IN VACATION
Tuespay, March 29, 1853 Before the Hon. THomas CusniNG Ayzwix.
Exparle ELmine Prince, for Writ of Habeas Corpus.— The petitioner in this inctance had been imorisoned in the common gaol of this district, from the month of September last, in virtue of a writ, purporting to be a writ of contrainte par corps, issued in a case wherein one Olive Marcotte was plaintiff, and the petitioner was defendant from the Circuit Court for the Montreal Circuit.
The alleged ground of commitment was, that she had refused to r'epré= senler, deliver up, certain goods and chattels, to which she had been appointed guardian according to law, seized under the writ of saisie-gagerie in the above cause issued,
À petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus was now presented, praying for her release, on the ground of nullities apparent on the face of the copy of the commitment, furnished by the gaoler.
Mr. Driscoll, on the part of the Crown, declared that he had no objection lo the enlargement of the prisoner, He had no douht whatsoever
The petilioner, also cited the Chapter 110, sec. 13, of the Cons, Stat. for L. C., and tûe article 789 of the Code of Civil - Procedure, to show tha. «he defendant ought to have been confined in the common gaol of the district of Montreal, the Codeof Civil Procedure having superseded and overruled the terms of the judgment.
Several other objections were also raised and discussed, but not necessarily decided. The plaintiff, by his counsel Mr. Lafrenaye, contended ; 1st, l'hat a writ of Habeas Corpus
on his mind that the commitment was bad, from the want of any alternative being given to the petitioner ; in default of payment, she was condemned to perpetual imprisonmert. The commitment should have contained the alternative of the representation of the effects originally seized,
Mr. Papin, the attorney ‘or ihe plaintiff in this case, appeared, and urged that, being a civil st, giving a judgment on the commitment would, in fact, be constituing His ,:.onor a Court of Review for judgments pronounced in in parallel cases in the Circuit Court.
Mr. Kerr, for the petitioner, drew attention to the fact that there was no sum expressed in the writ of contrainte par cerps or commitment, on payment of which the petitioner might be discharged, the words being, “ until she shall have paid tbe amvuunt of the judgment against her, in capital, interests and costs together, with seventeen shillings and nine pence costs accrued on the rule declared absolute as aforesaid, With three shillings and six pence, cost of this writ, and your own fees.” There were, to be sure, some letters and figures at the bottom cfthe first page, purporting to be a statement of the debt, cost and sub-costs in the case ; but there was no reference made to this statement in the body of the commitment. Even taking it for granted that reference had been made to it, still the sums being in figures in lieu of letters, it would be bad, xs not being sufficiently certain.
The writ of Habeas Corpus was ordered to issue,returnable immediately.
On the return of the writ, His Honor proceeded to rencer judgment.
Apart from the technical objections regarding the form of this conirainle par corps or commitment, which are insuperable, even supposing that the present writ had been drawn carefully, in lieu of negligently, that the sums which the petitioner had to pay before being liberated were clearly written and expressed, still 1 have great doubts as to the fact whether the Legislature has not by the Act 12 Vic., ch. 42, abo-
will not be grauted in the case of a defendant confined in gaol on civil process. (1)
2nd. That the debtor is liable to a second coercive impri sonment, contrainte par corps, if he has been discharged on other grounds than those mentioned in articles 793, 794 and 795, C. C. P, Under the French Law ; Teulet, Codes Annotés, page 244, art. du Code de Procédure Français, 804, page 245, Nos. 1, 2, 17, 18, 19 and 20, Under the English Law and Equity Reports, vol. 24 anno 1854, page 146 ; Exyarte Eggington, and page 150. Erle, J.'s remarks. The chap. 95, sec. 11 of the Cons. Stat. for Lower Canada applies only to criminal offences and not to civil process.
3rd. That the code of Civil Procedure had no retroactive effec& upon the order in the judgment quoad the gaol of the district ; article 1360.
On the return of the writ, His Honor proceeded to render judgment :
lished all recourse by landlords against their tenants (par corps) in the event of their not producing, when duly required therein, the effects entrusted Lo their charges by the operation of the law, in cases of saisiegagerie.
The tenant created guardian by the operation of law to the saisiegagerie does net come within the exceptions created by that Statute to its general effects. The Act 12 Vic., ch. 42, abolishes the writ of Capias ad Salisfaciendum, and also all other writs of execution against the person, with the exceptions contained in the 15th section.—The present cases does not fall within those exceptions ; therefore, it is still a question undetermined, though one «bout which I have little doubt, But this point does not come up at present. The commitment or contrainte in this case is partlÿy bad on the face ofit. I cannot allow the liberty of the subject to be infringed upon, as it is in the present instance, and, therefore, order her to be discharged, The learned Judge referred to Paley on Convictions, p. 255. And prisoner was discharged,
(1) 8 L. C. Reports, page 216, Barber vs. O’Hara. Exparte Mercure petitioner for a writ of Habeas Cornus for his discharge from coercive imprisonment, by reason of a rébeliion à juslice, in chambers, at Montreal, Aylwin, J, Decision not reported. See 5 L, C. Reports, page 168, as to the nature of the case. 9 L. C. R., p. 285, Exparte Donaghue.
The parties having been fully heard before me, I find two questions raised by the petition for Habeas Corpus ; both, however, constitute, in reality but one. Strictly speaking, I'have only to decide the reasons assigned in the petition. I was right when 1 first decided tnat the petition sbould be discharged at the time of his first arrest. The chap. 95 C. S. L. GC, sec. 11, which is the old law, prohibits the unjust vexation by reiterated comr ‘tments for the same offence ; whether the first discharge takes place by reason of a variance or not, it is indifferent.
Thisisthe same cause of arrest for the same offense. The authorities of the plaintiff”s counsel do not apply. I must put the law into execution. This not an imprisonment for debt, but for an offence 1gainst the law. It wasresisting a bailiff in the execution of his duty, and it is punishable more severely than any misdemeanor, inasmuch as the debtor is bound to remair i: gaol the whole time of his natural life, if he cannot pay the debt, being the amount of the judgment recovered against im by the plaintiff. If a man steals £500 he is sentenced to a certain number of years in the penitentiary, but the law in the present case is much more severe. I maintain that by law it is an offence within the meaning of the Statute, ch. 95, sec. 11. The petitioner was discharged once, and 1 am bound by the same law to discharge him again.
The judgment ordering the mode of its execution was good when pronounced, and according to the law of the jiand ; but the law now in force, art, 789, C. C. P., must override that judgment, so far as its mode of execution goes, but the judgment would not fall to the ground for that reason.
Suppose that anciher writ would issue — but I decide that it cannoi—that writ would have to be executed according to the law now in force.
I will order that the petitioner be discharged in the usual form, as it is not necessary to enter any reason in the order of discharge.
The causes in the writ of contrainte par corps being insufficient to warrant his arrest, the petitioner is discharged,
8 Rev. Légale, p. 716. Dawson, app. } Juoi : Qu'une personne ne et Ogden, int. C. d'Ap. Québec, 1877. Lu être condamnée à l'e:nprisonnement pour mépris de Cour, pour avoir fait une opposition frauduleuse à un bref d'exécution, avant que le mérite de cette opposition ne soit jugé.
Le jugement de la Cour Inférieure a été rendu le 26 Octobre 1876 par la Cour Supérieure à Trois-Rivières, l'Honorable Juge Thomas McCord, président, et en ces termes :
The Court having heard the Plaintiffs in continuance of suit Charles Kennis Ogden, by his attorney, upon the rule nisi for coercise imprisonment in this cause granted on the twenty-second day of November, one thousand eight hundred an% seventy-fve, the attorney for the Defendant and Opposant William McDonnell Dawson being present in Court and declining to appear as attorney in answer to the said rule, but having addressed the Court in the interest of the said William McDonnel! Dawson, and against the said rule, although stating that he did so as Amicus Curiæ, having examined the said rule, the affidavits in support thereof, the notice thereof given, and the proceedings of record, as well as the tierces oppositions in this cause filed, claiming a portion of the amount due by the Defendant nnder the final judgment in this case, and having upon the whole maturely deliberated :
Considering, 1st. That the Defendant Opposant in this cause, has fraudulently and in bad faith, filed a false and unfounded opposition afin d'annuler to the Writ of Fieri Facias de bonis et de terris, issued in this cause on the twenty fourth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and seventyfive, in execution of the final judgment rendered in this cause, and to the seizure of his goods and chattels, lands
and tenements, made thereunder, repeai:ng as his ground of opposition the allegations of his pleas to the action which are res Judicata between the parties in this cause, and demanding on the said grounds, that the final judgrent in in this cause be rescinded and revoked or annulled, vacated and discharged, and the Writ of Fieri Facias de bonis et de terris, the seizure made thereunder, and all proceedings in virtue thereof be declared nvil and void, and that main levée of his goods and chattels so seized be granted him, which he knows and knew to be an illegal opposition and demand © -4, That the said opposition was filed for the purpose of resisting the order and process of this Court to wit: the said final judgment and the Writ of Execution issued in this cause and is a fraudulent ” vasion of the judgment and Writ of Execuiion by preventing and obstructing the sale of his property seized in this cause under and in virtue of the said Writ of Execution in sa isfaction of the said judgment.—Doth declare and adjudg & the said William McDonnell Dawson to be guilty of contempt ot this Court, and of resistance to and fraudulent evasion of the judgment, order and process of this Court, to-wit, of the judgment in this cause rendered on the tenth day of June one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four, and of the Fieri Favias in this cause on the twenty-fourth day of April, one thousand eight hundred anû seventy-five, and doth order that the said Willian McDonneil Dawson be imprisoned in the common jail of the District of Three-Rivers, until he shal! have paid into the händs of the Prothonotary of this Couri, 10 aide the further orders of this Court, the amount : id judgment, in principal, interest and costs, as mer. ‘ioned in the writ of Fieri Facias aforesaid, to-wit, the sum of iwo thousand and thirty-three dollars and nineteen cents, of capital, with interest thereon from the twenty-fifih day of August, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, together wit:. the sum of one hundred * .d eighteen dollars and forty cents, being the costs due in virtue of the said
[ARTIOLE 2273.
judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, confirming the said judgmen: of this Court, and also the further sum of three dollars and fifty cents, being the costs 6f the said writ Of Fieri Facias.
And the Court doth further consider the said William McDonnell Dawson t2 pay the costs of the said rule nisi, and of the motion made to obtain the same, whereof distraction is graated to Messrs, McDonnell & Houliston, attorney’s of the said Plaintiff in continuance,
L’Appelant demande la révision de ce jugement pour les raisons suivantes ; premièrement parceque le jour où le dit jugement a été rendu, savoir le 26 Octabre 1876 n’était pas un jour d’audition fixe par la loi et par ordre de la Cour ou d’une autorité légalement constitué, deuxièmement parcequ’il n’y avait personne pour représenter Isaac Low Evan- Ggden et parceque le reprenant l'instance n’é:ait pas légalement devant la Cour ; troisièmement, parceque les procédés adoptés, en cette cause sont contraires à l'esprit et la lettre de nos lois, la règle pour contrainte par corps ayant été accordée sans affidavit ou procédés préliminaires équivalents, sans avis du jour de l'argument, et sans les f-rmalités ordinaires observées dans les procédures judiciaires.
De son côté l’Intimé prétendit que le j"gement était correct et devait être maintenu, parceque la mauvaise foi de l'Appelant résultait de la nature de son plaidoyer.
L'article du Code Civil qui s’applique à la cause est l’article 2273, ainsi que les articles 781 et 782 du Coce de Pr«cédure Civile,
A l’allégué que l’Appelant n’est pas régulièrement devaat la Cour, l’Intimé répond que cette prétention de l’Appelant est basée sür le fait qu'il n’y a pas au dossier de preuve de l2rregistrement du jugemeni lui permettant d'accepter, sous bénéfice d'inventaire, la succession de feu Isaac Low Evans (igden, le Demandeur originaire, ainsi que requis par l'article 661 du Code Civil, mais il prétend que cette preuve n'est pas nécessaire et que l’Appelant ne peut faire
SR
si mi AR CUS = 23
valoir © défaut d'enregistrement au mérite de la cause, mais qu'il devait s'en prévaloir pour contester la demande en reprise d'instance. La reprise d'instance n’a pas été contestée, et suivant l’article 440 du Code de Procédure Civile, lorsqu’eli. n’est pas contestée, elle est censée admise. Da. près l’article 439 du Code de Procédure Civile, le simple dépôt d’une telle demande au Bureau du Protonotaire, suffit lorsque le délai pour la contester est expiré et aucun jugement formel n’est . fcessaire.
Quand À la question de savoir si le jugement pouvait être rendu Je jour où il a été rendu, l’Intimé prétend qu’il n’y a pas de difficulté ; que, par le premier article du Code de Procédure Civile, la Cour peut ajourner le terme à aucun jour subséquent en vacance. L’ajournement du terme de Septembre au 26 Octobre, jour où le jugement a été rendu, était régulier, et il est entré au registre en ces termes: “ Le 22 Septe 1bre 1876, le présent terme de la Cour Supérieure est continué par ajournement aux jours suivants, et cette Cour est ajournée aux dits jours suivants, qu’elle fixe, savoir, au 26 Octobre et au 25 de Novembre prochain. ”
Ci suit le jugement de la Cour d'Appel.
Juexment; The Court of Ou: Lady the Queen, now here having heard the Appellant and Respondent by their counsel respectively, examined as well the record and proceedings had in the Court below, as the Reasons of appeal filed by the Appellant and the answers thereto, and muture deliberation on the whole being had :
Considering that the judgment rendered by the Court below on the twenty-sixth day of October one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, by which the Appellant in this cause was declared and adjudged to be guilty of contempt of the Court, and of resistance to and fraudulent evasion of the judgment, order and process of the said Court, to wit, of the judgment rendered in this cause on the tenth day of June one thousand eight hundred and seventy-four and of the Fieri Facias issued on the twenty-fourth day of
April, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five and was ordered to be imprisoned in the common jail of the District of Three-Rivers, until he shall have paid into the hands of the Prothonotary of the said Court, to abide the further orders of the said Court, the amount ofthe judgment in principal, interests and costs as mentioned in the Writ of Fier: Facias aforesaid, to wit, the sum of two thousand and thirty-three dollars and nineteen cents of capital with interest thereon from the twenty-fifth day of August, one thousand eight hundreä and seventy-three, together with the sum of one äundreë and eighteen dollars and forty cents being the costs due in virtue of said judgment and the further sum of one hundred and twenty-three dollars and fifty one cents being the amount of costs due in virtue of the judgment of the Court of Queen’s Bench confirming the said judgment of the said Court below and also the fur. ther sum of three dollars and fifty cents being the costs of the said writ of Fieri Facias and also the costs of the rule and of the motion to obtain the same was s0 rendered on a rule issued in the said Court on the twenty-second day of November one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five charging the said Appellant with having fraudulently and in bad faith filed a false and unfounded Opposition afin d'annuler to a seizure made in said cause:
And considering that the said Opposition afin d'annuler of the said Appellant, had not been contested nor adjudicated upon, when the motion for the said judgment of the twentysixth day of October one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, was rendered and that the said opposition is still pending before the said Court below.
And considering that the said Appellant could not be declared guilty of contempt, for having filed the said opposition until the merits of the same bad been finally adjudicated npon, and considering that there is error in the said judgment of the said Superior Court of the twenty-sixth day of October one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six.
DE Lortmien. Bin, vor. 21. 2
This Court doth reverse the said judgment and proceeding to render the judgment which the said Superior Court should have rendered, doth dismiss the rule of the twentysecond day of November one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, and adjudge that the said Respondent shall pay to the Appellant the costs by him incurred as well on she said rule, as on the present appeal, and the motion of the Appellant for certiorari is rejected with costs,
5 Juriste, p.76. Thomas vs. Pepin, Jucé: Qu'une règle pour mé-
C. C. M. 1861, Sadgley, J. } pris de Cour peut émaner contre la partie nour avoir produit plusieurs oppositions dans le but de retarder une vente, et de s'opposer à l'exécution de la justice.
Dans cette cause, l’Opposant avait produit à l’encontre du writ d'exécution émanée contre les biens-meubles du Défendeur, trois oppositions afin de distraire consécutives.
Le onze février 1861, jour où la troisième opposition était fait rapportable, le Demandeur fit motion pour obtenir une règle contre la partie elle-même, George Pepin, fils, l’opposant, tendant à le faire déclarer coupable de mépris de Cour, ‘“ en autant que le dit Opposant avaii, en violation des règies “ de pratiques et des formes de procédure suivies par cette ‘ Honorable Cour, produit trois oppositions afin de distraire ‘ à l'encontre du writ d'exécution émané en cette cause, et “des procédés de l’huissier, le dit Opposant renouvelant ‘“ telles oppositions en violation de la loi et s’opposant par ‘ ]à à l'exécution de la justice et des jugements de ce tri- “ bunal.”
La Cour prit la cause en & * ‘béré, et par son jugement du 18 février 1861, accorda la motion du Demandeur et en conséquence, ordonna l’emanation d’une règle pour mépris de Cour contre l’'Opposant, rapportable 11 mars 1864. (1).
(1) Et déclarée absolue le 1? mars, Coram Berthelot, 4,
13 Rev. Légale, p. 418.) Jucé : Qu'il n'y a pas lieu à la contrainte
Girard vs Audette. par corps pour mépris de Cour contre un opposant, pour la raison que l'opposition produite par ce dernier a été déclaree frauduleuse et renvoyée,
Nous publions ci-dessous le motivé du jugement rendu en cette cause par l’hon. juge Chagnon.
Voici les notes du savant juge :
Marie Audette à fait une Opposition à fin de distraire réclamant la propriété des effets saisis sur son frère le défendeur. Apparemment, d’après la déclaration de l'opposante, enregistrée au bureau du protonotaire, c'était elle qui faisait Commerce sous la raison de Jules Audette & Cie.
Le demandeur a prétendu que l’opposante n’avait agi là que comme prête-nrm du défendeur et que le tout n’avait été qu’une fraude tramée contre les créanciers du dit défendeur. La Cour a considéré, après avoir entendu la preuve, qu'en effet l’opposante, n’avait été dans ce cemmerce que 12
prête nom du défendeur, et elle s’est bâsée sur les indices de
fraude qui surgissaient de la preuve et des relations et raports entre le défendeur et l’opposante ; et l'opposition fut
renvoyée avec dépens.
Le demandeur a subséquemment fait émaner une règle pour mépris de Cour contre l’opposante demandant son emprisonnement, attendu que son opposition avait été frivole, frauduleuse et vexatoire,
Je ne crois pas que cette règle puisse être déclarée absolue. L'art. 2273, C. C. dit bien qu’il y a lieu à la con. trainte par corps pour ‘ tout acte tendant à éluder l’ordre ou le jugemeni d’un tribunal, en prévenant ou empêchant la saisie ou la vente des biens en exécution de tel jugement.” L'art, 782, C. P. C., dit en substance la même chose. Mais je ne sache pas que, quand un tribunal aura renvoyé une opposition comme frauduieuse, c’est-à-dire comme étant bâsée sur des actes impliquant d’après la preuve, dans l'opinion de la Cour, une fraude vis-à-vis les créanciers du défendeur,
rm tp mé gap
[A PMICLE 2273.]
l’opposant devra être invariablement passible de la contrainte par corps.
Dans le cas aciuel, l’opposante a soumis ses moyens d'opposition à l'appréciation du tribunal ; l'opposition a été renvoyée et apparemment l’opposante n’a rien fait depuis quismarquât de sa part la volonté de résister à ce jugement,
11 faut des actes exceptionnels de résistance, pour qu’une partie puisse devenir passible d'une contrainte par corps. Dans la cause citée par l’avocat de l’opposante (Perrault vs. Charbonneau, et Boisseau, L. N. vol. 5), il s'agissait aussi d’une opposition frauduleuse faite à l'encontre de la saisie par l’opposant. Un a pris une règle pour mépnis de Cour contre l’opposant, et S. H. le juge ‘Torrance a déclaré, par son’ jugement renvoyant la règle, qu'il n’y avait aucune preuve que l’opposant eût ca1erché à cacher ou à évader les effets saisis ; qu’il avait fait une opposition et qu’il avait simplement failli sur cette opposition, et la règle fut déchargée.
Dans la cause de Thomas vs Pépin, et Pépin (L. C. J. V. 76), la règle fut déclarée absolue parce q e l’opposant avait renouvelé trois fois la même opposition à l'encontre du bref d'exécution ; d’où sa conduite était devenue une véritable obstruction à l'exécution du jugement de la Cour.
Dans la cause de Dawson vs Ogden (R. L., VIII, 716), le défendeur avait fait une opposition foudée sur les mêmes moyens que ceux qu’il avait invoqués dans son plaidoyer, et sur lesquels il avait failli. Le tribunal de première instance le condamna à l’emprisonnement, Ce jugement fui ensuite renversé sur le principe que telle contrainte par corps ne pouvait, dans tous les cas, être ordonnée, qu'après adjudication sur le mérite de l'opposition. Mais la raison de l’incarcération «elle que prononcée par le tribunal de première instance, reposait encore sur le fait d’une véritable obstruction provenant de ce que la partie cpposante f. un véritable acte de rébellion contre le jugement.
Dans le r1s actuel, l’opposante a soumis une fois ses
moyens ; son opposition a /‘é renvoyée comme frauduleuse d’après la preuve, et je ne v. . pas qu’outre le débouté de cette opposition avec déf 5, ; : sois justifiable, en face des art. 2273, C. C., et 782, C. P. C. de punir l’opposante par une condamnation additionnelle à l’emprisonnement,
La regle sera déchargée, mais dans les circonstances elle le sera sans frais.
2? M. L. Rep. S. C., p.294. Gravel ) Hecv: That an order for vs. Lahouillière. Torrance, J. 1886. | coercive imprisonment may be granted in an action for separation from bed and board.
This was the merits cf a rule against the plaintiff for not obeying the order of the court giving the custody of a child to its mother, the wife of plaintiff.
The action was for the separation from bed and board. The plaintif, in answer to the rule, made several objections
as to form. st. The cause could not be proceeded with in vacation ; G. C. P. 1. 2nd. A rule of this nature was beyond ihe power of a judge ; C. C. P. 781. 1t should be issued by the Court. and it was issued by a judge in vacation. 3rd. The Judgment, not having granted, contrainte the Court conld not now grant it, 4th There could not be a contrainte in a cause between husband and wife. The only penalty was a money condemnation.
Per Curtau :— It is admitted that an order was given by this Court, on the 25th June, 1886, awarding the custody of a child to the mother. A money condemnation would be entirely nugatory in some cases, “ qui veut la fin, veut ies moyens.” I believe it is true that, in France, in such a case as this between man and wife, contrainte would not be ordered. I refe; to ‘he authorities cited in Ex parte Piles, 7 Legal News, p. 78, but this court represents as well the Conseil Supérieur, as the olà King's Bench, and in England, and also in Scotlard, there is no doubt but that an order for coercive imprisonment might be given in a case like the
present. I shall therefore overrule the answer, and declare thesrule absolute against the husband en contumace. —C, C. {1 Revue Légale, p. 375. Crowley vs. Chrétien, à Jucé: Qu'il C. S. M. 1882, Mathieu, J. ÿn'y a pas lieu à la contrainte par corps contre le détenteur d’un immeuble condamné à ‘e remettre et à rendre compte des fruits et revenus, par ce qu’il n’a pas produit son compte dans les délais fixés par cour.
9 Legal News, p. 211. McCarthy vs. Jackson Jucé :—Que le gar-
et Ward. opn. C. C. M. 1886. Gül, J. res à une saisie qui par une opposition afin d'annuler, fondée sur des moyens illégaux et frauduleux, s'oppose à la vente des effets confiés à sa garde et de fait en empèche la vente, commet un mépris de cour et est sujet à la contrainte par corps.
La demanderesse a fait saisir à la place d’affaires de la défenderesse, certains meubles et effets déjà saisis dans une autre cause émanée de cette cour sous le No. 364, dans laquelle A. Brunet et al. étaient demandeurs et la défenderesse en celte cause et son époux, étaient défendeurs.
Comme Percy M. Ward avait été nommé gardien à la saisie de A. Brunet et al., et qu’il était en possession des effets ainsi saisis, il fut de nouveau établi gardien à la saisie en cette cause au désir de l'Art, 577 du C. P. C.
La veille du jonr fixé pour la vente des dits effets en la présente cause, le dit gardien, dans le but frauduleux d'empêcher la vente des dits effets, fit signifier à l'huissier exploitant, une opposition foncée sur les moyens suivants :—
“ That all the said seized effects were at the best of this opposants knowledge and belief, included in certain goods and effects seized on the 16th day of January instant in the premises No. 1264 St. Lawrence street Montreal, where the present seizure was made on the 19th day of January instant, which certain goods and effects were (at the time of the
present seizure) in the guardianship of this opposant under the said first mentioned seizure, which was a seizure (by way Of saisie-gagerie) in a certain suit still existing in this honcraële court and numbered 364, in which A. Brunet and others are plaintiffs and tbe present defendant and her husband are defendants ;
“ That at the time of the making of the seizure in the present cause, this opposant warned and forbade the bailiff not to seize the said effects and told him of the said seizure by way of saisie-gagerie having already been made, and said opposant refused to sign papers on present seizure. ”
Que l’opposant jura que cette opposition n’était pas faite pour retarder la vente des effets saisis en la presente cause, mais qu’elle était faite de bonne foi et dans le seul et unique but d’obienir justice.
La demanderesse a cependant contesté cette opposition comme illégale, frivole, vexatoire, de mauvaise foi, frauduleuse et faite en mépris de cet honorable cour, et elle en a demandé le renvoi non seulement avec dépens, mais elle a en outre conclu à ce que le dit opposant fût déclaré en mépris de cette cour et condamné au paiement des dits dépens sous les peines de !a contrainte par corps.
Voici le texte :—
“ La cour, parties ouïes et témoins, sur l'opposition faite et produite en cette cause, par le dit opposant, déclare icelle opposition frivole, vexatoire, de mauvaise foi et frauduleuse et faite en mépris de cette cour et la renvoie avec dépens distraits à M. D’Amour, avocat de la demanderesse.
“« Et la cour déclare le dit opposant, pour avoir fait la dite opposition, coupable d'un mépris de cour, passible de contrainte par corps et en conséquence.
“ Condamne le dit opposant à être incarcéré dans la prison commune de ce dist.ict, jusqu’au paiement des frais de la dite opposition, distraits comme susdit. ”
Opposition rejetée et contrainte par corps accoräée.
[A l'appui de ce jugement, voir les authorités suivantes :—
Jacobs’ Law Dictionary, vo. Comtempt ;
“JItisa contempt to institute a suit fictiously, either to hurt any person, or ic get {he opinion of the Court. Cox v. Phillips, Rep. Temp. 237-239.
3 Pertersdorffs Abridgment, vo. Contempt, note au bas de p. 23: “ Prosecuting an action not to determine a right or controvercy, but to deceive the Court and raise a prejudice, against a third person, is a contempt. ”
3 R. L, 328, Champagne v. Bélanger et al
5 L. C. J. 76. Thomas v. Pepin et Pepin lils, opposant. Note du rapporteur.]
33 Juriste, p. 192. Vineberg, vs. Ranson, ) Y arrested under a
C. d'App., M. 1886, Monk, etc. JJ. of capias gave a special bail as required by Art. 824 C. C.P. he capias Was contested but maintained, and V ordered to file a statement in accordance With Arts. 764, 765 and 766 C, C. P. witnin 15 days from service of the judgment which he failed to, and by another judgment was declared to be in contempt of Court, and condemned to be “ detained in jail until otherwise ordered by this Court.”
Heu, by Mathieu, J., in Superior Court, that under Art, 766 C. C, P., the debtor who is at liberty on bail is cbliged to furnish a statement Within 30 days of the judgment in the suit, and that there is no distinction in this respect between the cases in which such special bail is given and others.
Hecn:—In appeal, that a commitment for contempt must be for a given time, or uatilthe person in contempt does or is willing to conform to the order of the Court,
That a commitment which is general and during pleasure will be quashed and set aside.
In April, 1884, at Montreal, a writ or capias issued against the appellant at the instance of the respondents,
The appellant duly appeared, and gave bail, as required by article 824 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and afterwards petitioned to quash the capias, but was unsuccessful, and the .capias was maintained on the 26th of May, 1885. On the fourth of March (1885) the respondents presented a petition to the Superior Court, asking that appellant be ordered to fyle in the Prothonotary's office, a statement
under oath, in accordance with the requirements of Arts. 764, 765 and 766 of the Code of Civil Procedure, within sach time as the Court might fix, and that in default of so doing, that said appellant be declared to be in contempt of court, and for such contempt be arrested and imprisoned, and kept in custody of the keeper of the common jai! of the said District of Montreal, until said appellant do fyle s-id statement and declaration, or for such other time as the Court "ay order.
To this petition the appellant pleaded that is true he was arrested under a capias at the instance of respondents, but that he duly gave bai! as required by article 824 of the Code 2f Civil Procedure ; that the condition of he bond, given on behalf of appellant, is that the sureties shall become responsible if appellant leaves the heretofore Province of Canada (to wit, the Province of Quebec and Ontario) without having paid the debt, interest and costs, for which the action is brought. That the said bail is what was formerly known as special bail to the action, the condition of the bond being'prescribed by 5 Geo.ät: ,hap. ? : that by the law ofthis Province no one arrested under a Capias, and having put in special bail to the action, as appellant has done, can legally be called upon to make a dc. laration and abandonment of his property. The abandonmnnt of property being for the relief of creditors who could not give special bil tu the action ; that the said respondents have no right by l1w to call upon the said appellant to make a declaration and an abandonment of his property ; that article 766 of the Code of Civil Procedure mentionned in respondents,petition refers to the case of a debior who has given security to surrender, in defauit o{ a right abandonment of his property, and not to the case of the appellant who has given special bail to the action.
The judgment rendered on respondents’ said petition, by His Honor Mr. Justice Mathieu, merely ordered the appellant to fyle the statement demanded, reserving to adjudge
thereafter on the other conclusions of the said petition, and “was in th: following terms :
La Cour, après avoir entendu les parties sur le mérite de la requête des demandeurs, demanäant qu'il soit ordonné aux défendeurs et à chacun d’eux de produire et de déposer au Greffe le bilan mentionné, aux conditions et de la manière aussi mentionnées, avoir examiné la procéäure et la réponse à la dite requête, et tout le dossier, vu la déclaration des parties à ce que jugement intervienne en cette cause— bien que le délibéré ait été déchargé,—vu que le délibéré a été ainsi déchargé par suite d’une erreur, et avoir délibéré ;
Altendu que, le vingt-six janvier dernier, les requérants ont obtenu jugement contre les défendeurs Hymza Vineberg et Israel Vineberg, les condamnant conjointement et solidairement à payer aux requérants la somme de deux mille six cent quarante-cinq piasires et soixante et dix-sept centins (82,645.77) courant, avec intérêt à compter du vingtneuf avril dernier [1884], et les frais de poursuite qui furent taxés à la somme de quatre cent hit piastres et quatre-vingt centins, et maintenant le bref de capias ad respondendum émané contre eux daus à äite poursuite ;
Attendu qu'avant le jugement final maintenant le Capias comme susdit, les dits défendeurs avaient été admis à caution en vertu des dispositions de l’article 824 du Code de Procédure Civile ;
Attendu que les dits défendeurs n’ont pas déposé le bilan sous trente jours de la date du dit jugement;
Attendu que les dits requérants par leur requête, demandent qu’il soit ordonné aux défendeurs de produire et déposer au Greffe de cette Cour, sous tel délai qu’il plaira à cette Cour fixer, un bilan assermenté, conformément aux disposions des articles 764, 765 et 766 du Code de Procédure Civile, et qu’à défaut par eux de ce faire, ils soient déclarés en mépris de cette Cour, et emprisonnés dans la prison comm une du District de Montréal, jusqu’à ce qu'ils aient déposé
le dit bilan, ou pendant tel temps que cette Cour pourra ordonner ;
Attendu que les défendeurs prétendent que cette requête ne peut être accordée, parce qu'ils ont fourni le Cauiiannement requis par l’article 824 du Code de Procédure Civile, et que la condition de ce cautionnement est qu’ils ne laisseront pas la Province du Canada, ot que ce cas échéant, les cautions payeront le montant du jugement à intervenir en principal, intérêt et frais,et qu’ils ne peuvent être tenus de deposer un bilan, le dépôt du bilan n'étant exigé que de ceux qui ne peuvent fourrir un cautiounement spécial, conformément aux dispositions du dit article 824 du Code de Procédure Civile ; que la disposition de l’article 766, qui exige que le débiteur qui a été élargi sous caution dépose üun bilan, ne s'applique qu’au cas d'un dé‘iteur qui a donné caution de se remettre sous la garde d' shérif, à défaut de faire une cession de ses biens, et non au Cas d’un défendeur qui a donné un cautionnement spécial comme les défendeurs l'ont fait ;
Considérant que par ies dispositions : l’article 766 du Code de Procédure Civile, le débiteur qui a été élargi sous Caution est tenu de déposer ce bilan et cette déclaration sous trente jours de la date du jugement dans l'instance sous laquelle il a été arrêté ;
Considérant que cette disposition de la loi ne fait pas de distinction quant au cautionner-ent, et qu’elle s'applique aux défendeurs en cette cause ;
Considérant que la requête des dits requérants est bien fondée, a accordé et accorde la dite requête, et a ordonné et ordonne aux dits défendeurs et à chacun d’eux de produire et déposer. au Greffe de cette Cour, sous quinze jours de la signification du présent jugement, un bilan assermenté par eux, et indiquant :
10 Les biens meubles et immeubles qu'ils possèdent.
20 Les noms et adresses de tous et chacun de leurs créanciers, avec le montant de leur créance respective, et l’indi-
Lh .
cation de la nature de chacune des créances, soit privilégiées, hypothécaires ou autrement et d'accompagner ce bilan d'une déclaration des dits défendeurs qu'ils consentent à abandonner tous leurs biens à leu:s créc nciers ; réservant à adjuger ri-après sur les autres conclusions de ;- dite requête.
Subsequently the respondent presented another petition to the Superior Court, asking that appellant be declared in contempt of court by reason of his having made default to fyle the statement required.
To this petition the apnellant answered that by-law he was not bound to fyle the said statement, and that the non-compliance with the said judgment did not by-law render him liable to ve declared in contempt of court.
The judgment upon this petition, which declared the defendant to lie in contempt of court, and ordered him to be imprisoned, was rendered on the 30th of June, 1885, by His Honor Mr, Justice Torrance, and was as follows :
The Court having heard the parues by L sir counsel, to wit the plaintiffs and the defendant Israel Vineberg upon the petitir a of said plaintiffs, fyled on the first day of June instant, ‘epresenting that by judgment of this Court rendered on the 4th of May last, the defendants were crdered to file with the Prothouotary, within fifteen days from the service of jndgment, a sworn statement making known first all the moveable and immoveable property of which they were possessed, and the names and addresses of all and each of their creditors, the amount of their claims and the nature of same, whether privileged, hypothecary or other. wise, such statement to be accompanie“ with a declaration by them that they consent to abandon :ilt&eir property to their creditors; that the said judgment was served on said defendant Israel Vineberg on the 7th of May last, and on the said defendant Hyman Vineberg on the 8th of May last, and have failed to comply with the sail judgment, and praying therefore, said plaintiffs, that said defendants and
each of them be declared in contempt of court, and imprisoned in the common jail ; and the other defendant Hyiman Vineberg not having appeared at the said hearing.
Having examine the proceedings and deliberated, doth grant the said petition and the conclusions thereof, In consequence doth order and adjuge that the said defendants and each of them be declared in contempt of this Court, and for such contempt be imprisoned in the common jail of the District of Montreal, and be detained in such jail until otherwise ordi red by this court, the whole with costs distraits to Messrs. Girouard & McGibbon, attorneys for plaintiffs petitioners.
From the above judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of Queen’s Bench. In appeal the appellant contenäed, {st, that when the defendant has furnished special bail to the action, he is not bound to file the statement and make the declaration mentioned in Article 766 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this contention he cited the following authorities : Poulet vs. Launière, 6, Q.L.R, p. 314 : Cossit vs. Lemieux, 4 L.N.. ». 263, also reported in Appeai, 2 Q.B. Reports 14, Sewell vs. Vannever, 14 L.C.R. 251.
The appellaut contended that even ifthe Judge might legally order the defendant to fyle a bilan, yet compliance with such judgment cannot be enforced by contrainte par corps.
No authorities where cited by the respondents, who after reciting the facts of the case merely prayed that the judgments rendered be confirmed,
The Court of Appeal, after having heard the case, ren-
dered judgment reversing those of the lower Court, the judgment in appeal being as follows : —
The Court of our Lady the Queen, having heard the appellant and respondents by their counsel respectively, examined as well the record and proceedings had in the Court below as the reasons of appeal filed by the appellant, and
the answer thereto, and mature deliberation on the whole being had :
Considering that Israel Vineberg, one of the defendants
‘+ cause, now appellant, was arrested under a capias à at the instance of the respondents, plaintiffs below, { gave bail under Article 824 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and inasmuch as by the judgment of the Superior Court, rendered at Montreal on the 30th day of June, 1885, the said Israel Vineberg was declared to be in contempt of Court for not having filed the statement required by Articles 764, 765 and 766 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which he had been previously ordered to do by judgment of the said Superior Court of the 4th day of May, 1885, and was condemnned by the said judgment of the 30th day of June, 1885, to be imprisoned in the common jail of the District of Monreal, and to be detained in such jail until otherwise ordered by the said Court.
And, considering that a commitment for contempt must be for a given time or until the person in contempt does or is willing to conform and not generally and during pleasure,
And considering that in the said judgment of the 30th day of June, 1885, there is error.
Doth quash the commitment of the 30th day of June, 1885, with costs as well in the Court below as in the Court. here.
14 Déc. de Québec, p.359. Ex parte majeure. Mach: — C. d'app. Québec en chambre 1888, Andrews J. |
tion for Habeas Corpus by a witness committed for refusing to give evidence at a preliminary investigation before a magistrate, a writ of certiorari may be ordered to bring up the deposition containing the question put to the witness, the excuse he has given for his refusal and the decision of the Justice thereon
That on applica-
And. That the statement by the witness that he may be subjected to prosecution for conspiracy Lo defame, although he has been already convicted of libel, is sufficient ground for claiming protection, and excuse
for his refusal to answer : and, if committed for such refusal, he will be discharged on Habeas Corpus.
The petitioner, who had been committed for refusing to answer a question put to him at a preliminary investigation before Judge Ducas, was brought upon a writ of Habeas Corpus before Mr. Justice ANDREWS, of the Superior Court, in order that the validity of the commitment might be decided.
= The return to the writ O1 Habeas Corpus was filed and shewed that the prisoner was detained for having refused to answer the following question: “ Will you state from whom you got the promissory note and the document which purports to be annexed thereto, and referred to, in the extract lastly above recited ? ” without offering any just excuse for such refusal.
Mr. Irvine. Q. C., for the Petitioner, said that the commitment did not disclose the reason given by Mr. Maguire for declining to answer the questiou, for which he had been imprisoned, and he therefore applied for a writ of certiorari to bring up the deposition in which the question was put unless the Crown would consent to its being produced without such formality,
Mr, Fitzpatrick, for the Crown, refused such consent and argued that the petitioner should have resorted to a writ of certiorari as a principal writ on which to obtain his discharge, and that it could not be granted as ancillary to a writ Of Habeas Corpus. In support of this contention, he cited exparte Narbonne, 3 L. N., p. 14, specially referring to Judge Rawsay’s remarks therein,
Mr. Irvine, in reply, cited exparte Eno, 10 Q. L. R., p. 173, and also referred to Æliots case (unreported), in which Chief Justice Sir James STUART, had granted the writ.
Judge Anprews, after a short adjournment to consider the matier, stated that he found that Judge Tessier, though one of the judges who decided the Narbonne case, had nevertheless ordered a writ of certiorari as ancillary to the
writ Of Habeas Corpus, in exparte Eno; and also that Chief Justice Doriox, in exparte Narbonne, 3 L. N., p. 15, said: “ We do not say that we have no right to issue à certiorari We have a right Lo issue a certiorari to see whether the commitment is conformable to the conviction. What we hold is that we have not a right to issue a cert.orari to see whether a magisirate has committed a man according to the evidence.” Also further that in exparte Jones, 1 Q. R,. R., p. 100, Chief Justice Dorion is reported as saying : “ The petitioner should have moved for a certiorari to bring the conviction before the Court, or should have shewn why he could not do so, ”
That in this matter, the deposition of Maguire containing the question put to him, his refusal to answer it and Judge Ducas’ decision, ordering him to prison for such refusal, contituted in fact the conviction of Maguire of the offence for which he had been committed ; and, therefor, could and ought to be brought up by certiorari, and therefore, he ordered the writ to issue. Upon this, Mr. Fitzpatrick gave his consent to the production of the depositiou ; and argument was had on the merits of the petition, which was disposed of as follows :
Per curiam.—The petitioner has been committed to gaol by Judge Ducas, as Judge of the Sessions of the Peace, for refusal to answer a question submitted to him as a witness on the investigation of a charge brought against Messrs. R. P. Vallée and B. Trudel, of conspiring with certain others unknown, to bribe members of the Quebec City Council, in connection with the contract for the construction of the new city aqueduct.
He applies to me for his release on the ground, 1st, that the warrant committing him is defective in itself ; and 2nd. that he could not be compelled to answer the question put to him.
The deposition in which the question occurs, as well as the whole of the investigation cf which it is a part, having
been, with the consent of the Crown, put before me, I think it is my duty to see whether in fact the petitioner was justified in his refusal to reply, rather than to enquire into the technical sufficiency of the warrant under which he was committed. Upon that point I therefore pronounce no opinion. [am the more disposed not to allow the case to turn Upor, any such technical objection, as I have been given to understand by counsel at the argument, that Judge Ducas had expressed a desire that it should be by a Judge of this Court determined whether the petitioner was, or not, legally bound to testify on the matters sought to be elicited from him, and that counsel themselves concurred in that wish.
The reason assigned to Judge Ducas by the petitioner for declining to answer the interrogatory in question, was cause it might tend to criminate him.
That this is a good reason i: law, if true in fact, all are agreed, and Judge Duças had already sustained the petitioner’s refusal, on that ground, to answer several preceding questions in the same deposition.. The general principles ‘egulating the protection to be accorded to witnesses invoking it on this ground, have been s0 Clearly, ably and, I may say, exhaustively discussea by the counsel on both sides in this matter, and their familiarity with all the authorities and decisions bearing thereon is such, that my labors in coming to a conclusion have been most materially lightened. From the precedents they have submitted to me, it appears that while, for a certain time in England, it was asserted, if not indicially held, that it sufficed for a witness to swear that his reply would put him in »eril; the rule is now settled to be as formulated in the case of the Queen v. Boyes, 1 Best & Smith’s Reports, p. 311, that ‘ A merely remote and naked possibility of legal peril to a witness from answering a question, i- not sufficient to entitle him to ths privil-3e of not answering. To entitle him to the privilege of silence, the Court must see from the circumstances of the
case, and the nature o{ the evidence, which he is called to De LortmiEn, Bis. vol. 21. 27
give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness, from his being compelled to answer, Moreover the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law, in the ordinary course of thing- -not a danger of an imaginary and v’substantial character, having reference tu some extrae:anary &nd barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct, Still, if the fact of being in danger be once made to appear, greai latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself of the effect of any particular question. ” This rule was fully affirmed in the subsequent case of exparte Reynolds (Law Reports, Ghancery Division, vol. 20, page 294,) and I adopt it, as governing me in the decision I must now render.
The petitioner having been, as 1 began by saying, called as à witness to prove a charge against Vallée and Trudel cf conspiracy with others, to bribe members of the Quebec Council, in connection with the aqueduct contract, was asked whether in February 1887, he wat :he editor and publisher of the Quebec Day Mercury, and he admitted that he was.
He was then asked whether he was now in a position to subtantiate the charges he made in that paper, on the seventeenth of that month and year, agair st some ©ozen persons, including a number of City Councillors, of their corrupt receipt of monies in connection with said contract,
He replied he was not. He was then asked to indicate the source from which he derived the information on which the said charges were based, He declined to reply on the ground that to do so might have a tendency to criminate him. Thereupon Judge Ducas sustained such refusal, giving in the deposition as his reasons for so doing so, that % the question has tendency to criminate the witness.”” It then having been elicited from the petitioncr that a part of that information was documentary, he was asked where he got
those documents. He again declined to answer, and, on the same ground, his refusal was sustained by the Judge. Petitioners attention was then called to an article in the Mercury of the same date, wherin was printed an alleged reproduction of a promissory note for 84,200, and a memo. attached thereto, going to shew that such sum had been corruptly received by the Mayor, and he was asked whether he had been indicted and convicted for the publication of that article. He admitted he had. He was then asked to give the source whence he had derived the information on which that last article was based. Again he declined, and again, for the same reason, and after an adjournment of the case to the next day, Judge Ducas maintained him in his refusal.
Finally, there was put to him this question : “ Will you state from whom you got the promissory note and the documents which purports to be annexed thereto and referred to in the extract lastly above cited. ” Ha replied ‘“ it came from the same source which I declined to state yesterday for reasons given at the time. ” But this question he was ordered to answer, and persisting in his refusal to do s0, he was committed, and it is this commitment that is before me.
Counsel for the Crown distiguishes this last question from the one preceding it; he says Judge Ducas was right in sustaining the petitioner’s ubjection to answer those and right in rejecting his objection to answer this, because the former questions all had reference to articles wherein were included charges against many others besides the Mayor, but this latter referred only to the promissory note for $4,200 and the memo, thereto attached, that having been convicted of libelling the Mayor, he could not be indicted again for the same offence, whereas he could be still indicted for the libels in those articles contained, against tae other parties mentioned. Il is, however, not very clear, on the face of the matter, as it comes before me, that these two documents are to be held to refer to the Mayor onlv:the
La:
note as printed professes to be signed A. E., the memo,. B. C., apparently different persons. Pat, from the whole tenor of the petitioner’s depositior, and of the entire of both articles to which it relates, it ssems manifest te me, or to say the least extremel; probable, that there is the most intimate connection between all the documents and that they all came to the petitioner from the same source. This isin fact precisely what the petitioner has sworn to, when he says: “ IL came from the same source which I declined to staie yesterday.” If then, it was correct, as counsel for the Crown admits it was, and as I have no doubt it was, to justify the witness in refusing to give the source from which he received the whole of information oral and documentary, it seems to me to necessarily follow that it would have been right to justify such refusal to disclose the source, whence he derived a part, as, manifestly, having got all from one source, the moment he disclosed whence he obtained a part, he, by the same answer, revealed whence he got the whole. It would be therefore precisely as dangerous for him to reply to this last question, on which he has been sent to prison, as it would have been, to reply to those wbich he was oxcused from answering.
Then again, as was earnestly contented by petitioner’s counsel at the argument before me — it appears probable that several persons were concerned in the getting together of these documents, and the publication of these articles, which have already been adjudged to be criminal libels ; and therefore all so concerned would be open to an indictment for a “ conspiracy to defame,” which is itself a misdemeanor distinct from the act of libelling, also a misdemeanor and an offence not merged therein.
In support of this proposition they have cited to me, Archbold’s Criminal Pratice & Pleading, Waterman'’s notes, vol. 3, p. 619, also Archbold’s Criminal Evidence, edition of 1878, p. 1012, to which may be added Bishop, on Criminal Law, vol. 1, No. 814,Vo. Merger, who says ‘‘ It therefore appears
LL #8. AN As |
A Ales O0, AD. AR AR ue
D ED pue
IARTICLE 2273.]
not to be strictly correct, on general principles, as laid down, or intimated in some American cases, which may still be binding in their own localities, a conspiracy, which isa misdemeanour, to commit a felony is, when executed, merged in the felony committed—a rule the avuthorities
agree, not applicable, when the object of tbe conspiracy isa misdemeanour.
It therefore seems that the question before me reduces itself to this : “ Can] say that the fear of prosecution which the petitioner says he enterlains, if he answers che question propounded to him, is such a plainly chimerical danger, that it ought not to be taken into account ? ” Before, however, considering this, I will for a moment allude to the mention in the deposition that « petitioner is ordered to answer, inasmucCh as it appears that his object to refusing to answer is not so much to avoid criminating himself, as to protect others.” This reason, I understand, is based on the reply made, by which he (it is said) needlessly disclosed that the note and mem», in question were procured from the same source, as the information on which the whole of the articles were published. But 1 cannot concur in this. If the fact be so, and, as I have said, the petitioner has sworn to it, and al! the probabilities indicate it; the danger existed quite independently of that answer, by which he brought the fact to the knowledge of the Judge. I have no doubt that the law will not compel a witness to give any aid whatsoever to the prosecution of himself, As to this I think the Case Of Burton v. Young, decided by Chief Justice Merrorrx and STUART, is a precedent applicable. As said in England, in ex-parte Reynolds, if the question could in any way form even one link in a chain, the one end of which would be the accusation and the other a conviction of the witness, a Judge would hesitate verv much before compelling the witness 10 answer. I think, therefore, the petitioner was right in drawing the attention of the Judge to the fact that, if he revealed the source from which he procured the note and
memorandum, he would practically direct the Crown how to find where he obtained the other documents and information, which that Court had already held he was not bound to do, because in doing s0 he might give information tending to his own incrimination,
Finally, the decision whether the allegation by the petitioner, that to reply to the question on which he has been imprisoned might tend to criminate him, is merely a pretence, involves the consideration and appreciation of allthe circumstances surrounding his position and the giving of his testimony. It would extend beyond the bounds of the time at my disposal, to indicate at any length the reasons which cause me to conclude that I cannot hold such to be the case. They will suggest themselves from the remarks which [have already made.
Briefly they may be condensed into these,
{st. The petitioner by his reply may give information which may lead to his prosecution for libelling others for a conspiracy to defame.
2nd. He may thereby give information leading to his prosecu:ion with others fur a conspiracy to defame,
8rd. I do not think that the possibility of such a result is in any way of that remote, almost, if I may so say, impossible character, which induced the Judges in Queen v. Boyes to order the witness to answer ; nor is the question put to the petitioner at all Like those apparently immaterial, indifferent questions which, in eæ-parte Reynolds, it was determined he could not refuse to reply to.
In my opinion, these two cases are, in principle, against the decision requiring the petitioner to answer the question, for his refusal to reply to which he stands committed.
I think if I sanctioned such a decision, I would very possibly violate a right of the petitioner, which has been termed in England à sacred right, and that I would certainly not give sufficient or due weight to that part of the holding in both these cases of Boyes and Reynolds, which declares that
“if the fact of the witness being danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed him judging for himself of the effect of any particular question.”
Having therefore given the matter very earnest, | may say very anxious consideration, [ have decided to order the petitioner’s discharge.
4 MI. Law Rep, Q. B. p.239. Kiefer vs. White- While an action heaa, C. d'App. M. 1886, Dorion, J. C, et of revendication of Monk, Ramsay, etc., JJ. some machincry Was going on, the plaintiff obtained an order of a juège, giving him provisional possession of the machinery. N evertheless, by collusion between the defendants, the property was put into the possession of Wikite, intervenant. The plaintiff having taken a rule for coutempt, the defendants and intervenant were ordered to give over the property within three days, which order was disobeyed.
Heup :—(Reforming the judgment of the Superior Court, M. L. R., 1 S. C. 288), that White was guilty of - vntempt, and should be fined 8100 ; but that it was no longer expedient to order him to give up the machinery, because in another action, in which judgment was rendered at the same roment as that on the rule, White was declared to be the lawful proprietor of the machinery.
The appeal was from a judgment of the Superior Court, Montreal (TascHerEaAu, J.), April 11, 1885, The jm45-"nt of the Court below is reported in M. L. R., 1 8. O. 288, See also the preceding report of Whitehead & Kiefer & White.
[May 25, 26, 1886.]
R. Laflamme, Q. C., for the appellant,
