‹ Vie de saint Dominique (volume 3)Chapitre 46 sur 51 · CHAPTER XI MEMORY · texte numérisé non relu

CHAPTER XI MEMORY

For TuDO.

The problem is to détermine certain factors in the capacity for memorizing geometrical figures. Two

FiG. 17.

styles of figures will be used. One the style shown in Fig. 17, and the other the style shown in Fig. 18. Let

132 MEMOEY

the first expérimenter use the former style, and the second the latter. As the illustrations in the book contain the material which is to be memorized, each person must refrain rigorously from examination of the

FiG. 18.

material assigned to the other. This is imperative. Both may proceed independently to prépare materials for the experiment, as f ollows :

Set A: Select nine of the figures of your style and draw them neatly by freehand in a single vertical column in your note-book.

Set B: Arrange the same nine figures, on another page, into a regular parallelogram with three figures in each row horizontally and vertically.

MEMOKY 133

Set C : Rearrange the same nine figures, on another page, into the same kind of a parallelogram but in a radically différent order; leave no figures in the same position as in B.

AU the figures hâve certain f eatures in common : ^ eaeh figure is composed of three lines ; the lines are ail straight; two lines are equally long, and the third is half as long as thèse ; the two long lines always adjoin each other; the lines join either at the end or in the middle; no line is crossed; no two figures are alike. The angles in one style are right angles, and in the other angles of 45° or the supplément of 45.°

1. Memorîzing the Form of Figures. — Allow O to see the figures in Set A exactly ten seconds, in a unif orm and favorable position, and then let him reproduce as many of thèse as he can, regardless of the order in the column. Examine the reproduction to see if there is any error or omission f and then cover it with some opaque object. Show him the set again for ten seconds and let him reproduce as before. Repeat this procédure until O has reproduced the form of ail the figures correctly, regardless of the order or position in the column.

Check those that are right in each reproduction, and

*In verîfyîng this refer only to the sets of figures you hâve selected and constnicted.

f After examining a reproduction, E can say only "Right" or "Wrong". If any figures are wrong in form, O must discover it for himself.

i In case of excessive difflculty the experiment may be lef t incom* pieté, say at twelve trials.

Write in tabular form the number of correct figures for each trial. Plot a curve of the results, as in Fig. 19, where the numbers at the bottom dénote the successive trials, and the numbers at the side dénote the number of figures that remain unleamed.

Let O record observations as to method of leaming the figures, groupings, disturbing factors, peculiar aids

Fig. 19.

such as the use of imagery schemes, etc. — in short, anything which may aid in the interprétation of the curve.

One of the f undamental requiremènts for an experiment, as we hâve seen, is that the problem shall be reduced to its éléments ; only one élément at a time may be varied, and âll other éléments and conditions must

be kept constant. This is an idéal which is never fuUy attained, yet the value of an experiment may often be measured or tested by this criterion.

This experiment is an illustration of a fair control of conditions in a memory test. The observer started with a full and adéquate knowledge. of certain spécifications aa to the number, the length, the straightness, and noncrossing of the lines, the adjacency of the Unes, th.e place of joining, the magnitude of the angle, the number of figures, and the absence of répétition. Thèse are ail features in the memorizing of the form of the figures. They could be leamed by accurate discrimination in repeated observation, but to hâve left them unmentioned in the présent experiment would hâve complicated it and made it practically worthless. The experiment begins with the supposition that thèse are known ; hence they are eliminated from the memory task which is before the observer.*

With ail thèse factors under control, the problem was reduced to the spécifie task of learning the form of the figures. Other désirable features, such as the order of the figures, were excluded.

Then foUowed the control of conditions for learning and recording. The exposure of thë figures was made definite, — ten seconds at a time. The timé of rétention was made definite; the observer reproduced immediately. The means of verifying were limited; the ob-

* Suppose the observer had been required to learn by observation that every figure has three lines, and that no two figures are alike, and to learn by very close discrimination that the lines do not vary in length by small steps, that the angles are uniform, that the place of the joint is limited, etc. He would then hâve faced a very différent problem from the présent one.

server had no access to the records of his foregoing trials. The expérimenteras approval or disapproval was unif orm ; the expérimenter gave no due as to which or how many were wrong. The records were ail preserved, making it possible to trace certain peculiarities in the leaming process objectively.

Yet the introspective notes show that several conditions which might hâve been controUed were not controlled. For example, the observer might hâve been instructed as to how to proceed most effectively in mode of impression, grouping, classification, associating, using concrète imagery, etc. He might hâve been warned of certain avoidable difficulties. In technical experiments such factors must also be isolated and controUed. There are two reasons for not attempting it hère: in the natural development of a problem thèse factors come ont in introspection first and are then taken into considération, one after another, as they are revealed; they are too intricate to control in the time allotted for an elementary experiment. The careful observer has seen the force of many of them and has mentioned thenj in his introspections,

Closely related to thèse are many îndividual and temporary conditions which never can be controUed entirely. Among such are the fluctuations of attention, peculiar associations, temperamental disqualification for the task, imagery types, habits of memorizing, etc.

Thus we see in a gênerai way how far we hâve succeeded in cômplying with the requîrements for analysîs of the problem and control of its éléments. The récognition of difficulties is the first step toward progressr

MEMOKY 137

Thîs experîment should serve two purposes : it should give a glimpse of the complexity of the conditions that enter into a memory test, and it should leave the impression that with patience and skill the complex situation may be reduced to more elementary ones which can be isolated and controUed.

2. Memorizing the Position of the Figures. — Allow O to see the figures in Set B in ten-second exposures and proceed as in Exp. 1, except that the task hère is to memorize the positions, the forms being known from Exp. 1.

Check, tabulate, plot curve, and write introspections as in Exp. 1.

This experiment builds upon the foregoing. The observer acquired a definite degree of certainty in the memory of the form of the figures in Exp. 1 ; he was just barely able to reproduce ail the forms from memory. Thèse figures, whose form was known, were redistributed and the task was to memorize their présent positions.

This task was made difficult by the similarity of the figures and their relative lack of immédiate associations or names. The figures were "stripped" in this way to secure relatively simple and homogeneous material which should enable the observer to follow the development of his method and to record his introspections.

Probably the most striking fact the observer learned was that he could not "handle" the figures without enriching them with associations in concrète imagery.

He f aced the same kind of difficulty as he would face in trying to remember individually a dozen hailstones, ail perceptibly différent in shape.

The observers may be divided, on the basia of thèse two experiments, into two types : those who go about it by some sort of rote method, and those who develop imagery which gives them something tangible. Both of thèse types hâve varions subtypes, as may be seen in the introspections. In gênerai we may say that those of the first type found the first experiment very difficult and the second even worse ; while those of the second type soon mastered the first experiment and profited very much by it in the second. An important exception may be noted iater.

It is a well-known f act that memorizing is f acilitated by giving meaning to the new material. This is iUustrated in the remembering of poetry, a landscape, a face, an invention, a work of art, etc. Such objects are exceedingly rich in meaning ; we cannot think of them at ail except in terms of certain meanings. Such material is not suitable for expérimental study because it is too complex; there are too many possibilities and uncertainties.

Nonsense syllables, as buk, miv, pok, dal, etc., hâve been used extensively on account of their supposed lack of meaning. But work with such syllables soon reveals the f act that one cannot memorize ten of them without reading into them curions, varied, and eflScient associations or meanings. The présent figures are undoubtedly much freer from natural associations, vet one cannot regard them without "feeling into them'' (German,

hineinfiihlen) motor, visual, tactual, or other forms of imagery and perceiving analogies of varions sorts.

Let us notice some of the means at the command of the observer of the second, the ingénions, type. He mày prépare for the test by fixating clearly an image of the plot of positions and then number thèse mentally. He may make one of the spécifications the basis for a starting-point in the grasping of a figure. Thus, knowing that there is only one short line in each figure, he may classify the figures with référence to the position of the short Une, or with référence to the type of figure f ormed by the other two lines. He may fix in each trial a group of similar figures, the easiest figures, the most difficult figures, the figures in one line, etc., and then proceed systematically by concentrating on as many as he can master in one exposure. He may, if he has a fertile imagination, give fantastic descriptive names to the figures, or make the situation dramatic* He may classify the figures into the T and F types and then remember them as the one or the other upturned, leaning to the right, leaning forward, top and middle lines interchanged, etc. He will fix the group grasped deliberately in the reproduction so that there shall be no danger of losing any part of it when he gets other groups in mind. He will adhère vigorously to the principle adopted, and not mix methods.

The curve of learning is probably of the same gênerai shape hère as in Exp. 1.

*Thus, in the first line of forms in Fig. 18 he may see this épisode : The folding chair gives away ( 1 ) , the man makes a dive (2), he puis the chair into a position for comfort (3), but soon finds it on the floor (4).

3. Memorizing the Position of the Figures after Redistribution. — AUow O to see the figures in Set C in ten-second exposures and proceed as in Exp. 2.

Check, tabulate, plot curve, and write introspections as in Exp. 2.

The object of this experiment is to détermine to what extent and in what respect the observer bas profited by the foregoing training. The extent of improvement is ' shown by a comparison of the curves. The character of the cause of improvement is shown in the introspections.

Observers of the first type find this experiment, like the two foregoing ones, difficult, and show but little if any progress ; while observers of the second type make improvement and feel the task growing easier.

Those who made improvement bave probably recorded that they acquired some power or insight as to means of grasping the figures in the first two experiments. They also probably acknowledge having benefited by one or more of the suggestions in the discussion of Exp. 2. But the greatest gain undoubtedly dépends upon the fact that the observer could hère place the figures in terms of their position in Set B, which he remembers. Thus, he may hâve observed at once that the first is now the seventh, the seventh is now the fourth, the second is now the fifth, etc.

In any or ail of the experiments a person with natural ability may fail to make good progress for several reasons. He may hâve undertaken to use some means which are not suited to him. He may change methods and thus lose both by the discarding and by the resulting

confusion. Thèse and many like causes may account for the levels and even rises in the curve at any stage. They are, of course, stated in the introspections, and the idiosyncrasies of the curve are to be explained principally by them.

In foregoing chapters we hâve learned something about the significance of individual différences in sensibility, discrimination, imagery, and association. There are even greater différences in memory types. One person has good memory for names, another for faces, another for poetry, another for geometrical figures, etc. Hère we hâve tested one narrow type of memory. The observeras other memories may or may not be like it.

This experiment suggests that improvement in memory consists largely in leaming how to observe. This fact has great pedagogical and psychological significance. It makes psychological analysis relatively simple, and gives promise that a pedagogy of memory may be based upon a psychology of improvement in memory.

There are three gênerai types of methods employed in experiments on memory : the method of reproduction, the method of identification, and the method of introspection of the memory image. The above experiments bave illustrated the first. The second might be illustrated by experiments on the memory for the size of circles. A standard circle is shown ; af ter a given timeinterval a compared circle which is either equal to the standard or slightly différent in diameter is presented, and the observer is required to say whether it is equal, larger, or smaller. By varying the diameter of the com-

pared circles in small steps and making a large number of trials it is possible to get a measure of the observeras space-memory in terms of the error made. The third method is really not a method of measurement, but a method of controUing introspection. The observer sets himself constant conditions for observation and then observes in repeated trials the character of the imagery and other f actors, much in the same way as in the above introspections.*

Memory is not a suitable title for an expérimental problem because the term is too comprehensive. It is customary to speak of four éléments in memory: impression, rétention, recollection, and récognition. Thèse are in tum very broad terms. Thus, we may hâve impressions through the différent sensés, imagination^ reasoning, and feeling, and ail sorts of combinations of thèse. Within one sensé, the impression may hâve référence to différent attributes ; namely, quality, intensity, duration, and extensity or space.

The experiment must be limited to one factor at a time, as we hâve seen. It may be a study, e.g., of the

*Kuhlmann, American Journal of Psychology, October, 1907, suggests problems from this third point of view, as foUows: **This gênerai aim is threefold. First, the analysis of the memory consciousness into its éléments. What différent kinds of mental imagery, what organic sensations and affective states occur in the mind from the beginning to the end of the process of the recall of a given thing? Secondly, the détermination of the function in the memory consciousness of each of thèse éléments. What is the order in which they appear, of what use is each in attaining the end that is desired, to wit, the reinstatement of the imagery that is wanted and the récognition of this imagery as correct or not? Thirdly, since the end product of a recall process is often a memory illusion, a prominent question in memory analysis is that of the nature and causes of thèse memory illusions."

MEMOET 143

materials of impression such as tones, spoken numbers, noises, colors, distances, etc. ; it may be a study of the modes of impression, such as rote, logieal analysis, f oreed association, etc. ; or it may be a study of the effect of répétition, length of rétention, mental occupation, etc. The pursuit of any of thèse problems will do much to enrich one's conception of the orderliness, the beauty, and the worth of the life of re-presentation.

CHAPTEE XII

APPEECEPTION

For Two,

Appekception is the meaning-aspect of expérience. It is the grasping of a new expérience in terms of previous expérience in such a way as to give it meaning and clearness and to make it serviceable. Some authors reduce it to "clearest perception," others identify it with "attention activity," and still others look upon it as a classifying or "pigeonholing" process. It is well to keep thèse théories in mind. But apperception is not a process in itself, such as perception, memory, or feeling; it rather désignâtes the fusion of the presentative with the représentative and the relating processes and ail their affective and conative tendencies, in the moment of a new expérience.*

1. The Meaning-tendency. — Place a drop of ink on a clean sheet in the note-book, place a sheet of paper over it and press gently so that the ink forms an irregular blot. Make three such blots in each note-book. Let

* Présentation încludes sensation and perception ; représentation includes memory and imagination; and élaboration or the relating processes include conception, judgment, and reasoning. Affection has référence to feeling, and conation to will and action.

APPERCEPTION 146

each student write for each of thèse six * "gobolinks" a secret list (not in the note-book) of three différent things it might represent, giving them in the order in which they are thonght of, but counting only such as are aptf

When thèse lists hâve been completed, witl opération or consultation, write the two sets o| from the lists under the respective dots anc that the objects suggested may be ver feront, (2) that the^paning given is^Kted to the observeras interests, récent expérience, nabits, etc., and (3) that the actual physical blot seems to change with the change in meaning.

The objects suggested may be widely différent; but when one observer sees the other's list he is ordinarily able to see the same interpretation^lthough he had not seen the slightest hint of them beforey

If we had hundreds of records of this kind, it would be interesting to comparé them and observe how they reflect the observeras interests, récent expériences, habits, tempérament, mental capacity, knowledge, etc.

It is most significant that the actual physical blot seems to change radically^as we pass from one interprétation to another. • ->-

The object in using the ink-blots is, of course, clear ; there is no intentional design in them and they are free from fixed associations. They should not represent anything, yet they do suggest things in terms of past expérience to every alert mind. The person who ap-

* Three in each note-book.

f Do not stare at the figures or search for détails.

146 APPEECEPTION

plies himself to the study of thèse supposedly meaningless objeets in a f ree and artistic mood gets a glimpse of that tendency in human nature which justifies the poet in saying

**. . . not the slightest leaf but trembling teems With golden visions and romantic dreams."

The analogy between the human eye and the photographie caméra is instructive. There is the dark chamber, the sensitive film, the lens with mechanism which adjusts for clearness, distance, and size, the iris diaphragm, and the cap. The camera-maker simply imitâtes nature. But if this analogy suggests to us that the human eye is nothing but a living caméra, it is very misleading. The caméra copies the object ; the human eye, "the mind's eye," interprets the object.

AU perception is inceptive interprétation. Among différent persons viewing the same point in a landscape under exactly similar outward conditions, the botanist sees the cause for the shape of the overhanging tree, the artist sees effective shadows for the setting of a sketch, the carpenter sees a good location for a cottage, the farmer sees the rich clover going to waste, and the summer girl sees the location for a romance."*^

"We see things not as they are but as we are." (Patrick.)

And let a man recall what he has seen in a f amiliar landscape as a child, as a bail-player, as a lover, as a

* Speaking of a certain ink-blot, one writer says : "To the hunter it is a beaver or a woodchuck; to the naturaliste a hedgehog or a flounder^ according as his mind has been most directed to land animais or fish; to the mason, a trowel; to the keeper of pets, an Angora cat." (Colgrove.)

APPERCEPTION 147

real-estate investor, as a naturalist — in happy moods or in gray moods, in company or alone. No matter how constant the outward f eatures, he has always seen in the landscape just what it meant to him in the light of his knowledge, needs, and tendencies of the moment

AU interprétation is partial. It is confined to the limits of the sense-organs, the time, opportunity, and inclination for detailed scrutiny, habits of inf erence, the purpose in mind, the store of knowledge about it, etc. Thèse facts are so universal that we scarcely take cognizance of them. Before the psychologist was interested in the doctrine of apperception, schoolboys delighted in reciting the happy story of the six blind men of Indostan who went to see the éléphant The essential lines suffice for quotation :

First blind man, falling against the elephant's side: "God bless me! but tbis éléphant Is very like a wall."

Second blind man, feeling the tusk:

"This wonder of an éléphant Is very like a spear."

Third blind man, grasping the squirming trunk: "I see", quoth he, "the éléphant Is very like a snake."

The fourth blind man, clasping the knee:

" Tis clear enough, the éléphant Is very like a tree."

The fifth blind man, catching the ear:

"This marvel of an éléphant Is very like a fan."

148 APPERCEPTION

The sixth, seizing the swinging tail :

"I see", quoth he, "the éléphant Is very like a rope."

"And so thèse men of Indostan Disputed loud and long, Each in his own opinion Exceeding stiflf and strong, Though each was partly in the right, And ail were in the wrong."

The interprétation is personal ; it is an act for itself . We can never fully pereeive anything without f alling into a cluster of associations whieh are peeuliar to ourselves. How does the salad taste ? That dépends upon the season, how much one has eaten, one's préférence for certain dressing, the stage of dyspepsia, and the attitude toward the hostess and the cooL What do you see in this picture? The reflection of something in yonrself. It is a happy freak of nature that so many men sincerely marry the "best woman on earth/^ and that their children are the most wonderful children in the community.

Our normal interprétation is always purposive. As a rule, we attend to sensé impressions only in such a manner as to get the needed meaning out of them. We instinctively do this in the most économie way. As we grow in expérience we can get along with less and less of the outward impression, the sensory eue. A good reader will easily see only the significant words on a page; prépositions, articles, and adverbs are often supplied from the context. When we discover that it is John Smith who is approaching, we hâve attained to certain marks of identification which suffice to give us the desired information. It may be that we hâve seen

APPERCEPTION 149

Lis beard, bis profile, the swagger of his walk, his sombrero bat, or merely a vague sometbing in the place wbicb we knew Mr. Smitb to be ; we may bave beard bis greeting, or only tbe sound of bis footsteps. Wben we see a borse we do not ordinarily examine if it bas four legs. Many intelligent persons do not know bow many legs a fly bas, altbougb tbey bave observed Aies witb deeided interest, from tbe point of view of comfort, a thousand times.

Perception is of "definite and probable tbings.^^ Tbe Sound of tbe approacbing footsteps comes out from tbe cbaos of noises around and becomes sometbing definite.

Furtbermore, pictorial représentations to tbe eye are "mère suggestions." An artist can draw a buman face, f uU of expression, witb balf a- dozen lines. Tbe speedy crayon artist can deligbt bis audience witb cbaracter sketcbes tbat remind one of moving pictures. Tbe deptb, tbe distance, tbe relief, tbe solidity, and tbe size in a drawing bave bardly any correspondence to real life. Drawing is an exceedingly abbreviated code of signais to tbe eye. Hence we bave formed a babit of approacbing ail grapbic représentations witb a gênerons constructive imagination.

2. Bias. — Eecord wbat Fig. 20 represents to you, and observe tbe opération of tbe principles mentioned in Exp. 1.

Wbicb of tbe two possible views sball présent itself first dépends largely upon wbicb side of tbe figure one attempts to read meaning into. Tbe face is of greater BÎgnifîcanoe than tbe back of tbe bead. One person

160 APPEECEPTION

sees a rabbit, another sees a duck. Fortunately in this case one can accept the view of the other when it is pointed out

The thing to be emphasized is that when the object is a rabbit it is a rabbit, and when it is a duck it is a dnck. Tet hère the object consists in a rigid and clear figure on the paper. Now, when the objective marks are not so rigid, as in vague sensations, indistinct images, partial generalization ; and when the interprétation is an expression of f eeling or the realization of a longing, what an enormous range in the possibilities of interprétation

FiG. 20. (After Jastrow.) is opened! There is abundant opportunity for bias, préjudice, and old-fogyism.

Eegarding the kaleidoscopic appearances under the microscope when new features are under discussion, one says rabbit and another says duck. In giving testimony on the incidents of a wreck, one witnçss maintains rabbit and another maintains duck. Is the world going to the dogs? One says rabbit, another says duck. Considering the beauty of a painting, one says rabbit, another says duck. Considering the future life, one says rabbit, another says duck.

Like the blind men of Indostan, each can remain

APPERCEPTION 161

sincère, honest, and unshaken in his convictions because he is satisfied with the view he bas obtained and does not give the other side an opportnnity to develop. One approaches his object with the expectation of rabbit, another with the expectation of dnck. This expectation can in tum be traced to environment, tempérament, training, désire, etc. Bias is the satisfaction with a partial view. Our experiment contains a simple and rigid illustration. The more complex the situation is, the more danger there is of warp, twist, prepossession,

FiQ. 21.

bigotry, quirk, crotchet, whim, and other forms of obliquity which may resuit from f alling into a rut.

To become educated is to acquire the ability to put oneself into the place of another.

3. Subjective Grouping. — The circles in Fig. 21 are ail alike and they are grouped symmetrically. Group them subjectively by voluntary attention in tum as fol-

APPERCEPTION

lows: (1) five horizontal lines, (2) five vertical Unes, (3) two diagonal lines, and (4) an outside large square with an inside small square and a eirele in the center. Record how thèse subjective groupings affect the apparent size, clearness, and spacing of the circles.

This experiment further emphasizes the f act that the actual physical object seems to change as we ascribe différent meanings to it. This figure in its plainness and rigidity puts the principle to a most critical test. The subjective grouping unquestionably changes the apparent spacing, clearness, and size of the circles.

The same principle is illustrated in Fig. 22. Now it is a star; now it is a polygon with accessory points; now

FiQ. 22.

Fig. 23.

it is a figure with two sides parallel and ends feathered. In each case the lines on the page look différent.

4. Réversible Perspective, a. The Reversai — ^Look for a few moments at Figs. 23, 24, and 25 in turn and observe that thèse figures are unstable; they are seen clearly and satisfactorily in a given aspect at osigt moment, but ail at once they suddenly lop o^^gjjfand

APPERCEPTION 153

présent a radically différent relief.* Record the number of blocks in Fig. 24.

This experiment is introduced in order to illustrate how it is possible to take a given case of apperception and trace it to underlying f undamental motives. There is a reason for every actual apperception of an object or event, no matter how bizarre it may be. It is the

Fig. 24.

business of psychology to trace such motives in order to explain mental life.

Thèse figures are not drawn in true relief; they are made ambiguous so that either of two radically différent views may appear. Why should they not be

* Looking at figures with one eye favors the reversai ; so doea also holding the figure at a distance.

154 APPERCEPTION

seen as they really are — plane figures on the surface of the page? The answér is to be found in a tendeney whose history ean be traced. If early ail objects in which we are interested hâve volume and relief; relief cari be only suggested in a drawing; hence we hâve formed deep-rooted habits of interpreting objects as having relief, no matter how imperfect the device for representing it in the drawing.

Hère again it is significant that when one particular view'is obtained it is entirely adéquate; there is no

FiQ. 25. (After Wallin.)

ambiguity in the expérience. Indeed, some observera find difficulty in obtaining any reversai. Yet, presto ! there is an instantaneous and complète reorganization of the figure right under the eye, as if by some magie wand. As soon as the reversai has once taken place, the figure continues to oscillate irresistibly. The reason it may not hâve reversed soon after the first trial is that the observer did not know what to expeet to see. Now

APPEKCEPTION 165

that the two views hâve been seen and are equally clear and eonvineing, expectant attention favors the change.

6. The Normal Rate of Fluctuation. — Call the first relief that appears "One" and the second *^Two." Let O look continuously at Fig. 23 and call out "One" or "Two" as the respective changes take place. Start when the second-hand of your watch is at 60 and record . the position of the hand at each signal for two minutes. Eecord the approximate dnration of each relief in the successive appearances.* Observe Figs. 24 and 25 in the same manner.

The observer has now completely overcome his bias. He has been liberated from the attitude in which he asserted that there were only six blocks and now takes a more gênerons and enlightened view of the situation. He now realizes that there are greater resources in the figures than he had first credited them with, and perhaps draws a sweeping moral as to the opération of the same principles in his ordinary interprétation of people, events, théories, ideals, etc. After one has once grasped the truth, it will not down, but lights the way for f urther pénétration.

c. The Fastest Rate of Fluctuation. — Proceed with Fig. 23 as in Exp. 4 6, but let O force the rate of change as much as possible. Eecord the number of changes and O's introspection of the effort to force the rate.

d. The Slowest Rate of Fluctuation. — Proceed as in Exp. 4 Cy but let O struggle to maintain the figure in a stable view.

* If no reversai takes place in the two minutes, it is because 0 did not get suffîciently familiar with the two views in Exp. 4 o.

APPERCEPTION

The results differ with ingenuity and chance dues of the observer. For some the effect of the effort is to increase the rate of the fluctuation in both experiments ; for others there may be some appréciable snccess both in the increase and the decrease of the rate; still others may discover the secret of the reversai and be able to hold or reverse at pleasnre. What this secret is we shall discover in the next experiment.

e. Control of the Reversai. — Observe that Tig. 26 may appear to represent a glass jar one moment as seen

from above, and another as seen from below. Fixate the eyes in successive trials, upon the points in the edges marked A, B, R, and 8 respectively, and observe that the figure remains stable so long as you retain a steady fixation of one of thèse points, and that the relief is always the same for a given point. Eecord for each point whether the top or the bottom view prevails. The secret then lies in allowing a certain point in the figure to catch and hold the eye. Fig. 26 is favorable for the démonstration of this because it is large

APPERCEPTION 167

and simple enough to enable one to control the regard. It is difficult to verify this prineiple on the smaller figures whieL hâve finer patterns over whieh the eye involuntarily wanders from one point of regard to another.

The gênerai law observed is that the point whieh first catches the eye or tends to hold its regard is perceived as a near part of the objeet. This fixes the view.

Why should the part whieh first catches the eye be judged near? It is a habit. Whenever we look at objects, economy bids us look first at the near side, other things being equal ; this has resulted in the tendency of assuming that the first part seen is the near part of the objeet.

Why should the point upon whieh we maintain regard be judged near? It is a habit. Whenever we try to see a whole complex objeet there is a tendency to accommodate for a point near the center of the surface, and this is, as a rule, near us; the uniformity of this expérience has resulted in the tendency of assuming that when we regard a fairly central point in a complex figure, this point is a near part of the objeet.

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