Kinds of Association: Primary Laws. — Let O

trace the chain of associations in one of the lists he has and Write ont, on the plan of the above spécimen, an introspection showing which of the three kinds of association operated in the transition from image to image.* Make the report even more detailed than the model, and point ont as many links of association as possible among the images of which the words represent only a f ew.

An introspection of this kind reveals to the observer something of the richness and connectedness of such a simple and apparently incohérent mental act There was no trouble in seeing why each word came; there was a reason for every word. The words do not express the fuU chain of the processes, not even ail the clearly conspicuous images, but simply one hère and there, for the flow of images is more rapid than thought and incomparably more rapid than speech. There were reasons for every image, though few can be tracd. And, furthermore, the images did not stand out isolated and

* Some observers may prefer to make a new list in order to hâve the chain of associations fresh in the mind.

stripped, but were supported by a background and bridging material of more or less undiffetentiated imagery and non-integrated mental activity. There was a reason for each élément in this.

Two facts of most profound significance are therefore impressed upon the observer in this experiment: ail images flow according to law ; the number of primary laws is surprisingly small. Similarity and contrast are usually considered inséparable. Each of thèse also involves an élément of contiguity. This has led some to say that there is only one law of association. But thèse three phases vary so much in relative prominence that it is helpful to trace the dominating aspect, as in this experiment.

But the question arises, what determined which particular image should come forth by the law of contiguity when there was a vast number of possibilities of the same kind? Why does apple and not a score of equally similar things follow fig? Or, in similarity, why does sweetness suggest sugar and not one of the many other sweet things ? Why does darkness suggest black horse and not some of the many other dark things ? The answers to thèse questions are to be found in the secondary laws which are laws of neural action or habit. Four of thèse are : primacy, f requency, intensity, and recency.* Other things being equal, the first or primary association will dominate; other things being equal, the most frequently repeated association will dominate ; other things being equal, the most impressive

* Calkins, "Association", Monograph Supplément to the Psy chological Review, No. 2, 1896.

or intense association will dominate ; other things being equal, the most récent association will dominate.

Thèse four secondary laws may operate within any of the three primary; that is, contiguity, similarity, and contrast. There is thus established a complex mechanism of forces which coôperate or counteract in varions ways and to varions degrees.

We may think of the primary laws as kinds of ties or bonds for the image, and the secondary laws as power applied to each tie. Each image ordinarily has a large number of ties. TJsually ail three kinds are represented, and each is supplied with more or less power. The image brought up by the key-word above had a rich supply of thèse ties. The next image which came to the front came because it was, as it were, most effectively tied np with the other. This is illustrated in the following introspection which is supplementary to the one quoted above :

"Fig suggested apple because apple is the most common (freq.) spécimen of the kind of thing a fig is, a fruit. Apple suggested tree because they hâve been experienced together frequently (freq.). Tree suggested blossoms because I had been looking for blossoms on the cherry trees this morning (rec). Blossoms suggested bee because bées are frequently seen with blossoms and their présence has an exciting interest (freq. and int.). Bee suggested honey because bee and honey are thought of as cause and effect (freq.). Honey suggested juice of a flower because the image of honey had followed the image of flowers (rec). Flower- juice suggested sweetness because sweetness is the principal characteristic of flower-juice or honey (inten. and freq.). Sweetness suggested the mass of images of sweet things because there is a tendency for the mind to think the abstract in terms of the concrète (freq.). Sugar came to the front from thèse because it is the commonest of sweet things (freq.). Sugar suggested mali because sugar was thought of as an extract and malt is a common form of extract which contains sugar (freq.). Extract was présent in the image of malt (rec. and freq.). Vanilla came to the front because it is one of the most familiar extracts

(freq.). Vanilla suggested îce-cream soda on account of my fréquent choice of that flavor in soda (freq.). Soda-water suggested myself and the whole setting in the drugstore (prim. and freq.). Clerk was named.from the many objects in the setting because the image represented something living and active in relation to myself (inten. and freq.). Phrenologist was drawn out from the situation of my judging brain capacity on account of the strangeness and incongruity of the idea (inten.). The images came very much faster than words could be spoken, and there was a distinct tendency to fit the word to the image which was just coming into consciousness at the moment that I could begin to articulate the next word. For this reason many very strongly associated images were deprived of opportunity for expression."

3. Reinforcement ; Secondary Laws. — Let O retrace the chain of associations in the same list as in Exp. 2, and Write out an introspection showing, as in the above spécimen, where and how the four secondary laws, primacy, frequency, intensity, and recency, operated, — not only for thèse words, but for ail the recognized images which the words represent only in part.

The primary laws are qualitative ; they dénote kinds of association. The secondary laws are quantitative; they dénote force or magnitude of a quality. The two invariably operate together. Had it not been for the sake of clearness, the introspections of Exps. 2 and 3 should hâve been written out together, stating, for example, that in a given instance the law of contiguity operated in several directions, but a certain one of thèse became dominant by the law of frequency.

The associations in the list quoted above were in a light, agreeable vein. The observer accounts for this on the ground of ^^emotional congruity." Emotional congruity is one of a number of so-called laws of association which are neither primary nor secondary. They might properly be described as unanalyzed com-

plexes of association. Thus, according to this law, one thinks of good and pleasant things when one is well and happy, and this in tum makes one better and happier ; when one is blue, the disagreeable things corne to mind. Now, a state of happiness or a state of misery, if reduced to the constituent éléments in so far as they are cognitive, would probably résolve itself into a very intricate complex of the above primary and secondary laws, or laws of a similarly elementary order.

One of the easiest ways of getting material for the study of images and their modes of connection is simply to sit down and relax one's self and allow a passive floW of imagery, as in rêverie, for a few seconds, and then go over it and retrace the connections. Another good way is to analyze a spécifie act of remembering or thinking ; for instance, let the observer recall his last boat-ride, or ansv^er the question "What is courage ?" Each of thèse instances can be reduced to a definite network of the opérations of thèse primary and secondary laws of association.*

4. Errors of Association. — Take a dollar, two halfdoUars, two quarter-doUars, two nickels, and two dimes f and arrange them edge to edge in a row, with the dollar in the middle and the ôther coins ranging in opposite directions away from the dollar in the order of diminishing size. Let O take such a position that his eyes are directly over the dollar, the row pointing toward

* Work out thèse two examples if time permits. f Cireles eut any size but varying in about the same proportion as the coins may be used in place of the coins.

hîm, and, without sighting or measuring^ straighten the row of coins so that one side tangent to.all the coins will seein to be a straight line. When he is satisfied that the line is as straight as he can make it, without sighting or measuring, lay a straight-edge alongside and measure in millimeters the amount of misplacement of each coin.

The normal observer will arrange the coins so that what seems to be a straight line is really a gràcefuUy curved line. The straight-edge touches only the dollar, and the other coins retreat f rom it by distances inversely proportional to their size. This is true only for the normal and careful observer; an unfaithful observer may read this paragraph before he performs the experiment and try to correct for the error.

The explanation for this normal error lies in the fact that when we make one judgment we are invariably beset by a number of other, often irrelevant, judgments. In this case the observer was asked to make one side straight ; but he could not do that without having more or less dimly in the background of consciousness a line through the center of the coins and a line on the other side of the coins. The présence of thèse associations influenced his judgment on the straightness of the one line in question.

Fig. 16 illustrâtes the same principle. The middle sections of the five bars are parallel; they.do not look parallel because we cannot entirely dissociate direction of the end lines from the direction of the middle sections.

Normal life, in ail its phases and ail the degrees of its

complexity, is full of errors; the greatest number of thèse are errors of association. The association need not be a conscious one ; it may hâve been redueed to the simplest law of neural habit.

Popularly we say "I had something else on mymind." Thus, in reading we read largely by the context; and for this reason there are very few good proof-readers. A good author may read a proof-sheet a half-dozen times without noticing that a senseless word, not to speak of an error in spelling, is flagrantly évident The good

FiG. 16.

proof-reader has mastered, to a considérable extent, the power of suppressing meaning-associations.*

5. Irrepressibility of Association.— Inflate a large paper bag and tie it up. Place this bag on one hand of the observer and put coins, nails, or any other heavy material into the other hand until O judges that the weights in the two hands are equal. Let him change hands and verify his judgments until he is satisfied. Then weigh the bag and the coins separately and record the results.

There is a gênerai tendency toward harmony of

* In reading this last word in the copy, the author read it "meaningless associations."

properties in nature. In the long run, large objects are heavier than small objects. This observed fact bas crystallized under tbe principle of frequency into a neural habit which acts without our attending to it. This association is a very économie principle, for it helps us to adjust our efforts to our tasks. Without thinking of it, we make the proper différences in adjustment of muscles for the lifting of a peck of apples and a bushel of apples. Now, when a large object like the bag is extraordinarily lightj the association causes us to put forth too great effort in lifting it and this maladjustment leads to underestimation of the weight of the bag. Similarly, coins are small for their weight, and the same association probably leads us to make too délicate an adjustment for the lifting of thèse; this maladjustment leads to an overestimation of the weight of small objects. If we now compare the actual weight of the bag with that of the coins, we find that the normal observer bas selected coins which weigh only from a half to a tenth as much as the bag. Hère is the real answer to the old quibble : which is heavier, a pound of lead or a pound of feathers? That this illusion persists after training and accurate knowledge of the actual weights is an illustration of the fact that habits of association continue irrepressibly in the face of sensé and reason.

We bave, in this and foregoing chapters, marshalled before our mind's eyes the material in the structure of our knowing processes. The materials are the perceptions, images, and ideas ;* the structure is their modes

*An mental life is activity; perceptions, images, and ideas are always proceaaea.

of connection — the associations. But just as in a building the material is ail there is, so hère the perceptions, images, and ideas constitute the mental states, the cognitive life. Association merely dénotes the ways in which the materials are joined together in the mental framework.

Education consists in the development of associations. To the uneducated, the grain of sand does not suggest the great number of geological forces that brought it together ; it may not even suggest the economical uses to which it might be put.