MONTREAL, 30 MAY
Coram Davy, J., Monpezer, (C.) J., CHABOT, J. N°. 34.
Languedoc et ux., vs. Laviolette.
Held,—1. That by the law of nations a marriage, contracted and s0lemnized according to the laws of the country where it is so contracted and solemnmzed, is binding and valid everywhere.
2. That in inasmuch as the laws ofthe State of New-York, where the plaintiffs were married. recognize the validity of marriages between
minors, Without the aid of their parents or tutors, the fact of one of the plaintiffs being a minor and uuassisted by her Tutor, and of both parties being residents of Lower Canada, cannot invalidate the marriage thus solemnized between them.
. That inasmuch as the matrimonial domicile of the plaintiffs was in Lower Canada, the effect of the marriage in the State of Bew-York, without an antenuptial contract,was to produce a communauté de bin.
4, ‘l'hat a subsequert marriage in Lower Canada, preceded by a cortract stipulating séparation de biens, can in no way atfect the civi rights of the parties under the first marriage.
5. That the fact of the defendant in his capacity 6f Tutor to one of the plaintiffs having been a party to the contract, and present nt the se cond mnarriage, is nor bar to his pleading the non=validity of such contract and second marriuge, and that the fact of his being a cre ditor of the husband entitles AT in law 80 to plead,
6. That it is incompetent for either of the married parties themselves 10 ; lead the nullity of their first marriage.
This was an action of account brought by the female p'aintiff, assisted by her husband, against the defendant, her former tutor. She sued as séparée de biens by contract of mariage of 23rd October, 1849, passed at Sherrington, Lower Canada. :
The defendant, in effect, pleaded that the plaintiff had been maried at Cain oluit, in the State of New- York, in September, 1849 ; that, at that time, Lower Canada was their domicile ; that from their marriage, without an antenuptial contract, in Champlain, a communauté de biens became established between them ; that the plaintiff had censequently no right to maintain her action à titre de séparée de biens ; that her alleged contract of 234 October, 1849, was null, beiug post nuptial ; that the delendant had a legal interest to urge this, inasmuch as he was à creditor to the extent of £300 cy., ofthe plaintifPs husband, with whom alone he intended to account as chef oï the communauté refered to.
The plaintiffs by special answer, denied that they ever contracted any valid marriage except the one of October, 1849 ; that supposing the marriage of September to have taken place at Champlain, it was null, not having been preceded and accompanied by the formalities required by the Laws of Lower Canada where the plaintiffs were domiciled ; that in September the female plaintiff was a minor, and that her marriage in Champlain was without the consent of defendant, her tutor, and not preceded by pub'ication of banns, nor celebrated by the proper curé of the parties, nor in conformity with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, te which toth the contracting parties at the time belonged ; that besides all this, the defendant having become (as
one of the tatthe seity of such ving a cre=
hemselves
the faainst the séparée October,
plaintiff of Newe, Lower eir Mmaramplain, between no right e biens ; 849, was t had à he was à laintiffs account
that they t the one rriage of in, it was mpanied of Lower ed ; that inor, and thout the preceded the propwith thé hich toth red ; that come (as
he had) party to the marriage contract of Octobet 1849, and present and consenting to such contract and the mariage which followed it, could not legally set up the nullity of such contract.
At Enquête, both marriages of the plaintiffs were proved ; the first at Champlain, before a minister of the gospel, according tn the laws of the State of New-York ; and the second in Lower Canada, before the propre curé of the parties. No publicaion of banns was proved to have been made before the New- York marriage, nor did it appear whetherthe minister of the gospel was a Roman Catholic or a Protestant one. No proof was made that defendant had not consented tothe New-York marriage. The law of the State of New-York was proved to the effect that publication of banns and consent of parents were unnecessary there, and that any minister of the gospel could marry, as in this case.
At the hinal argument, Cherrier, Q. OC! for plaintiffs, contended that it was by the laws of Lower Canada that the question should be determined whether the New York marriage referred to was valid or null ; that in the present case the Court needed not even to pass upon that question, for defendant could not be heard to attack the separation stipulated in the contract of October—a contract to which he had been « party—(Louet. Lettre N, No. 6, Lemerle, Fins de non recevoir, Page 192): that by that contract the defendant had, as it were, consented that the female plaintiff should enjoy her property separately and be fiee from her husband”’s debts. He contended further that the marriage in New York was subject to the laws of Lower Canada, in respect of the capacity of the combracting parties, and their état ; that it was null, being the marriage ofa minor without authorization of her tutor, and without the presence of her proper curé, and without dispensation. (Pothier, Mar. 69, 149, 349, 355 ; Guyot, Rep. Vo Mariage, P. 368, there cited.)
Mackay, for defendant, argued that ifthe plain-
tiff”s pretensions were maintained, husband and wife could advantage themselves after marriage ; they might set aside the droit public, and might defeat creditors; the éfat of persons could be held as various as contestations, one to-day and another tomorrow. Trouble would be cast into thonsands of tamilies in Upper and Lower Canada were this marriage in New-York declared a nullity, as contended for by the plaintiffs.
He argued that the New-York marriage was perfectly good, and certainly could not be set aside upon es | the prayer of the two parties married ; particularly
à considering that they allege no error, fiaud, or mista- 14 ke. As well might one ot the plaintiffs agaiust the 1 other be received to have that marriage declared ne | null. Ifthe New York marriage was goud, the after k marriage contract of plantiffs was nuil—prohibited
k by the droit public, —particularly doing away with 4 (as it does) our droit commun, substituting the cor:- 1 ventions of the parties for that droit commun. He g argued also that the ordinances relied upon by plain- ES tifis had fallen into desuetude in France, before the # conquest, (Pothier, Mar. No. 324) ; at any rate, that he they were incapable of being enforced here under the British régime. That as tothe defendant?s having become party to the plaintiffs’ marriage contract of October, that could not prejudice the defendant, for this was a case aflecting the éfat des personnes, which, once formed, ouvrage de la loi, must remain as formed, (Lemerle, pp. 289 and 299 ; Boullenois, 4e Vol. 1, pp. 800, 801, 802.) The régime of plaintifis? LT marriage was the régime de communauté, and that plaintifls’ action was misconceived, and must be dismissed.
Ar‘'orities cited for defendant to the effect that Plaintiffs could not allege against their New-York marriage : Merlin, Rep. octavo edition, Vol, 19, P. 480 ; Pothier, Contr. de Mar. 229, 333, 336 ; Cochin, octavo edition, Volume ?, P. 291.
Cherrier, in reply, cited Merlin, Vo. Religion-
serment: à
NU
OS SDS a dites gg
and wife ge ; they ht defeat Id as vaother to.
nsands of this marontended
was perside upon articulariy , or mistabainst the
declared
the after brohibited way with > the cor:nun. He by pluinbetore the rate, that ere under aut’s have contract lefendant, personnes; ist remain joullenois, plaintiffs?
, and that ust be dis-
effect that New-York ol. 19. P.
; Cochin,
Religion-
‘tion.
naire, S. 6 ; Pandectes Franç., Tom. 3 ; Félix, Rev. de Leg. 1, Vol. 8. P. 639.
Day, J.-—The only difficulty in my mind from the beginning has been as to the right of the Tutor ta raise such an issue. As a general rule, the defendant wonld have no legal in that capacity to raise such a question ; but he is here sued personally and not as a Tutor,and his interest is plainly shewn by his alleging that the male plaintiff owes him a considerable sum of money, which, if the plaintiffs be communs en biens, he has a right to set off, pro tanto, against any reliquat de compte claimed by the present action. The defendant is not contesting the validity ofthe plaintiffs’ marriage, but on the contrary is maintaining the validity of such marriage, and simply contending for the nullity of the contract entered into after it was legally solemnized. With
‘regard to the fact that the conclusien of the declara-
tion are taken in favor of the | api conjointly, I would merely remark, that this cannot alter the nature of ihe action, which is plainly one in the in-
‘terest of the wife alone.
Now, as to the proof of the first mariage, two witnesses swear to the ceremony and to its being performed in all respects in accordance with the laws of the State of New-York, where the marriage was
celebrated. The only question which can arise,
therefore, is as to the legal effect of such a marriage
‘on the civils rights of the parties ; and it has been
well setticd, that ihe matrimonial domicile of the parties mus govern the determination of the ques- In the present case, not only was the matrimonial doraicile in Lower Canada, but the parties themselves residea ere immediately before and subsequent to their marriage ; 80 that there can be no doubtithat the effect of the marriage was to establish a communauté de biens between the contracting parties. As to the ground contended for by the plaintiffs, that these parties shouid have been mmarrme
se rés
D our HE CN Eat TRES
ied by the curé of their parish, and that no marriage otherwise celebrated could produce any civil effect, it is undoubted that such was formerly the law cf France ; but it is equally undoubted that that law was based on a union of civil and eeclesiastical rule, which was peculiar to France, and which never has obtained in this country. Here there is an absolute freedom, as regards thought and form of religion. There is nothing to prevent a Protestant getting married by a Romish Church, and vice versa. ‘The Acts of Parliament moreover, authorizing all sorts of sects to marry, are in no way restrictive as to the peculiar religion of the parties. The law gives them full power, in broad language, tomarry. And then as to the fact of the marriage having been celebrated in one of the adjoining States, there can be no doubt, that, according to the law of nations, if the marriage were legally contracted and celebrated there, it is binding here ; and, as I said before, it has been abundantly proved that the marriage in question was duly contracted and solemnized in accordance with the laws of the State where it was celebrated. Moreover the want of consent on the part of the tutor or guardian, which has been so much relied upon in the argument of the plaintifl’s counsel, cannot legally be urged by the parties themselves, but only by some one standing în loco parentis. On the wlole, therefore, the majority of the Court is of opinion to dismiss the present action,
Chabot, J. Dissentiens. La présente action est en reddition de compte portée par les Demandeurs contre le Défendeur comme ci-devani tuteur de la Demanderesse. Le Défendeur par sa défense invoque la nullité du second mariage et celle du contrat de mariage des Demandeurs, vû l’existence d’un premier mariage dans l’Etat de New-York, qui a eu lieu devant un ministre protestant et sans aucune autorisation du Tuteur.--Le Défendeur était présent à ce second mariage qui a eu lieu devant un prêtre catholique, et je considère qu’il ne peut pas
harriäge l'effect,
law cf law was al rule, bver has absolute religion.
ettin
Le The all sorts as to the ives b Sand een celcan be s,ifthe ebrated efore, it riage in d in ace it was ton the been so laintifl’s parties ; in loco jority of t action.
tion eet andeurs ur de la 2n6e in du conistence ork, qui ans auait prévant un eut pas
attaquer ce mariage. Le mariage célébré dans l’Etat de New-York a-t-il produit des eflets civils ? Pour pouvoir décider cette question il aurait fallu que ce mariage eut été prouvé ; or il ne l’a été que ar un seul témoin, qui a identifié les parties, et les rocureurs ont eonsenti à ce que cette déposition valut comme deux dépositions dans la cause.
Je considère ce consentement nul, vû qu’il s’agit d'établir une question d’ordre public, car il en est de même de la preuve de tout fait qui a rapport à une : paration de corps et au cas où le divorce est prononcé dans les pays où 1l a lieu.
Je suis d’opinion que le muriage donne droit à la reddition de compte et que les conclusions qui ont été prises par les Demandeurs sont suffisantes.
Mondelet, J. Le Défendeur a intérêt à demander la nullité du second mariage, attendu qu’il est prouvé qu’il est le créancier du Demandeur pour £300.
Le premier mariage est bon, car si un mariage est contracté dans un pays civilisé d’après les lois de ce
ays, il est considéré bon par le droit des gens. De l'Etat de New-York où le premier mariage a été célébré, un mariage entre une miueure et un majeur ou même entre deux mineurs sans l’assistance ou le consentement de leurs parents ou tuteurs devant un ministre protestant est valable ; car telle est la loi de cet Etat.
L’article 40 de l’ordonnance de Blois ne prononce pas même de nullité quant aux mariages qui ne sout pas accompagnés des formalités qui j' sont indiquées.
Pothier, malgré ses eflorts pour en induire une nullité, n’a pas réussi à la constater.
La déclaration de 1697 est la seule loi en France (1) qui prononçait la nullité du mariage, lorsqu'il avait été fait sans publication de bans ou dispense d’iceux et sans le consentement de leurs père ou mère ou tuteur pour les mariages des mineurs ; mais elle n’est pas en force en Canada, vû qu’elie n’a
ns
eee
(1) Pothier, Traité du Contrat de Mariage, No. 337, 361
re nl
jamais été enregistrée au Conseil Supérieur de Québec, or on ne trouve aucune autre loi pour déclarer un mariage nul sous de telles circonstances, mais en supposant même que ces ordonnances comportaient une nullité à l’époque de leur promulgation qui était plus ou moins rapprochée de celle de la révocation de l’Edit de Nantes en 1685, il faut admettre que deux français catholiques qui auraient dér assé la frontière et qui se seraient mariés en Angleterre sans publication de bans devant le curé de leur paroisse ou un autre prêtre, l’auraient été valablement ; car ces or-
donnances ne s’appliquaient qu’aux mariages contrac-
tés en France, et l’on peut se convaincre de l’existence de cette doctrine en référant au traité du Contrat de mariage par Pothier No. 348, où il rapporte ce qui s’est passé dans le Coucile de Trente au sujet des mariages clandestins.
Un des effets civils qu’a produit le premier mariage des demandeurs dans l’État de New-York esi Ja communauté de biens entr’eux. La “outume « Paris en déciarant la nullité des contre-letires fr: pe de nullité le contrat de mariage qui a été fait après ce premier mariage. [1 1e peut y avoir qu’un seu: mariage qui puisse produir: de: effets civils et non un second, si l’un est en eéoniit avec l’autre. La présence du tuteur au second snariage ne peut pas avoir eu l’effet de valider ce qui ne peut pas produire d’effets civils.
The following are the reasons of the judgement :—
“The Court * * ** considering that the plaintiffs have failed to show that by reasons of the pretended contract of mariage in the said declaration, set toith and alleged to have been executed on the twentythird day of October, ia the year ot our Lord 1849, or by reason of any other matter or thing in the said ‘eclaration alleged, and by Jaw any separation as 10 property, séparation de biens, between the said Jouise Angélique Adele Beaudry, one of the plainul, and the said George Languedoc, the other of
de Qué- ‘larer un mais en bortaient qui était sation de lue deux frontière publica- Du un auces orscontracle l’exisdu Conrapporte au sujet
diet MA- -York esi itume es Jr: pe lait après u’un seu Ïs et non
l’autre.
> ne peut | pas pro-
ment :— plaintiffs retended set loith twentyord 1849, the said ration as the said he plainother of
the plaintiffs, was at any time before the institution of this action established or did subsist, or that she the said plaintiff was entitled to the separate enjoyment and administration of her property and estate, inasmuch as the plaintiffs long before the execution of the said pretended contract of mariage—that is to say, on the 25th September, 1849—had contracteul and besn conjoined in lawful marriage at Champlain in the State of New-York, one of United States of America, according co the laws in force in that State ; and by reason of the said marriage on the said 25th September, 1849, and under and by virtue of the laws in force in Lower Canada, where the plaint'fts for a lou:: time before had been and then were, and ever siice have been resident and domiciled, a comraunity of property, communauté de biens, was established and doth subsist by and between the said George Languedoc and Louise Angélique Adèle Beaudry, his wilte ;
Aud considering that the defendant hath alleged and proved that he hath an interest and right by law to except to and contest the validity and legal effect of the said pretended contract of mariage, and that by reason of the premises and by law the action of the plaintiffs founded upon the said pretended contract of marriage, and more especially upon the clause and stipulation of separation as to property, séparation de biens, therein contained, ought not:t0 be maintaired in the manner and form in which the same has been instituted, maintaining the exception by the defendant in this cause pleaded, doth dismiss the action of the plaintiffs with costs.
‘ Reserving to the plaintiffs such recourse as by law they may be entitled to.?
Cherrier, Dorion & Dorion, for the plaintiffs.
Cartier & Berthelot, for the defendant.
R. MacKay, Counsel.
CR. McK.) (5. B.) (P. R. L.)
