NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES

Thèse great countries contain three millions of people, and are for thousands of miles conterminous with the United States. It is évident that no forces sent from home can be supposed to undertake the defence of this vast line of territory. The security of the inhabitants rests chiefly on their own patriotism and valor, of which they hâve already, whenever required, afforded brilliant and successful examples. The principle was propounded by Earl Grey in 1851, and was repeated by the Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary for War, and Sir George Grey, as Colonial Sccretary in 1854, that in Canada the fortified city of Québec, and the fort of Kingston, with perhaps one or two outlying posts between Montréal and the frontier, should be garrisoned by the gênerai troops of the empire, but that no more ought to dcvolve on the gênerai Government. This proposition was acquiesced in by the authorities of Canada without a murmur, and they hâve set about active measures, at a considérable charge to themselves, for rendering their militia efficient. The harbour of Halifax is as much a station important to the gênerai power of the nation as any of the places which hâve been enumerated in the list of military posts. It is only just that its garrison should be provided for out of the Impérial funds; nor could the province of Nova Scotia, which is far from wealthy, be expected to tax itself for such a purpose, merely because this valuable Impérial post happens to be situated within its limits.

This complètes a review of the principal groups of Colonies. The following results may, I think, be drawn from it: —

First. That in British North America and Australia, being the chief assemblages of European communities, a gênerai and intelligible principle about military expenditure is already established.

In conclusion, I must express my regret for the length of this examination of the différent Colonies, but it seemed to me that the true nature of the difficulties to be met could not be shown by any shorter process. What has to be salved is not one problem, but many. I despair of discovering upon them any self-acting rule which shall be a substitute for the judgment and firmness of the Ministers of the Crown for the time being. They will doubtiess always be guided by a policy, but they can hardly expect to despatch such complicated and arduous questions by a single maxim. To deal with cases on their merits, to labor patiently ag-ainst opposition in some quarters, and to welcome and reciprocate co-operation from others: thèse, in so wide and diversified a

sphère as the British Colonies, appear to me tasks and duries inséparable from the function of governing, which can never be superseded by the machinery of a system however ably conceived or logically constructed.

(Signed) T. FREDERICK ELLIOTT.

Rapport de la Commission parlementaire (*)

(Extraits)

The SELEC* COMMITTEE appointed on Colonial Military Expenditure, to inquire and Report whether any and what Altérations may be advantapeously adopted in regard to the Defence of the British Dependencies, and the proportions of Cost of such Defences a* now defrayed from Impérial and Colonial Funds respectively : — Hâve considered the Matters to them referred, and hâve agrreed to the following: Report : —

I. The dependencies of the British Empire (exclusive of India, to which your Committee hâve not extendcd tbeir investigations) may be divided, for the purpose of this Inquiry, into two classes : —

lst. Those which may properly be called "Colonies." To this class belong the North American and South African Colonies, the West Indies, Ceylon, Mauritius, New Zealand, and the Australian Colonies, with the exception of Western Australie.

2d. Military garrisons, naval stations, convict dépôts, and dependencies maintained chiefly for objects of Impérial policy. To this class belong Malta, Gibraltar and the Ionian Islands, Hong Kong, Labuan, Bermuda, the Bahamas, St Helena, and the Falklands, Western Australie, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and the Gold Coast. Throughout their inquiry, your Committee hâve deemed it essentiel to keep in view the distinction to be drawn between thèse two classes.

9. Taking into considération the facts disclosed by the évidence laid before them, your committee are of opinion that no uniform rule, as to the cost or mode of their military defence, can be laid down which shall be applicable alike to communities so various as those which compose the British Colonial Empire; but, following the classification adopted at the commencement of their Report, it appears to your Committee that, as to the second class of dependencies above defined, the responsibility and main cost of their defence properly devolves on the Impérial Government.

10. With respect to the dependencies properly called "Colonies," and to which any recommandations hereinafter to be made as to the mode cr cost of Colonial defence exclusively relate, the practical application of such recommendations, both as to time and place, must necessarily be left to the discrétion of Her Majesty's Government, having regard to the local resourcea of each dependency, to its dansera from external attack, and to the gênerai exigencies of the empire. With this réservation, it appears to your Committee that the responsibility and cost of the military defence of such dependencies ought mainly to devolve upon themselves.

Your Committee further submit the following gênerai suggestions as arising from the évidence laid before them: —

II. That it is inexpedient that the proportions of cost of Colonial defence to be borne by the Impérial and Colonial Governments respectively, should be the subject of negotiations with the various dependencies, but that évidence has been given, tending to show that the mode of proceeding adopted by Lord Grey in 1851, in announcing to the Australian Colonies the terms on which alonc Impérial troops could be sent there, may be gradually applied to other dependencies.

19. In conclusion, yoar Committee submit that the tendency of modem warfare U to strike blows at the heart of a hostile power; and that it is therefore désirable to concentrate the troops required for the defence of the United Kingdom as much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for securing- against foreig-n at;trreasi*n the distant dependencies of the Empire.

llth July. 1861.

(1) Sessional Papers, 1862, No. 17, — deuxième partie.