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DROIT CIVIL

1. Traités, Vue générale d'un corps complet de législation, chap. xii Bonn ring, vol. lil, p. 1*9).

'1. Traites, Vue générale d'un corps complet de législation, chap. xiv (Bowring, vol. III, p. 18'»).

(Pp. 62-65) NOTES. 30:>

3. James Mill écrit .'Jurisprudence^ III) : a Âll righls, whea tlie essence of them is spoken of, are powers : powers to an individual, >vbich the gOTerning memberg of the community guarantee ; powers, more or less extensive, of making either a pcrson or a thing subseryient to Ihe gratification of bis desires. To be made to gratify the désire of an individual, is to be made to render him a service. And the term service may, fortunately, be applied to both persons and things. A man receives a ser>'ice from the field wbere it produces a crop, as well as from the servant and the horsc who ploughed it. In one meaning of tlie word service, it implies only active senricei or that rendered by the voluntar}' opérations of sentient beings. In tbe présent case, however, it is employed to dénote both active and passive services. Is is évident, that in every case in which anything inanimate is rendered subservient to the gratification of a désire, the service is, properly speaking, a passive service. It is also évident, that even animate beings are rendered subservient to the gratification of desires in a way H'hich may equally be called passive. — It is necessary torequest attention to the eiplanation which is hère given of the meaning in which the term service is to be employed ; as both the English and the Roman law7ers use it in a very restricted sensé. Hère it is employed to dénote the whole of that ministrationto the gratification ofour desires, which weareentitled, in conséquence of rights, to dérive either from persons, or from things. Rights are powers, and the powers are mcans for the obtaining of services. M'e bave now, therefore, a language, by the help of which we may speak with tolerable clearness. — Dans Y Introduction j Bentham distingue entre droits sur choses et droits sur services : chap. xvi, xxxv : (Bowring, vol. I, p. 117) : with' regard to such of the ofTcnces against propcrty as concern only theenjoyment of the object in question, this object must bo either a service, or set of services, which should hâve been rendered by some person, or else an article belonging to tlie class of things. In the former case, the offence may be styled wrongful xvithholding of services. — Mais il ajoute une note qui laisse supposer que déjà il a conçu Tidée du changement de terminologie explicitement proposé par James Mill : ... Were the word services to be taken in its utmost latitude (négative included as well as positive) this one head would cover the whole law. To this place then nre to be referned such services only, the withholding of which does net coincide with any of the other o£fences, for which separate dénominations hâve been provided.— 3Iéme incertitude dans les 7raf/^s, où se trouve celte phrase (Quatrième titre du Code civil. Des services) : < L'Homme... peut être envisagé sous deux aspects, comme capable de recevoir les faveurs de la loi, et comme capable d'être soumis par elle à des obligations. Les choses ne peuvent que rendre des services : l'homme peut également les rendre et les recevoir». Et, chose caractéristique, Dumont supprime le second membre de phrase dans les éditions subséquentes.

4. TraitéSy Code Civil, 2« partie, chap. v (Bowring, vol. I, p. 339).

5. Traités, Code Civil, 2* partie, chap. ii (Bowring, vol. I, p. 333).

306 NOTES. (Pp. 65-76)

6. TraUés, Code Civil, 2e partie, chap. II, § ii(BowriDg, vol. I, p. 331).

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