acte ayant trait à cette élection, ou de montrer cause au il j

bref est adressé, est tenu de rapporter le bref au jour in- Vi diqué, avec un certificat sur ce bref de l’exécution qu'il a | ' reçue. | |!

1027. Dans le cas où il s’agit d’une élection à faire pa” k {

une porporstian à une charge vacante à raison de ce que :

contraire.

ont Ibid. s. 14, $ 2. F

qu'un 1028. La personne à laquelle le bref de mandamus soit

primitif ou péremptoire est adressé, suivant les disposi. tions de l’article qui précède, ne peut cependant procéder à cette élection sans en donner avis public par écrit dans les langues française et anglaise, et cet avis doit être affché pendant l’espace d'au moins dix jours avant le jour fixé pour l'élection, et ce à la porte de l’église de la localité Où la corporation à son principal bureau ou le siége de ses affaires, et s’il n'y a pas d'église, à l'un des endroits les plus publics de cette localité.

Ibid, s. 14, $ 8.

1029. Néanmoins telle élection et tout acte y relatif est invalide, à moins qu'il ne soit présent à l'assemblée et y prenne part, le nombre de voteurs qui aurait été requis, si l'élection s'était faite à l'époque et dans les circonstances ordinaires.

Ibid, $ 5.

Ad ul 24x 1030. Ce bref péremptoire est signifié de la même mafat‘ nière qué le bref d'erreur ou d'appel.

| Voir Lusignan, v. Mandamus : aussi Robertson, eo, verb, La cour supérieure n’a pas le pouvoir d'accorder un bref de mandamus pour

faire émaner une licence sous l'acte 37 Vict. ch. 3.— Privat vs. Sexlon, 18 L. OC. J. 192,

À DES PROHIBITIONS. 1031, Le bref de prohibition.est adressé à tout tribunal

J Ye À à Sinférieur qui excéde sa juridiction.

ASS Il est poursuivi, obtenu et exécuté, comme le bref de

Klaus et avec les mêmes formalités, in S. R. B. OC. c. 89, s. 1.—2 Wharton, L. Lex, 832. d N ë N Voir 35 parte ch. 6, sect. 21, sous l’article 998, anle. col Voir Lusignan, v. prohibilion. the Le bref de prohibition adressé à une corporation doit l'être à elle-même en the son nom corporatif, ét noû pas aux officiers publics qui le composent.--Lan- go dry vs. Mignaull, 13 L. C. J, 325, confirmé en appel, 15 L. C: J. 65. ret — Voir Le Maire el al., de Montréal e: Benny, 16 L. C. J. 1, et Duval vs. lébert, 17 he ES L C.J. 229.—aussi Girard vs. Bilanger, 17 L. C. J 36. go Un bref de prohibition ne peut être accordé contre une corporation munici- ; pale pour faire suspendre les procédures. sur un-bref de saisis émano par le wr

Y maire pour le paiement de RARE Blain, 18 L. CO. J. 180.

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Inre Armstrong et la Corporation de Sorel, le Juge Loranger a maintenu un bref de prohibition pour suspendre les procédures d'une municipalité pour exécution pour taxes, La cour d'appel a renversé ce jugement, mais, on verra par les remarques suivantes des savants Juges, lors du jugement, que la cause, ex-parte Blain, ci-dessus citée, pourrait bientôt ètre overruled.

Montreal, December, 1875.

Corporation of Sorel, Appelants, and Armstrong, Respondent.—Ramsay, J., dissenting.—It was a question whether a writ of prohibition would lie estrain a municipal corporation from proceeding to execute a judgm for unpaid taxes. The case was not without difficulty, Authorities were not to be found in England on the particular point; the court was forced, therefore, to have recourse to abstract reasoning. His Honor referred to the clause of the Act of Incorporation of the town of Sorel, with respect to the levying of assessments, It appéared that the respondent's goods were seized upon a process or warrant, signed by the Mayor, not exactly for the assessed taxes, but for work done under one of the by-laws. The respondent had several defences. He-said he was not proprietor of the land ; and further, that if he owed anything he had a claim against the corporation for a certain sum, He applied to the court, at Sorel, for a writ of prohibition, and Judge Loranger gave judgment declaring the prohibition valid and binding: The question came up whether this was a case for a writ of prohibition. As remarked before, there was no authority exactly in point. The general rule of the code was that writs of prohibition are addressed to inferior courts when they exceed their jurisdiction. The ground taken by the appellants wus that they were not an inferior jurisdiction ; and secondly, that (hey had not exceeded their jurisdiction. The question arose, what did the article of the code mean by the term court? Was it not what was meant in England hy a ‘ jurisdiction ? ” His Honor thought there could be no question it was a jurisdiction that was meant, not a Court, and when the Mayor issued a warrant it was a jurisdiction, The next question was whether an erroneous judgment could be the subject of prohibition. In general terms, it might be admitted that an erroneous judgment of an inferior court was not a subject prohibition, —for example, a bad judgment of the circuit oourt could not be prohibited by Lbe superior court. But this principle ceased to have any application if it turned out that the jurisdiction and the rightful exercise of the Jurisdiction were co-extensive, His Honour referred to the case of the Mayor. of London and Cox, ? H. L,. 239, in which it was held that a person sued in an inferior court can bring an action of prohibition before pleading in the inferior court, if the prohibition be sought on the ground of an.absolute want of jurisdiction in the inferior court. The view his Honor took was that an erroneous judgment was not the subject of prohibition, unless the erroneous judgment went to the root of the case. There were authorities which said a writ of prohibition would not go where there was another remedy. That meant'an easy and a complete remedy. Here there was'no other easy and complete remedy., Upon the whole, he came to the conclusion that the judgment;of Mr. Justice Loranger was a good judgment and ought to be maintained.

Dorion, C. J.—There was not much difficulty as to the principle on which a writ.of prohibition should issué., It was admitted'on all hands that the writ

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could only issue to an inferior tribunal when it exceeded its jurisdiction, In this case the corporation of Sorel had passed a by-law and made an assessment, Inthat assessment they had put Armstrong down as proprietor of certain lands. That assessment, the law said, became a judgment, because as soon at it was made the corporation might get the Mayor to issue a warrant to levy the amount. The assessment, therefore, was a judgment for the amount. Suppose the corporation had sued Armstrong in the circuit Co recover this amount, and the latter had pleaded, I am not proprietor oft lands—which was the plea in this case—and the Circuit Court had decided that he was proprietor, and condemned him to pay the amount, and upon execution being issued, Armstrong had applied for a writ of prohibition, It would not be pretended that the writ could issue, and yet that would be precisely what was attempted here. It was said the lots were not in the town of Sorel ; but there could be no doubt that they were in the town, and the commonalty had decided that Armstrong was the proprietor of the lots. They were within their jurisdiction in so deciding, They had imposed a tax upon proprietors within the town of Sorel, which they had a right to do. But Armstrong said, you have wrongly decided that I was proprietor, and therefore, 1 have a right to take a writ of prohibition. The majority of the court were of opinion that in this case the corporation acted strictly within the limits of its corporate rights, and that if it erred at all it was in a matter over which it had complete jurisdiction.

Sanborn, J., remarked that the majority of the court in holding that the writ did not lie, must not be supposed to decide that the writ would not lie in any case. That principle had been laid down by the court of review in the case of Blaine and corporation of Granby, but the court here did not go the lenglh of saying whether that was right or not. The Municipal council had a right to determine this matter by the rules of their charter, and if they did not violate their charter there was no writ of prohibition against them. So long as they followed the provisions of their act of incorporation the writ of pro. hibition did not reach them. ‘

Judgment reversed,

Jugé :—Qu'un conseil municipal est un tribunal inférieur dans certains cas, tel que dans la collection des taxes etc., et quand il excède ses pouvoirs, dans ces cas, le bref de prohibition peut être accordé.—Pentland vs. La Corporation d'Hébertville, C. S. Québec, Décembre, 1875.

1032. Dans tous les cas où les droits d’une corn: municipale sont en question, tout électeur ayant de voter est compétent à rendre témeignage.

1035. Il y a appel de tout jugement final rendu en vertu des dispositions contenues en ce Chapitre, à la cour du ,

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