to me, aa a reply, con-

Juîce sciousness of the fact that honey is the juice of

a flower (contig. and simil.). This bit of forbidden reasoning, very complex, reminded me that the

Sweetness characteristic quality of flower-juice is sweetness (simil.). (Our imagery is much richer than our vocabulary, and our associations are often couched in words coined at the moment to serve their purpose, for instance *flower-juice' , although they may be of doubtful value for currency in speech.) There followed a bombardment by a mob of images which struggled for récognition as représentatives of sweet juices or extracts (simil.). The image of sugar was distinctly in the foreground (simil.),

Malt but before I could speak, I thought of malt as an

extract which contains sugar (simil.). Then a whole flock of extract-bottles in varied colors and forms flew before my mental eye (simil.). They had so equal récognition of attention that, for the moment, I could not décide to discriminate in favor of one or another in the group by mentioning it, 80 I compromised by including them ail and said

Extract extract (simil. by whole and part). But when I

heard the word extract I thought *I'll take

Vanilla vanilla' (simil.), and saw myself seated on a high

chair consuming a soda in the front of a drugstore with a fountain to the left, fruit-dishes to the right, and in front of me a white-jacketed waiter

Clerk (clerk), with a supercilious air and limited brain

capacity. (This scène was ail one composite image which was suggested by soda-water (contig.). The last-mentioned feature in this impression brought a feeling of compunction which took the

Phrenologist form of the question, *Am I a phrenologist (simil. and contr.), that I profess to judge a man's brain?' There followed a jumble of more or less fragmentary images of long hair, a phrenological chart, the word 'fake* , etc., but thèse overran the time limit."

There are two particularly conspicuous tendencies in this introspection. The first is that, although the observer was free to use any part of speech, nouns were used exclusively. The reason for this lies in the fact that economy of speech has made the object-image the

most available antécédent to a speech-word. The ol> jects, i.é., images of objects, seem to be the things in consciousness. The other peculiarity is that there was only one clear case of association by contrast. Contrast is a principle which should be used only for effect, and in the ordinary flow of images it is not fréquent.

If one has a good grasp of images, they may be traced in much greater détail.