y. Première Partie, chapitre troisième, II
i&. ConsL CodCf Book I, chap. u; Bowring, vol. IX, p. 9 : In every comoMinity in which a constitutiooal code, generally acknowledged te be in force, is in existence, a really existing constitutionai branch of law, and with it, as the oiTspnng of it, a constitution, is so Car in existence. — In no community in which no constitutionai code thus generally acknowledged to be in force, is in eoùstence, is any such branch of law as a constitutionai branch, or any such thing as a constitution, really in
16. Const. Code, Book I, chap. XVI, sect. vi; Bdwriiig, vdl. IX, pp. f2i-123. — Cf. Secttrities against Migrule; Bowring, vol. Vïll, p. 557; — l^nnonnal Fragments, chap. m; Bowring, vol. IH, pp. 217 sqq. ; — S<yphismes potUiqtMSy partie T, chap. Y. — Book of IFaKaciet, part. I, chap. m ; Bowring, vol. II, pp. 402 sqq.
17. Const. Code, Book I, chap. xvi^ Bowring, vol. IX, p. 123 : This définition l)eing destitute of ail référence to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the authority of Montesquieu bas no title to regard. He threw into the field of législation a few unconnected ligbts, but he had no clear conception of any one spot in it... Of happiness, he says nothing : instead of security for the people against their rolers, he talks of liberty, and assumes without directly saying so, that to establish the most perfect liberty is the proper ôbject of ail government : whereas gMeanment cannot opemte but ai the expeoBe of liberty, and then and Aammly is liberty perfèct, where no governmeot bas place. — Cf. Westmitmter Heview, n* V, janv. 1«25, art. II. Montlosier^ Frmch Monarduy. — Montlosier est une sorte de wkig français, et le critique, à piofioB de son livre, discute le libéralisme aristocratique. Voir en particulier, p. 37 : Liberty is a most convenient word to be used for despotic purposes. It ^idmits of any définition which it may suit him who employs it to adopt. « Our fathers », says Mr. Montlosier, « enjoyed liberty in ils fullest estent ». Our fcOhers, too, iscomfortably vague. —Cf. JkonUÀogy, Part ii^ diap. I, vol. n, p. 69 : The word libéral is one of vague and varions hfterpretaftiooB. It is applied, with différent meanings, to thougfats, words and actions... in the polltical field, libéral and liberalism are used as selflaudatory terms by a party in the state, and are generally associated, in the neoniog of tfaose who employ them, with the original idea of liberty, — libérais, the advocates of liberty ; liberalism, the principles of liberty applied to public life. There are few words which, with îts dérivations, hâve foeen more mischievous than this word liberty. When it means anylliing beyond mère caprice and dogmatism, it means goed govermnent;
436 NOTES. (Pp. 184-186)
and if good governmcnt had had the good fortaoe to occupy the sa me place in the public mind which lias been occupied by the vague entitj ealled libcrty, the crimes and follies which hâve disgraced and retarded the progress of political improvemcnt would hardly hâve beeo committed. The usual dclinition of liberty — thaï it is theright to do every thiog that the laws du nut forbid — shows with what carelessuess words are nsed in ordinary discoursc or composition ; for if the laws are bad^ what becomes of liberty? and if the laws are good, where is its value? Good laws havo a delined, intelligible mcaning ; they pursue an obvioiisly uscfùl end by obviously appropriate means. When madame de Roland undertook to distinguish liberty from licence, she flattered the ear bj allitt^ration, but brought no satisfaction to the understanding.
18. Const. Code, Book I, chap. viii; Bowring, vol. IX, p. 41 : As this tribunal (the public-opinion tribunal), by the counterforce, which, byits punitive power, it applies to the power of govemment, contributes to kei^p it in check, and keep its course wilhin the paths indicatod by the grcatcst happiness principle. . . so may it, in no inconsiderable degree, by its rcmunorating power. — Const. Code^ Book I, chap. IX; Bowring, vol. IX, p. 50 : By the force of that particular interest to the action of ^hicb every human breast stands exposed, every functionary is, at every moment, promptcd as above.to make by himself, or to concur in making, thesinister 8acriûct\ If this sinister force can by any means be prevented from bccoming in that way efTeclive, it must be by the opération of some countorforce, in addition to that opposed by his share in the universal interest: self-pn^ferenco or sinister force the temptation, counterforce the sanction, antagoniting with one another.
19. Coixsi. CixiCy Book I, chap. \vi; Bowring, vol. IX, p. 121 : True itis, that on this oiwision, as on any othor« it may happen, and is likelj to hapivn, to the suffrages of the suprême constitutive authority, to be dividiHl. But this is an iuconvonieniv the existence of which is in the ver}nature of the cax\
iiK hrit. Mus, add. mss., 35, 145, ff. 101 sqq. — Voici les questions )H>s. es à Hume, et transmises par Hume à Tlace ^9 oct. 1829/ : Do you, as a IVnthamite, hi>Id iliat the wills of ihe majority should rule and direct ihe minont> ? ^es. — If 29 of a ixvmmunity. say of 30, agrée that it would U' a feasl and afford pleasure to them lo roast the 30th, are they not wamnted b> the « («encrai Happiness x prioiiple, to roast and eat that v>ne, and en>ure llie grfvtest happiness of ihe greatest number? — Do tbe lVnthamitt:s Iwld that ihe 4 greatest liappiness > of every commuuity ought îo he attained at ihe sacnûiv vf ihe uTifôrinnate minorîty? — If so. mijzht not the mayriiy of am eomniîiniîy mbo are the poorest agrée lo *aWe ail the l.inds and pri-fiCTiy of xtiv fru -vA of iheir number and share :Vie eilinsi^e piv^penx c-f ihe few amon^i ûtt miny ? and would not that
(Pp. 188-189) NOTES. 437
be in perfect accordancc ^ith the principles of the Benthamites? — If so, ivhat a scène of confusion and oppression woald follow ?
21. Liberty of the PresSy pp. 22 sqq : When varions conclusions are formed among a namber of men, upon a subject on which it would be unsafe, and therefore improper, to give any minor portion of them a power of determining for the rest, only one expédient reniai ns. Fortnnately, that is an expédient, the opération of which is powerful, and its effects bénéficiai in the highest degree. AU the conclusions which bave formed themselves in the minds of différent individuals, shouldbe openly adduced ; and the power of comparison and choice should be granted to ail . Where there is no motive to attach a man to error, it isnatural to him to embrace the tmth; especially if pains are taken to adapt the explanation to bis capacity. Every man, possessed of reason, is accustomed to weigh évidence, and to be gulded and determined by its prépondérance. When various conclusions are, with thcir évidence, presented with equal care and with equal skill, there is a moral certainty, though some few may be misguided, tbat the gréa ter number will judge right, and that the greatest force of évidence, wherever it is, will produce the greatest impression; — p. 23: ... When ali opinions, true and false, are equally declared, the assent of the greater number, when their intercsts are not opposed to them, may always be expected to be given to the true.
22. CoMt. Code, Book I, chap. ii ; Bowring, vol. IX, p. 10. The concurrence of ail in the effective désignation of the individual, by whom the share in question in the operative power shall be posseased, not being possible, wherever the wishes of one part of those by whom the suffrages are given, point to one person, while the wishes of another part point to another, the ne\t most désirable resuit, with préférence to the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is that instead of being exercised by the whole number, the power shall be exercised by the greater part of it ; such being the most désirable resuit, such accordingly is the actual resuit.
23. Const. Codef Book I, chap. ix; Bowring, vol. IX, p. 62 : While confidence is minimized, let not power be withheld. Forsecurity against breach of trust, the sole apt remedy is, — on the part of the trustées, not impotence, but constant responsibility, and as towards their creators — the authors of their political being — on every occasion, and at ail times, the strictest and most absolute dependence.
